Rencontre du Parr Center, de la Chaire Hoover et du CRÉ

27 avril 2020

9:30 Refia Kadayifçi (Chaire Hoover) – « Neutrality of Effects and Discrimination Law »

10:15 Manuel Valente (Chaire Hoover) – « The Age-based Right to a Pension, Old-Age Sufficiency and Differential Longevity »

11:05 Eric Boot (Chaire Hoover) – « What Is the ‘Public Interest’ and Why Do We Need It? »

13:00 Alex Campbell (Parr Center) – « Lying, Misleading, and the Need to Deceive »

13:45 François Jaquet (CRÉ) – « What’s Wrong with Speciesism »

14:45 Gabriella Hulsey (Parr Center) – « Callouts as Moral Discourse »

15:30 Hannah Carnegy-Arbuthnott (CRÉ) – « Privacy, publicity, and the right to be forgotten »

28 avril 2020

9:30 Minji Jang (Parr Center) – « Content Externalism, Blame, and Moral Protest »

10:15 Åsbjørn Melkevik (CRÉ) – « Helping the Deserving Poor »

11:15 Ehsan Sheikholharam Mashhadi (Parr Center) – « The Ambivalent Ethics of Love for Neighbor in Dogville »

12:00 Peter Dietsch (CRÉ) – « Just returns from capitalist production »

Coffee Break
10:50 – 11:20

“Proportional Retirement Age”
Arno Baurin (UCLouvain)
11:20 – 11:50
“Big Data Analytics and how to buy an election in the United States”
Jørn Sønderholm; Jakob Mainz and Rasmus Uhrenfeldt (Aalborg University)
11:50 – 12:20
“Life as a trust game. A comment on the option value of life.” Gregory Ponthière (UCLouvain)
12:20 – 12:45

Coffee Break
12:45 – 13:15

“Power as non-recognition”
Simon Laumann Jørgensen (Aalborg University)
13:15 – 13:45
“Predistribution as a Prerequisite for Robust Democratic Equality”
Delphine Irac (UCLouvain)
13:45 – 14:15
“Digital Self-defense: Why You Ought to Preserve Your Privacy for The Sake of Wrongdoers”
Lauritz Aastrup Munch (Aarhus University)

Le midi sera introduit par Catherine Rousseau, agronome, en charge de l’aide alimentaire à la Fédération des Services Sociaux (FdSS), Laurence Dewalle, coordinatrice du réseau des Gasap Bruxellois et Douchka Van Olphen du service communication, chez Fairtrade Belgium. Il sera modéré par Goedele Van den Broeck, économiste, professeure en économie agricole à l’UCLouvain (AGRO/ELIA). 

The purpose of this talk is to defend the idea that the role of the welfare state has probably never been as important as it is today, but that this implies that it is renewed to meet the challenges presented by the various social fractures. The major source of these fractures is undoubtedly the breakdown of the social elevator. The welfare state may have been too concerned about income inequality and poverty and not enough about social mobility. It will have to redirect its priorities and adopt a more proactive policy. This requires securing the lives of the poor but also those of the middle classes, who bear the brunt of shocks that entails a globalized market economy. This requires above all to give everyone hope and prospects by restarting the social elevator.

Although reflections on inheritance are rarely at the heart of contemporary philosophical questions about social justice, libertarian theories give them a relatively important place in their analysis. We will therefore first examine why the theoretical and conceptual background shared by libertarian authors is a privileged place for the formulation of the philosophical problem of inheritance. We will then analyze the answers given by two so called “right-libertarians”, that of Murray N. Rothbard and that of Robert Nozick, paying particular attention to the way in which the family bond is mobilized in these theories. Indeed, we make the hypothesis that inheritance cannot be reduced to a transfer of property but constitutes a social relationship whose privileged place is the family, and therefore any normative proposal on inheritance cannot dispense with a reflection on the family bond without exposing itself to important theoretical fragilities. We will conclude by showing what theoretical inadequacies result from an insufficient conceptualization of the family bond in Rothbard’s and Nozick’s writings on inheritance and what changes in these normative positions need to be considered in an attempt to overcome them.

All things equal, it seems wrong that offenders who are unjustly subject to socio-economic deprivations are held criminally responsible and subsequently punished the same as non-deprived offenders. This paper argues that, particularly for paradigmatic cases, unjust socio-economic deprivation grounds a wrongful social provocation (WSP) defense. The WSP account holds that many (albeit not all) deprived offenders are being wrongfully provoked by ongoing government policies into committing a range of criminal offenses — typically, social and economic offenses like petty theft or welfare fraud or the violation of various government regulations, such as squatting or loitering — that a reasonable person is likely to commit at some point if systematically submitted to the burdens of unjust deprivation. Thus, when and insofar as they are wrongfully provoked, deprived offenders have a special claim to a partial excuse from full criminal responsibility and, correspondingly, to a mitigated criminal sentence.

Epistemic theory of democracy and the “voters’ ignorance”
The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) was generally considered to be of little use to justify or even attempt to improve democracy. The truth conditions of this theorem are simply too far removed from political realities. In their latest work An Epistemic Theory of Democracy Robert E. Goodin and Kai Spiekermann challenge this skepticism and propose to widen the field of application of the CJT to different aspects of contemporary democratic reality. I will discuss one of these challenges: the voters’ competence to make “the right choice” .

Are Hate Speech Bans Useless? An Appraisal of Eric Heinze’s Arguments.

Most Western democracies and international institutions have currently adopted a range of policies aimed at regulating hate speech. However, the kinds of target groups that hate speech regulations seek to protect have not been clearly defined yet. In a series of publications, Eric Heinze has challenged the coherence of such regulations. His core thesis is that hate speech bans have simply no place in longstanding, stable, and prosperous democracies. In my communication, I will examine the three main charges Heinze raises against hate speech bans – namely, discriminatory selectivity, intolerable censorship, and arbitrariness – and I will seek to demonstrate that none of them can withstand critical analysis.

14:00 – 14:30
Colin ROWE (KU Leuven)
“Satisfied but confused: The intrinsic need for simplicity in voting systems”
14:30 – 15:00
Kevin HARTMANN (UCLouvain)
“The Privatization of the Unconstitutionality Action in Colombia”
15:00 – 15:30
Josette DAEMEN (Leiden University)
“Security and Freedom”
15:30 – 15:45
Coffee Break
15:45 – 16:15
Manuel VALENTE (UCLouvain)
“Three Principles of Pension Equality and Old-Age Redistribution”
16:15 – 16:45
Jelena BELIC (Leiden University)
“The State's Right to Withdraw from International Organizations: A Restricted Account”
16:45 – 17:15
Seunghyun SONG (KU Leuven)
“Language and structural injustice (why is Hawaiian dying and why isn’t Arabic Belgium’s official language?)”

Organisation
Manuel Valente (Louvain), Wouter Kalf (Leiden) & Francois Boucher (Leuven)
Contact and Registration
Dina Geron (dina.geron@uclouvain.be)
Manuel Valente (manuel.valente@uclouvain.be)

Si vous souhaitez participer, merci d’envoyer un mail a Dina Geron <dina.geron@uclouvain.be> au plus tard la veille du jour concerné. Vous recevrez ensuite une notification automatique de Teams lorsqu’elle vous aura ajouté, de manière à ce que vous puissiez vous connecter à la session. Nous utilisons le logiciel Teams. Il n’est pas nécessaire de l’avoir téléchargé pour pouvoir se connecter. Nous vous conseillons de vous connecter à Teams via un autre moteur de recherche que Safari. 

Reciprocity vs. redistribution: The Case for Collective Pensions

1st session: D.144 (Salle Rousseau), Bâtiment Dupriez

Chair: Nathalie Schryvers
- 9:30-10:25: Daniel Halliday, “Immigration and Inheritance”
Respondent: Manuel Valente

- 10:25-10:40: break

- 10:40-11:35: Grégory Ponthière, “An age-based tax on inheritance”
Respondent: Eric Fabri

- 11:35-12:30: Edoardo Traversa, “Taxing Inheritance Without Inheritance Tax”
Respondent: Axel Gosseries

12:30- 14:00: Lunch

2nd session: MORE 55, Bâtiment Thomas More

Chair: Guido Erreygers
- 14:00-14:55: Mélanie Plouviez, “A forgotten nineteenth century proposal about inheritance: Emile Durkheim, inheritance and work”
Respondent: Guido Erreygers

-14:55-15:10: break

- 15:10-16:05: Kebadu Mekonnen, “Cognatic Descent and Fair Inheritance: the case of "Rist" Inheritance system in Ethiopia”
Respondent: [to be confirmed]

- 16:05- 17:00: Marie Bastin, “Do Family Values Require Taxing Inheritance?”
Respondent: Eric Boot

Philippe Defeyt nous entretiendra des effets distributifs du confinement et de la pandémie, en pointant probablement aussi vers quelques pistes de politiques :

Coronavirus et redistribution des revenus

Chair: Nathalie Schryvers

- 9:30-10:25: Daniel Halliday, “Immigration and Inheritance”
Respondent: Manuel Valente

- 10:25-10:40: break

- 10:40-11:35: Edoardo Traversa, “Taxing Inheritance Without Inheritance Tax”
Respondent: Axel Gosseries

- 11:35-12:30: Grégory Ponthière, “An age-based tax on inheritance”
Respondent: Eric Fabri

12:30- 14:00: break

2nd session:

Chair: Guido Erreygers

- 14:00-14:55: Mélanie Plouviez, “A forgotten nineteenth century proposal about inheritance: Emile Durkheim, inheritance and work”

Respondent: Guido Erreygers

-14:55-15:10: break

- 15:10-16:05: Kebadu Mekonnen, “Cognatic Descent and Fair Inheritance: the case of "Rist" Inheritance system in Ethiopia”
Respondent: Kevin Hartmann Cortes

- 16:05- 17:00: Marie Bastin, “Do Family Values Require Taxing Inheritance?”
Respondent: Axel Gosseries

Contact persons:
Axel Gosseries: axel.gosseries@uclouvain.be
Marie Bastin: marie.bastin@univ-paris1.fr

Les mesures prise contre la pandémie peuvent-elles conduire à une guerre civile?
La question de la recevabilité sociale des mesures prises contre la pandémie est capitale. Au-delà de leur faisabilité (comment confiner les gens dans un bidonville dont la population subsiste par l’économie informelle ?), leur compatibilité avec les valeurs et croyances partagées au sein des populations concernées (et souvent multi-culturelles, ce qui complique encore les choses) va déterminer leur degré de légitimité et, par conséquent, leurs modalités d’application : la force publique sera-t-elle nécessaire pour les faire appliquer ? Dans des démocraties libérales, quelles conditions doivent respecter les mesures –en particulier les plus « tragiques » (tri…) - pour susciter l’adhésion ? En l’absence -à discuter- d’arguments éthiquement fondés pour démontrer la supériorité absolue de certains critères de priorisation, quelles sont les options disponibles pour éviter que les critères retenus ne suscitent une résistance pouvant aller jusqu’à la guerre civile ?

We present the key goals that Covid-19 geolocation data collection could pursue. We discuss how to rank them. Based on such goals analysis, we assess various of the available options, especially from the perspective of basic freedoms. One of the conclusions is that the most important goals can be achieved through the least freedom-averse methods.

Coronavirus: what is at stake for Africa?

Should African countries follow by the letter the WHO guidelines in response to Covid-19? Does one size fit all considering the peculiar ways in which the crisis might affect each country in Africa?

Societies already burdened with socio-economic and political challenges, need to make hard choices. With respect to that, one moral concern relates to how to balance efforts at preventing the spread of Cornavirus without having to smuggle in the specter of hunger that a possible collapse of the fragile economies in Africa might entail.

What does collective responsibility require when the individual liberties any collective endeavor presupposes do not have a strong foothold in many African countries? Would it be fair and practically feasible to demand poor citizens sacrifice their quotidian chores necessary for securing the things that sustain their lives? How does the responsibility of the global community figure in the fight against Covid-19 in a continent with limited health care (eg., for a population of 110 million people Ethiopia earmarked 54 ventilators out of the available 450 for Covid-19, South Sudan has three ventilators but five Vice Presidents, there are more MPs than Ventilators in Kenya) and economic capacities? African countries’ unique demographic landscape can also serve as a segway for exploring the need for a shift in thinking about the coronavirus pandemic from the African vantagepoint. The majority of the continent’s population (estimate of 1.3 billion) is below 24 years old (ca. 60 %), where the working age population (25-64) constitutes 36.5% and older persons (above 65) a meagre 3.5%. What does that entail for a sound response to this global pandemic? Many commentators suggested that Africa’s younger demographic profile shields the continent from the worst projections of loss due to the spread of coronavirus. Is there any validity to such claim? On the contrary, one might argue that the virus’ disproportionate effect on the older and vulnerable could have catastrophic socio-political consequences. That may exacerbate what might be called Africa’s perpetual peter pan syndrome.

Moreover, the idea of a household characteristically takes a wider meaning, and in many of the meaningful activities in life people principally rely on traditional institutions over their civil and political counterparts. These institutions encompass services from social safety nets to funeral processions within their purview. Can we adequately combat this pandemic without effective engagement with these institutions?

After providing some basic facts/statistics about the current state of the COVID19 outbreak in Africa, we will launch our discussion by discussing those ethical challenges (and others) based respectively on the Ethiopian and Cameroonian contexts.

Slides

La propagation de la COVID-19 a conduit, en Belgique comme ailleurs, à un renforcement de l’Exécutif, en vue de l’adoption de mesures urgentes destinées à gérer la crise et ses conséquences. La réaction des différents Pouvoirs de l’État fédéral belge suscite de nombreuses questions d’ordre constitutionnel. Il s’agit, lors de e-MICH, de revenir sur l’attribution de pouvoirs spéciaux aux différents gouvernements, d’analyser le contenu de certaines mesures et de se poser la question du rôle des Parlements en cette période de pouvoirs spéciaux. En guise de conclusion, on s’interrogera sur la question de savoir si les pouvoirs spéciaux, palliatif à l’absence de régime constitutionnel d’état d’urgence ou d’exception, ne devrait pas être constitutionnalisé, ou remplacé par un véritable régime constitutionnel des états d’urgence.

What explains the fact that Sweden currently persists with a corona strategy so relaxed that it leaves the rest of the world baffled? How did the country that the far right used to call a 'socialist nightmare' end up on signs of Trump supporters protesting lockdowns, calling on the US to "be like Sweden"? While the Swedish death toll is ticking away, this strategy receives widespread and indeed growing support in Sweden. Is this a sign of the legendary Scandinavian trust and unflappability? Or are we witnessing an uncritical patriotism ready to defend the "Swedish model" at all costs?

L’objet de cette table ronde est d’identifier les éléments clefs qui permettent de garantir qu’un financement de long-terme soit disponible à terme, par exemple pour payer des retraites et couvrir les coûts du démantèlement des centrales nucléaires. En particulier, comment veiller à éviter un sous-provisionnement ou un hold-up par une législature ou génération intermédiaire.

12h30-13h45 - François Blais, Politologue, Professeur à l’ULaval, Ancien Ministre (Québec)
Le Fonds des générations du Québec : un mécanisme de solidarité intergénérationnelle

12h50-13h05 - Vincent Frogneux, Economiste, Bureau du plan et professeur à l’UNamur
Le fonds de vieillissement : pourquoi fut-il crée et pourquoi fut-il supprimé ?/The Aging Fund : Why was it created and why was it abolished ?

13h10-13h25 - Samuel Cogolati, Juriste et député fédéral Ecolo-Groen
Démantèlement des centrales nucléaires: les contribuables devront-ils trinquer?

13h25-13h55 - Débat

Inscription gratuite mais obligatoire: La table ronde aura lieu sur ZOOM. Si vous souhaitez participer, envoyez un mail à Dina Geron à : “chaire-hoover@uclouvain” avec comme message « table ronde"
Les données ZOOM vous seront envoyées le 12 mai.

Les mesures de confinement prises pour faire face au Covid19 en Europe provoquent un choc économique majeur dont les conséquences pourraient miner les systèmes démocratiques et économiques européens pendant de longues années. En particulier, les pays européens ne partaient pas sur un pied d’égalité face à la crise. Certains pays ont davantage bénéficié de l’intégration européenne et de la création de la zone euro que d’autres (Allemagne et Pays Bas notamment) et se sont renforcés économiquement. Cette marge de manœuvre accrue leur permet de déployer des politiques massives de soutien de l’économie. D’autres pays ayant moins bénéficié de l’intégration européenne (Italie, Grèce) ont vu leur marge de manœuvre économique se réduire et contraindre davantage leur réponse sanitaire et budgétaire à la pandémie. En l’absence de solutions budgétaires et fiscales au niveau fédéral à la mesure de la crise pandémique, ces inégalités risquent de se renforcer dans le futur et d’aggraver les tensions sociales et politiques entre, et au sein des pays européens. Adossée à ce contexte, cette communication cherche à explorer des pistes pour rendre la réponse des autorités européennes plus juste. En particulier, nous explorerons les débats liés aux restructurations de dette et aux instruments additionnels que pourrait déployer la Banque Centrale Européenne, tout en prenant en compte le niveau élevé de contraintes politiques actuelles sur ces options.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN TIMES OF CORONA

The public interest has enjoyed something of a resurgence these past few months. It has been said repeatedly – in the media, by politicians, in public debate – that we have a tradeoff to make in our struggle with this virus: either we stubbornly insist on our individual freedoms (e.g., of movement and association) or we privilege instead the greater good, often formulated in terms of the public interest, at the cost of those individual freedoms. The former option, it is said, will greatly inhibit the containment of the virus, whereas the latter option has proven successful in other parts of the world (e.g., East-Asia). In the phase that is to follow the strict lockdown, furthermore, it is often argued that we will need some kind of tracing app. Such an app will inevitably come with some costs to the right to privacy. This restriction of privacy, however, is held to be necessary in the light of the wider public interest.

Despite the frequency of such appeals to the public interest in order to justify the various measures to combat the coronavirus, it is not clear what is meant by the concept. In other words, what do people mean when they invoke the public interest as a kind of magical incantation to justify restrictions of certain fundamental rights and freedoms? Many different answers are possible here, and I will discuss a few in order to illustrate how one’s interpretation of the trade-off between individual freedoms and the public interest depends on one’s understanding of the public interest. In short, simply appealing to the public interest is unhelpful. We need to clarify what we mean by the public interest in order to clarify the choice before us.

"This series of e-Michs (online “mardis intrimes de la Chaire Hoover”) focusing on ethical issues raised by the pandemic replaces our usual brownbag seminars. Non-members of the Hoover Chair are most welcome to attend one or more of these sessions. If you want to do so, just send a mail to Dina Geron <chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be> at the latest one hour before the start of the session.You will then receive a message that will tell you how to connect, using either Teams or any browser (except Safari).”

"La perception tragique du tri d’accès à la réanimation pendant la première vague de l’épidémie de covid : quels enjeux éthiques pour cette soudaine visibilité dans le débat public ?"

Face à l’afflux de malades lors de la première vague épidémique, et au risque d’une pénurie de moyens pour prendre en charge les urgences vitales, le problème éthique du triage médical d’accès à la réanimation s’est soudainement invité, non sans malentendus, dans le débat public, dans une version tragique déformée par la pression médiatique. Les effets de ce choc sur le grand public et sur les soignants rendent sensibles l’importance et les difficultés qu’il y a à construire une véritable délibération démocratique sur les sujets de rationnement et de priorisation en santé, en particulier dans l’hypothèse où les critères strictement médicaux de pronostic ne suffiraient pas à opérer le tri nécessaire au regard des contraintes de la catastrophe.

Frédérique Leichter-Flack, 
Maître de Conférence, habilitée à diriger des recherches en éthique et littérature comparée, Université Paris Nanterre ; membre du comité d’éthique du CNRS. Dernier ouvrage paru : Qui vivra, qui mourra.  Quand on ne peut pas sauver tout le monde, éd. Albin Michel, 2015.

Feminists today seem to think feminism is for social equality, that anyone can be a feminist, that the sex industry is in need of defending, that self-objectification is empowering, and that anyone who identifies as a woman is a woman. Feminist groups have rebranded as being for 'gender minorities', women's studies has become 'gender studies', lesbians are rebranding as 'queer', and women who think feminism must surely have something to do with female people are being accused of exclusion and hatred. With the help of confused ideas about 'intersectionality', mainstream feminism has become something akin to a generalised global justice movement. This creates a vacuum where feminism used to be. Gender critical feminism, an evolution of radical feminism, is a growing theory and movement that fills this vacuum. In this book I explain the disagreement between liberal feminism and radical feminism, the relation between radical feminism and gender critical feminism, and defend a gender critical position on three of the biggest points of disagreement between liberal and radical feminists. These are the commitment to intersectionality, and their respective positions on the sex industry and transgender issues. I also try to explain why radical and gender critical feminism have been so vilified, and argue that much of the disagreement between the two feminist tribes comes down to a disagreement over political feasibility.

SHEDULE

Each chapter (45’)
Introducion by Holly LawfordSmith (10’)
Discussant + replies (15’)
Debate with everyone (20’)

08:00 – 08:05
Welcome

08:05 – 08:50
Introduction – Gender Critical Feminism (Chapter 1)
Discussant : Anca Gheaus (Pompeu Fabra University)

08 :50 – 09 :35
Major Faultline : Choices (Chapter 4)
Discussant : Siba Harb (KULeuven)

09 :35 – 09 :55
Coffee Break

09:55 – 10:40
Radical Feminism (Chapter 5)
Discussant : Marie Bastin (Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

10 :40 – 11 :25
The Sex Industry (Chapter 8)
Discussant : Eric Boot (UCLouvain)

11 :25 – 11 :45
Coffee Break

11:45 – 12:35
Trans/Gender (Chapter 9)
Discussant : Axel Gosseries (UCLouvain)

12:35 – 12:50
Concluding Remarks – Holly Lawford-Smith

Les mesures de confinement adoptées en Belgique comme dans de nombreux autres Etats  ont eu des répercussions considérables sur l’économie, avec des incidences variables selon les secteurs. Certaines entreprises, par exemple dans le secteur culturel ou de la restauration, ont été contraintes de cesser leurs activités ; certaines autres ont dû la ralentir ou la réinventer ; d’autres enfin, comme dans le commerce en ligne, ont vu une augmentation significative de leur bénéfices. Les gouvernements ont pris une série de mesure de soutien, sous la forme de subsides directs ou indirects, de réductions ou des report d’impôts ou de prise de participations. Ces mesures de soutien doivent-elle être assorties de conditions ? De quelle nature ? Y a-t-il une opportunité pour orienter les entreprises aidées vers des comportements « éthiques » (développement durable, lutte contre la fraude et l’évasion fiscales, participation des travailleurs et des autres stakeholders) ?

Le confinement a révélé la place centrale de l’école dans l’éducation. Quant au déconfinement, il a révélé les priorités institutionnelles et les faiblesses d’un système fragmenté qui conduit les écoles à apporter des réponses fort différenciées, certaines se concentrant sur les élèves les plus faibles et d’autres drillant les élèves pour les évaluations de fin d’année. Cette différenciation explique en partie qu’au contraire d’autres secteurs, la crise n’a guère été présentée comme une opportunité à saisir pour faire du système scolaire un vecteur d’intériorisation par tous les jeunes de normes et d’attitudes adaptées à un monde d’après qui ne ressemblerait pas à celui d’aujourd’hui. Une telle frilosité tient sans doute à l’indétermination des contours du monde d’après et à la possible persistance du monde d’aujourd’hui. Mais elle tient aussi à l’idée très répandue que toute affirmation d’un projet pédagogique plus précis est synonyme d’autoritarisme et de restriction des libertés. Est-il possible de définir démocratiquement un projet éducatif commun à toutes les écoles qui soit aligné sur une société d’après moins individualiste et plus égalitaire, tout en respectant les principes de liberté et de singularité ?

Format
7 minute presentations, followed by 8 minutes Q&A

Schedule
14:00–14:15 Marie Bastin (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Hoover Fellow) – Do Family Values Require Taxing Inheritance?

14:15–14:30 David Vogt (UiB) – Why Is It Better that Ten Guilty Go Free than that One Innocent Is Convicted?

14:30–14:45 Corrado Fumagalli (University of Genova, Hoover Fellow) – Epistemic Democracy, Fallibilism, and the Legitimating Value of Post-Decision Dissent

14:45–15:00 Break

15:00–15:15 Christopher Senf (UiB) – What Is Wrong with the Criticism against Identity Politics

15:15–15:30 Manuel Valente (Chaire Hoover) – Equality of Opportunity and the Gender Pension Gap

15:30–15:45 Preben Sørheim (UiB) – Longevity and Premature Death

SCHEDULE

Each chapter (45’)
 Discussant (15’)
 Replies by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (10’)
 Debate (20’)

09:10 – 09:15 Welcome
09:15 – 09:30 General Introduction by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen

09:30 – 10:15 Chapter 1 Hypocritical Blame
Discussant: Sara Amighetti (Zurich University)

10:15 – 11:00 Chapter 3: What, if anything, makes hypocritical blame morally wrong?
Discussant: Axel Gosseries (UCLouvain)

11:00 – 11:15 Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:00 Chapter 4: Generalizing: Other ways of not having a standing to blame
Discussant: Andrei Poama (Leiden University)

12:00 – 12:45 Chapter 5: Praising
Discussant: Manuel Valente (UCLouvain)

Chapter 3. Are parties and elections indispensable?
Discussant: Amaël Maskens (Hoover Chair, UCLouvain).

Chapter 4.
A randomly selected Senate Discussant: Élise Rouméas (University of Groningen)

Chapter 5.
Strengthening popular accountability Discussant: Viki Pedersen (Aarhus University)

Chapter 6.
Opening the initiative Discussant: Nenad Stojanović (University of Geneva)

QUELLES BALISES ÉTHIQUES POUR LA GESTION DES PANDÉMIES À VENIR ?

Pourquoi les pandémies sont-elles inévitables ?
Comment pouvons-nous les anticiper ?
Le concept "One Health" peut-il nous aider à gérer ces crises ?
La gouvernance et l'éthique libérales sont-elles capables de nous fournir les cadres normatifs pour gérer des menaces globales, telles que les pandémies, le réchauffement climatique ou la chute de la biodiversité ?
La gouvernance et l'éthique doivent-elles évoluer pour faire face à ces nouvelles menaces ?

Voici quelques questions qu'Eric Muraille tentera d’éclairer.

Les questions éthiques soulevées par les conséquences économiques de la pandémie et des mesures prises pour y faire face sont innombrables: il y a les trade-offs en termes de santé, avec implicitement le débat du prix d'une vie humaine; les arbitrages entre relance et réorientation de notre économie, l'impact en termes d’inégalité, en particulier quant au logement, en particulier); les questions intergénérationnelles (la crise est "payée" par les actifs, et en particulier les jeunes en âge d'entrer sur le marché du travail); un marché des capitaux (mais pas du travail) qui rémunère en fonction du risque; ou encore l'incohérence des règles du jeu de notre économie de marché, avec ce sauvetage des actionnaires pourtant supposés être les premiers amortisseurs des chocs conjoncturels. L’introduction épinglera quelques-unes de ces questions et la discussion qui suivra pourra les évoquer toutes.

Luck Egalitarianism is an important family of theories in distributive justice. It gradually evolved in the late 20th century and tries to reconcile two fundamental values which have traditionally been conceived as incompatible, i.e. equality and (personal) responsibility. However attractive, this raises a fundamental question: In what sense is Luck Egalitarianism still an egalitarian theory? Within this context, I would like to defend two separate claims: Negatively, I argue that Luck Egalitarianism fails to be a meaningful synthesis of equality and responsibility. Positively, I want to show that the core commitment(s) of Luck Egalitarianism can be transferred into a control-based theory of desert. Thus, instead of seeing themselves as egalitarians, Luck Egalitarians should wholeheartedly embrace desertarianism.

Capitalism is controversial. Supporters argue it maximises freedom and/or prosperity, even that it is necessitated by natural rights. Critics argue that it is exploitative, alienating, unjust, and/or corrupting. While each of these arguments can be evaluated individually, tallying them up or assessing their relative normative weight appears impossible: definitions of capitalism are elastic, causal links opaque, normative foundations controversial. Does this mean that political theorists and philosophers should refrain from overall evaluations of capitalism, restricting themselves to offering individual arguments for and against, but desisting from coming to overall conclusions? Not necessarily, I argue in this paper: a democratic critique of capitalism holds the potential, at least for those who share certain​ widely accepted premises, of a conclusive and conclusively negative evaluation. Besides analytically developing this critique, the paper bolsters the case for it through a close reading of parallel passages from G.A. Cohen’s Why Not Socialism and Jason Brennan’s Why Not Capitalism.

Go Funded?
A plan for fertility-based pension funding in the public pension system
By Niko Väänänen

Public pension systems have been successful in preventing old-age poverty. Yet, the financial sustainability of these systems is threatened by low fertility rates observed in Europe. The lack of trust in the long-term sustainability erodes public confidence of the systems.

To make public pension systems more future-proof while respecting intergenerational fairness, I propose adding a funded element to the pension system. Firstly, I propose of complementing the paygo pension scheme with a fund. This way the public pension would be provided by a mixed system. The funding ratio would depend on the changes in the ratio (active age population/children). Secondly, I will address the issue of governance of this fund as the institutional sustainability should be designed carefully. I will draw relevant conclusions of past experiences with public pension reserve funds and sovereign wealth funds."

Freedom’s Values: The Good and The Right
By Pietro Intropi

There are two very general ways of valuing freedom: one appeals to the good (e.g. to freedom’s contribution to wellbeing), the other appeals to how persons have reason to treat one another in response to their status as purposive beings (i.e. to the right). In this talk I offer an analysis of two ways of valuing freedom and I show that this distinction has many relevant implications for contemporary freedom debates, especially for understanding the relationships between freedom and justice. In particular, I discuss two attitudes towards freedom (promoting and respecting freedom) and two versions of the claim that freedom has non-specific value, analysing under which conditions interference with people’s freedom can be considered disvaluable as such (independently of the content of the freedom in question, and even when interference is aimed at depriving someone of the freedom to perform a morally impermissible action)

In this talk Aristel Skrbic develops a critique of ideology of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Unlike some recent attempts in the literature, he moves away from understanding ideology as a set of beliefs and instead focus on the function of ideology as a system of representation which through distortion helps to maintain and reproduce domination. Instead of arguing that political beliefs of judges enter into their work which leads to ideological judgements and should thus be critiqued, he shows that the work of the Court fulfils an ideological function. To make his case he focuses on the so-called breach/justification methodology which the ECJ uses to resolve apparent conflicts between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights. For example, when a companies’ freedom to freely move across borders comes into tension with the right of a labour union to strike, the Court resolves the conflict by using the breach/justification methodology. While the methodology is presented as neutral, he argues that it fulfils an ideological function by privileging capital over labour under the very guise of this neutrality.

Autant de questions que ce Midi de l’éthique spécial aura à cœur d’éclairer. Il sera introduit par le Professeur Yvon Englert, médecin, Recteur honoraire et Pro-recteur de l’université à l’ULB, délégué général COVID-19 auprès du gouvernement wallon et responsable de la cellule “débat sociétal et communication” de la task-force fédérale pour la stratégie de vaccination. Il identifiera les enjeux qui lui paraissent les plus essentiels. Suivra un débat entre deux protagonistes : Sandy Tubeuf (FSP/IRSS) d’une part, professeure en économie de la santé (FSP/IRSS/LIDAM/IRES) et co-auteure d’une étude sur un échantillon représentatif de 2000 belges relative aux priorités qui devraient être adoptées en matière d’accès au vaccin COVID-19, et Grégory Ponthière (ETES/ESPO/ISP) d’autre part, économiste du bien-être et professeur d’éthique économique et sociale. Le débat sera modéré par le professeur Axel Gosseries (ETES/FIAL/ISP), philosophe et juriste, et responsable de la Chaire Hoover d’éthique économique et sociale.

La crise du Covid 19 pose la question du prix donné aux vies humaines. Certes, les débats autour de l’attribution de valeur aux vies humaines et des équivalences matérielles sont relativement bien connus en philosophie morale et en économie. Qu’en est-il d’un point de vue politique ? Comment penser à la fois politiquement et normativement la question du prix de vie ? La crise du Covid nous en donne l’occasion, et je propose de discuter le prix de la vie en distinguant deux de ses versants, payer pour des vies et payer avec des vies, en montrant qu’ils sont constitutifs du politique et qu’ils longent au cœur de la responsabilité politique. Aujourd’hui, la crise du Covid opère comme une révélation de nos préférences qui, elles-mêmes, se situent dans le prolongement d’une évolution de notre rapport à la violence. Le prix de la vie tel qu’il a été donné à voir depuis novembre 2019 nous dit qui nous sommes.

Many agree that compulsory retirement is unfair because it discriminates against older people. But few would say that age discrimination in the right to retire is unfair because it discriminates against the young. This article examines whether age-based rights to retirement benefits are compatible with two distributive principles of pension justice: old-age sufficiency and equality. Whereas sufficiency worries about old-age poverty, equality is concerned with equal lifetime access to retirement. Sufficiency is compatible with age discrimination in the standard right to retire, but it is not enough to guarantee just retirement rights: it fails to detect objectionable inequalities between the old and the short-lived. In contrast, equality recommends age thresholds that favor the young and short-lived, but which are at odds with the standard right to retire and may not guarantee old-age sufficiency. Equality and sufficiency are a plausible combination, but they often pull in contradictory directions. I conclude that storable rights to retire early in life (either lump-sum or regular instalments) can distribute the opportunity to retire more evenly across the lifespan while respecting the principle of old-age sufficiency.

« The rights of persons with disabilities are often ignored or jeopardised because they ‘cost too much’. This article proposes that a major reason for the shaky status of disability rights regards difficulties concerning their justification in terms of justice. Three conceptions of justice are examined – justice as equality between citizens, justice as solidarity because of our shared bodily vulnerability, and justice as minimising domination. Drawing on Ian Shapiro’s conception of non-domination, I conclude that justice as minimising domination provides the strongest arguments to claim justice when it comes to disability.»

The stakeholder firm is defined as one that maximizes the (weighted or unweighted) sum of surpluses of its customers and suppliers (including workers). It is shown that, although this objective is hard to empirically measure, it can be pursued by simple management rules that rely on constrained profit maximization. It is shown that unconstrained profit maximization gives a competitive edge to ordinary firms, but that stakeholder firms are better for social welfare and internalize several important effects of their activities on society. It is also shown that long term entry decisions should rely on profit modified by Pigouvian pricing of externalities.

In this talk I will describe the "Homo Moralis" model of partial Kantian morality of Alger and Weibull, its evolutionary roots (genetics and culture) and its philosophical interpretation (the universalization principle). If time allows, I will present behavioral and political implications for three classical problems in the theory of voting: the divided majority problem, the costly participation dilemma, and the strategic revelation of information.

We develop a novel approach to address democratic electoral discrimination – i.e. when voters penalize candidates running for office on the ground of an adverse bias towards the candidates’ group membership – through the lenses of “office accountability”. We show how citizens qua officeholders should act in their institutional capacity in such a way that puts them in the position to vindicate the rationale of their action as coherent with the terms of their power of office mandate. Hence, when they act on their preferences in the ballot box, their action is not inherently objectionable insofar as they are in the position to vindicate it in view of the right to be governed by whoever they choose. But this does not imply that their power mandate is or ought to be fully unbound. Electoral discrimination may still have a negative impact on citizens’ democratic right to run for office. In this case, careful institutional design allows to mitigate such negative effects...

Le premier devoir des journalistes est de rechercher et de répandre la vérité. En temps de covid, cela veut dire mettre son nez dans l'élaboration compliquée d'un consensus scientifique. Las, à défaut de vérité, le journaliste découvre des débats, des controverses, des probabilités, des hypothèses, de la faillibilité, du provisoire, bref un univers où domine un scepticisme fondamental à la Rorty ou à la Popper particulièrement inconfortable pour le journaliste. Il se meut lui dans un autre rapport à la vérité plus spontané, plus classique, plus confortable où l'accès à la réalité semble aller de soi. La crise du Covid doit-il pousser les journalistes à revoir leur rapport à la vérité ?

What if we decide to introduce Automatic Balancing Mechanisms (ABMs) to pension schemes? Does such pension reform rise questions regarding Article 1 Protocol 1 on the Right of Property of European Convention on Human Rights (A1P1)? My hypothesis is that depending on when do we introduce AAMs, the legal consequences under the light of A1P1 ought to be different. When setting a new pension system, there would be a twofold and parallel phenomenon: i) an ex-ante condition of the pension benefit of current contributors and ii) an ex-post conditioning of the pension benefit for current pensioners. When introducing them to current pension systems the protection of A1P1 is triggered only to retirees and as such, it would be an interference to their peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Consequently, it would be necessary to justify such interference in precise public interest reasons. Consequently, due to the flexibility of the Court’s assessment when reviewing potential breaches of A1P1 in social security, the introduction of such mechanisms at any moment would not derive in a breach to A1P1.

Fossil fuel producers lie at the heart of the carbon economy. Yet standard climate policy responses engage them only indirectly—addressing only the point sources of greenhouse gas emissions under their control (e.g. methane leakages), and even then considering them as but one set of point sources among others. In the last few years, a growing body of climate governance scholarship has begun to address fossil fuel supply explicitly. In this literature, various measures to restrict fossil fuels are contemplated and explored, ranging from taxes to bans. Yet it has largely been assumed that present ownership and control over fossil fuel companies would remain unchanged. The potential for public ownership (of those companies that are currently privately owned) as a political means to the rapid and equitable phase-out of fossil fuels has been under-explored. The aim of this paper is to make a conditional case for such public ownership.

We can distinguish freedom as exit, which refers to opting out of certain social relationships, from freedom as voice, which involves exercising influence on a social relationship. We have reasons to value both. Nonetheless, some authors think that if we can exit, as when we can opt for different sort of consumer products or we can change jobs or residences, then voice is redundant, or even harmful when it involves collective decision-making. If freedom is based on the idea of ending ties and relationships, I will argue that we risk endorsing a self-defeating position, because exit is amenable to produce detached and self-interested individuals, hence hampering the development of civic virtues. Without civic engagement the commonwealth is unstable, meaning that freedom is not assured in dynamic terms because people will lack the dispositions that help to sustain a well-ordered commonwealth over time.

[14:00-14:15: Connect and make sure technology is working; welcome and introduction]

14:15-14:30: Alejandro Berrotaran (UCL) “Should the right to bequeath be a basic liberty?”
14:30-14:45: Erika Brandl Mouton (UiB), "From principles to practice: moral obligations of architects towards realizing the human right to housing"
14:45-15:00: Pablo Scotto Benito (UCL) “Universal Basic Income and the Duty to Work”

15:00-15:15: Break

15:15-15:30: David Vogt (UiB), "Is social injustice normatively relevant for criminal justice?"
15:30-15:45: Manuel Valente (UCL) “Basic Income and the Problem of Unequal Longevity”
15:45-16:00: Sindre August Horn (UiB), "Health, equality, and the worse off" (Bergen)

Justice et fiscalité successorale

avec Constantin BRISSAUD et Nicolas FRÉMEAUX

Lundi 8 mars 2021, 9h-12h
(en distanciel, lien Zoom ci-dessous)

PROGRAMME

9h-10h - Constantin BRISSAUD, "L'héritage au concret : le poids des intermédiaires dans la taxation de l'héritage et des successions en France et aux États-Unis (1980-2020)"

Présentation de Constantin BRISSAUD :
Constantin BRISSAUD est docteur en science politique de l'université de Strasbourg (laboratoire SAGE) et actuellement post-doctorant à l'université Paris-Dauphine (IRISSO). Spécialiste de sociologie politique de l'économie, il travaille actuellement sur les organisations internationales d'une part ; et d'autre part entame une recherche sur la taxation de l'héritage en France et aux États-Unis depuis les années 1980.

Résumé de son intervention :
Comment expliquer que, en dépit de son rôle majeur dans la reproduction des inégalités sociales, l'héritage soit de moins en moins taxé depuis les années 1980 ? Cette intervention présentera la stratégie empirique déployée dans une recherche en cours pour répondre à cette question, en prenant deux cas d'étude - la France et les États-Unis -, qui ont pour caractéristique commune de mettre la méritocratie au centre de leur contrat social. L'intervention soulignera l'intérêt d'une analyse des politiques fiscales pour comprendre que la diminution de l'héritage fasse l'objet de déclarations tonitruantes aux États-Unis quand elle fait au contraire l'objet d'aménagements discrets en France. Elle présentera également l'intérêt d'une entrée par les intermédiaires de l'action publique pour comprendre comment certains groupes (associations de contribuables, conseillers fiscaux, philanthropes, think tanks ou services de Bercy) catégorisent l'héritage comme une contribution au bien commun, ou au contraire produisent de l'ignorance sur son fonctionnement concret. L'intervention visera finalement à stimuler la discussion interdisciplinaire sur l'évolution des sens donnés à la méritocratie depuis les années 1980.

10h-11h - Nicolas FRÉMEAUX, "La fiscalité successorale en France : constat et proposition de réforme"

Présentation de Nicolas FRÉMEAUX :
Nicolas FRÉMEAUX est maître de conférences en économie à l’Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas. Ses thèmes de recherche sont à la croisée de l’économie des inégalités et de l’économie de la famille. Il s’intéresse plus particulièrement à l’accumulation et à la transmission de patrimoine. Il étudie aussi le rôle des décisions matrimoniales (choix du conjoint, régime matrimonial…) dans la formation des inégalités. Il a publié plusieurs articles académiques et un ouvrage Les Nouveaux Héritiers (Seuil) en 2018.

Résumé de son intervention :
L’objectif de cette intervention est double. Premièrement, après un rapide retour sur les réformes récentes de la fiscalité successorale en France, j’établirai un constat sur les limites de l’impôt actuel. Plus précisément, je montrerai que la fiscalité successorale est injuste dans le sens où l’architecture de l’impôt et les possibilités d’optimisation profitent principalement aux plus grosses successions. Cette fiscalité est aussi inadaptée aux évolutions familiales récentes et elle est grandement impopulaire. Deuxièmement, je présenterai les bases d’une proposition de réforme de la fiscalité successorale avec comme idée centrale un changement d’architecture. Ainsi, l’idée de ce nouvel impôt consisterait à imposer l’ensemble des héritages et donations reçus au cours de la vie en introduisant le principe du rappel fiscal à vie. On passerait donc d’une imposition basée sur les parts transmises à une imposition du patrimoine hérité. Ce principe permettrait de garantir une équité horizontale entre les héritiers et, en fonction des paramètres choisis, de limiter les inégalités entre héritiers.

11h-12h - Discussion

PARTICIPER À LA RÉUNION ZOOM

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CONTACT

Mélanie Plouviez: melanie.plouviez[at]univ-cotedazur.fr

POUR PLUS D'INFORMATIONS
http://www.crhi-unice.fr/1-penser-l-heritage

14:00 – 14:05: Welcome
14:05 – 14:35: ‘Libertarianism and Reciprocity’ by Pietro Intropi (Hoover Chair, UCLouvain; Trinity College Dublin​)
14:35 – 15:05: ‘Reactions Qualifications, Appearance, and Choice-Sensitivity’ by Søren Flinch Midtgaard (Aarhus University)
15:05 – 15:35: ‘The Epistemic (In-)Transparency of Political Legitimacy’ by Matthias Brinkmann (Oslo University)

15:35 – 15:50: Coffee Break

15:50 – 16:20: ‘Basic Income and Unequal Longevity’ by Manuel Valente (Hoover Chair, UCLouvain)
16:20 – 16:50: ‘Proportionate interventionism and self-determination’ by Fredrik Hjorthen (Oslo University)
16:50 – 17:20: ‘Driving it home: why bussing electors to the polls is no different from other ways of paying for turnout’ by Jørn Sønderholm, Jens Damgaard Thaysen, and Jakob Thrane Mainz (Aalborg University)

Lunch Break

4.00-15.30

Matthieu Agustoni(Leiden University)Anarchism and the Dao de Jing
Mahua Agrawal(KU Leuven)How the Trend of Dissociating Gender from Sex May Not Be as Progressive as We Think
Niko Väänänen(UCLouvain)Should pension (benefit) depend on the number of children ?

Organization
François Boucher (KU Leuven), Wouter Kalf(Leiden University) and Manuel Valente (UCLouvain)
More information & registration: François Boucher
f.boucher2014@gmail.com

PROGRAMME (version détaillée)

Matinée (11h-12h30)
Introduction par Hervé Pourtois (UCLouvain)
Roberto Frega (CNRS)
Les dimensions de la confiance

• Intervention de Mark Hunyadi (UCLouvain)
• Discussion

Après-midi (13h30-15h)
Vincent Jacquet (UCLouvain)
Prendre le problème à l'envers. Les gouvernants ont-ils confiance dans les citoyens ?

• Intervention d’Amaël Maskens (UCLouvain)
• Discussion
• Conclusions par Pierre-Étienne Vandamme (ULB & UCLouvain)

L’atelier est organisé sur Teams. Inscription auprès de Dina Geron
Les personnes qui souhaitent obtenir le texte sur lequel s’appuiera la présentation de Roberto Frega peuvent le demander à Dina Geron

13h30-14h15: "Bequeathing as a Legitimate Form of Sacrifice", Alfonso Langastro (Pompeu Fabra University).
Resp: Edoardo Traversa (UCLouvain)

14h15-15h00: "For a fairer future: inheritance taxation and limitarianism", Adelin-Costin Dumitru (Polytechnic University of Bucharest & National University of Political Science and Public Administration Bucharest)
Resp: Axel Gosseries (UCLouvain)

15h00-15h10: Break

15h10-15h55: "Moral objection to inheritance tax grounded on reciprocity", Catarina Neves (Universidade do Minho)
Resp: Mélanie Plouviez (Université Côte d’Azur)

15h55-16h40: « Inheritance and the regulation of the family: A normative reflection on the moral limits of inequalities », Leonardo Barros da Silva Menezes (Universidade do Minho)
Resp: Eric Fabri (ULB)

16h40-16h50: Break

16h50-17h25: "Does the Defense of the Family Require Taxing Inheritance?", Marie Bastin (Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)
Resp: Kebadu Mekonnen (Addis Ababa University)

Le débat sera introduit d'une part par David DOYEN, Commissaire Divisionnaire, chef de Zone de la Police Hermeton et Heure et Luc Welcomme, physiopédagogue, coordinateur pédagogique à l’Académie de police de Namur et d'autre part, Vincent Francis, criminologue, chercheur qualifié à l’UCLouvain, spécialiste en matière de politiques de sécurité urbaine. Il sera modéré par Céline Romainville, juriste, professeure de droit constitutionnel à l’UCLouvain et vice-présidente de la Ligue des droits de l’homme.

Le débat sera introduit par Cécile Van de Velde, sociologue, professeure à l’Université de Montréal et spécialiste de sociologie de la jeunesse et par Erik Schokkaert, économiste, professeur à la KULeuven et spécialiste de l’économie de la santé. Il sera modéré par Laurie Van Buggenhout, étudiante en Master en anthropologie et Présidente du conseil de l’AGL.

Le débat sera introduit par Renaud Maes, physicien et sociologue, professeur à l’Université St. Louis (Bruxelles) et à l'ULB et rédacteur en chef de La Revue Nouvelle, et par Charles Girard, philosophe, maitre de conférences à l’université de Lyon 3, directeur du programme de recherche Egalibex consacré à la liberté d’expression. Il sera modéré par Amata Mbani, étudiante en théologie à l’UCLouvain.

Inscription : chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

Le Dr. Pierre-François Laterre, chef du service des soins intensifs aux cliniques universitaires St. Luc, constate que 80% des patients covid 19 hospitalisés dans son service sont des personnes issues de quatre groupes allochtones, qu’environ la moitié d’entre elles ne comprennent ni le français, ni le néerlandais et qu’elles sont très mal informées sur la pandémie; il plaide en conséquence pour des politiques ciblées à l’endroit de ces quatre groupes allochtones. Son argument est fort : pourquoi les segments mieux informés de la population devraient-ils subir des contraintes inutiles dans leur cas? Mais du simple point de vue de l’acceptabilité sociale, des mesures ciblées, comportant peut-être une distribution inégale des contraintes au sein de la population, choqueraient les populations concernées et nombre de citoyens attachés à un idéal égalitaire. Cependant il est un fait que même ces derniers acceptent que des individus réputés « incapables » (généralement pour cause de déficiences mentales) jouissent de moins de droits -et soient astreints à moins de devoirs- que leurs concitoyens. Dans le cas présent, on pourrait imaginer des mesures ciblées provisoires et justifiées, à la fois dans l’intérêt de la santé publique et dans l’intérêt même de la protection des personnes considérées. Comment combiner l’égalité formelle de tous et une distribution inégale des mesures (incitatives ou répressives) ? Comment éviter que des citoyens soient privés de libertés sous prétexte que des contraintes sont nécessaires pour certains et qu’en démocratie, les droits et les devoirs doivent être les mêmes pour tous ?

14h45-15h30: André Masson, "Dear Inheritance"
Resp: Paolo Silvestri

15h30-15h45: Break

15h45-16h30: Åsbjørn Melkevik, "A Marginal Though Radical View on Inheritance"
Resp: Mélanie Plouviez

16h30-17h15: Eric Fabri, "From self-ownership to free transfers: the missing link"
Resp: Catarina Neves

À l’occasion des 100 ans de John Rawls et des 50 ans de sa Théorie de la justice, cette journée d’étude se déroulera en trois temps. D’abord, un retour sur la manière dont cette œuvre a été reçue et continue de l’être dans le monde francophone. Ensuite, des souvenirs plus biographiques de Rawls. Enfin, nous nous pencherons sur quelques idées qui ont marqué une série de chercheurs passés par la Chaire Hoover pour qui il fut une source d’inspiration importante.

La réception de Rawls
11h - 12h30

Présidente de séance : Speranta Dumitru (Université Paris, Science Politique)

Mathieu Hauchecorne (Université Paris VIII) 
"Lire Rawls en français. Une réception singulière?"
Maxime Lambrecht (Chaire Hoover, Chaîne Youtube Philoxime)  
« Rawls sur Youtube »

Souvenirs de Rawls
13h30 - 14h30

Présidente de séance : Marie Bastin "Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, philosophie"

Rima Hawi (Université de Versailles, Saint Quentin en Yvelines) 
« "Just Jack", l'autobiographie de John Rawls »
Philippe Van Parijs (Chaire Hoover & KU Leuven)  
« Quatre rencontres, trois désaccords »

Idées marquantes
14h45 - 17h

Présidente de séance : Danielle Zwarthoed « Professeure d'histoire-géographie au lycée Guillaume Apollinaire (Thiais) et ancienne enseignante-chercheuse à la Chaire Hoover"

Thomas Ferretti (The London School of Economics and Political Science) 
« L'actualité de John Rawls contre Katrina Forrester »
Louis Larue (University of Gothenburg, Sweden, Philosophie Pratique)
« Rawls au service d'une science pluraliste? »
Pierre-Étienne Vandamme (ULB & Chaire Hoover)
« Justice et efficacité au-delà de la rationalité capitaliste »
Sandrine Blanc (INSEEC Grande Ecole)
"Penser l'entreprise avec John Rawls ?"

Co-organisateurs : Axel Gosseries et Pierre-Etienne Vandamme
Inscriptions : chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

13h30-14h20: Mélanie Plouviez & Marie Bastin, "The Rignano principle in inheritance taxation: Philosophical arguments and contemporary uses"
Resp: Guido Erreygers

14h20-15h10: Alejandro Berrotaran, Is the right to bequeath a basic liberty?
Resp: Leonardo Menezes

15h10-15h30: Break

15h30-16h20: Antoine Germain, Economic theories of bequests taxation and fairness
Resp: Manuel Valente

16h20-17h10: Paolo Silvestri, "The gift of Inheritance. Ideas from the Percentage Tax Designation Institutions"
Resp: Axel Gosseries

Participer à la réunion Zoom

https://zoom.us/j/98480792309?pwd=akQrWVo2OTV4cE5ycXFvZFRMNUpsdz09

ID de réunion : 984 8079 2309
Code secret : 480487

Héritages et usages de Rawls
THEORIE DE LA JUSTICE 50 ans après

 La date limite d’envoi des propositions est le 30 mai 2021
L’avis du Conseil scientifique sera rendu par email à partir du 30 juin 2021

Committees multiply in firms, whether ethics or stakeholders committees, multi-stakeholders initiatives, or a recently established ‘Supreme Court’ at Facebook. These arrangements aim to organise and legitimise the social activities of corporations. This article raises the question of the appropriate form of such governance structures. The examples above illustrate three possible ways of legitimizing corporate social actions: deliberation within the company, deliberation outside and an approach we label corporate constitutionalism. While the first two models have been tested in practice and assessed in theory at some length, the third one is comparatively more recent, both in practice and in theory. This article focuses on the latter model and asks whether corporate constitutionalism is more appropriate for legitimizing corporate social action than deliberation (with or within firms). It examines the respective merits and justification of deliberative democracy and constitutional democracy as theoretical models for legitimatising corporate social actions.

This paper argues that methodological nationalism distorts Rawls’ understanding of justice. Methodological nationalism assumes that nation-states are the relevant units of analysis, and so does Rawls. This choice is, however, a source of bias for various reasons. One of them is that framing distributive justice in national terms is a way to increase the “citizenship rent”. The economist Branko Milanovic (2016) defined the concept of “citizenship rent” as the revenue people reap only by being ‘citizens’ of rich countries. He calculated that the citizenship rent in rich countries is higher for the lowest incomes than for the median incomes. The aim of this paper is to address a different question: how rich and poor people all over the world could be “redistributed” in countries in order to minimize the citizenship rent?

Cet E-Mich aura lieu en comodal au Doyen 21 et sur Teams.

While many expect happiness to decline in old age, research into well-being and happiness suggests otherwise. Happiness is U-curved, with the bottom of the U, the unhappiest part, experienced in middle age and happiness increasing thereafter. This surprising diachronic phenomenon presents ethical questions concerning the way we perceive our own and other peoples’ lives and how individuals and society ought to respond to ageing. This paper fleshes out some of these implications. I claim the U-curve could influence, inter alia, our attitudes to our own ageing, debates concerning prioritisation of the elderly in health decisions, and attitudes towards end-of-life decisions.

As an example of how the U-curve can influence the conclusion of an applied ethical problem in population ethics, I revisit Peter Singer’s claim that substantially extending later life would reduce total utility. Singer argues that given a fixed population, declines in happiness at the end of life could result in reduced population happiness, even if each individual was better off. With some qualifications, I defend Mark Walker’s claim that, in undermining the crucial empirical assumption that life gets worse as we age, the U-curve casts doubt on Singer’s critique of life extension.

In this presentation I examine a left-wing libertarian view that combines self-ownership with an egalitarian account of reciprocity. I discuss what kind of equality underpins such a view, comparing it with other left-wing libertarian approaches (left-libertarianism and libertarian socialism). I argue that, pace Quong, self-ownership and the luck-egalitarian justification of equality typically adopted by left-libertarians are not in tension. Nonetheless, left-libertarians have reason to complement their view with duties of reciprocity to capture a distinctively solidaristic aspect of equality. Second, I examine how reciprocity can be embedded in a libertarian socialist framework in which external resources are collectively owned, showing that reciprocity does not tie the realisation of distributive equality to a particular economic system (socialist vs. non-socialist). Third, I examine some policy implications that follow from combining self-ownership with reciprocity: these differ depending on which rights people can have over external resources, but all left-wing libertarian views committed to reciprocity acknowledge the existence of social rights that people have as co-operators.

Les Michs avaient originairement pour objectif de confronter des théories éthiques à des cas d’éthique appliquée. C’est cette fin que je nous propose de poursuivre en abordant un cas concret de politique publique : le travail qui sera mené dans les semaines et les mois qui viennent à propos de la mise en place d’une consultation populaire au sein de la région de Bruxelles-Capitale.

A supposer qu’on estime que la consultation populaire est un outil démocratique légitime, quelles sont les enjeux politiques qui président à sa mise en place ?

La littérature académique tend à pose les problèmes éthique un par un : un article, une question. Or, les politiques publiques se caractérisent par le fait que tous ces enjeux sont mêlés, de telle sorte que les réponses qu’on donne à un problème X influence inévitablement le traitement donné au problème Y. Pour n’en citer que quelques-uns : la consultation populaire doit-elle faire l’objet d’un vote obligatoire ? Sur quelle base définit le corps électoral ? Faut-il déterminer des seuils pour le dépôt des propositions de consultation, et/ ou des seuils de validité pour la consultation ? Quels sont les modes de dépôt des propositions de la consultation ? Quel rôle le Parlement et/ou la Cour constitutionnelle peuvent/ doivent-ils jouer à cet égard ? En quelle langue les convocations doivent-elles être écrites ? Comment la question sera-t-elle formulée ? Comment le débat sera-t-il organisé ? Les pouvoirs publics doivent-ils prendre en charge la délibération publique de la consultation (débats médias, town hall meetings, etc.) ?

Par ailleurs, une large littérature s’est intéressée ces dernières années à ce qu’on appelle les théories non-idéales de la démocratie/ de la justice. Mais concrètement, qu’est-ce que cela veut dire ? Quelles sont ces dimensions non-idéales ? Doit-on les considérer comme des obstacles, comme de simple contraintes ? Dans le cas qui nous occupe, celles-ci sont nombreuses :

- Contraintes juridiques et constitutionnelles : la Constitution encadre étroitement le cadre dans lequel les consultations peuvent être mises en place
- Contraintes formelles et légistiques : la consultation est mise en place via un outil déterminé, l’ordonnance
- Contraintes politiques : la consultation est négociée entre six partis, dont l’attachement aux consultations est très variable, et dont la conception même de ce que doit être une consultation est variable également
- Multiplicité des enjeux
- Distinction à faire entre l’intérêt normatif de certaines questions (ex : intégration du tirage au sort au sein de la procédure de consultation) et les priorités matérielles/ politiques (ex : heures d’ouverture des bureaux de vote)
- Tensions entre critères de justification de la consultation et critères d’applicabilité (ex : doit-on instaurer des seuils électoraux commune par commune ?)
- ...

Needs (the theory of needs) have minimal prominence in justice and modern law theories, especially in the foundation of rights. This invisibility has diverse effects on justice and rights, deepening inequality and social injustice. Among them, it reproduces a hierarchical scheme of rights detached from basic needs, including social rights, those most closely linked to the most urgent material needs. These are relegated to a subordinate place in the face of individual, civil and political rights, and it is not perceived that their curtailment and ineffectiveness damages the democratic nucleus of modern states of law, underestimating the interdependence that individual, civil and political rights have regarding them. Needs claim a central place in theories of justice, linked to equality and freedom, and must function as a foundation of rights. Or at least as good reasons for the justification of rights. It is, therefore, necessary to return, without prejudice, to take the theory of needs seriously, to show the tension that exists between needs, poverty, and rights, to discuss the concept of needs (from which we can challenge the law), to be able to propose a classification of needs (to question the hierarchies of law) and argue about how needs can function as reasons to justify rights.

Inscription obligatoire auprès des organisateurs, que ce soit pour y assister sur place ou à distance.

Lien pour participer en ligne (via Microsoft Teams)
Il n’est pas nécessaire d’avoir un abonnement ni d’avoir téléchargé l’application pour participer.

Programme :

13h45 : Accueil et introduction
14h : Sandrine Baume (Université de Lausanne) – Jusqu’où la démocratie peut-elle aller pour se protéger ? L’approche kelsénienne et ses échos contemporains
14h40 : Alice el-Wakil (Université de Zurich) – Agenda politique et systèmes démocratiques
15h20 : Pierre-Étienne Vandamme (Université libre de Bruxelles) – Qu’est-ce qui fait la légitimité de la représentation par tirage au sort ?

16h : pause

16h20 : Pierre Crétois (Université Bordeaux-Montaigne) – Le concept de propriété : entre réalisme et conventionnalisme
17h : François Boucher (KU Leuven) – Injustice structurelle, responsabilité collective et allocation des obligations de protection des réfugiés
17h40 : Victor Mardellat (EHESS) – Une solution contractualiste au problème du tramway ?
18h20 : fin de la journée

La rencontre sera suivie par une discussion sur la création d’un réseau de chercheur.e.s en théorie politique analytique.

Résumés des interventions :

Jusqu'où la démocratie peut-elle aller pour se protéger ? L'approche kelsénienne et ses échos contemporains (Sandrine Baume, Université de Lausanne)

Since the 1930s, there have been intense debates about how far democracy can go to secure itself against its enemies. In regard to this controverse, Hans Kelsen’s antagonistic relationship with militant democracy is well established in the literature and is not a matter of controversy. Indeed, Kelsen indisputably opposed “militant democracy” (Capoccia 2013; Müller 2016; Malkopoulou and Nordman 2018; Bruijnaers 2018) and emerged as a serious challenger of this paradigm, which Loewenstein pioneered and elaborated in the interwar years. Kelsen very clearly manifested his opposition to democratic governments attempting to assert themselves “against the will of the majority” in any way (Kelsen 1932, my translation).

Although, Kelsen’s opposition to “militant democracy” appears undisputable, I examine his position for two reasons, each of them in a specific section of my paper. In the section 1, I would like to anchor more deeply and systematically Kelsen’s opposition to militant democracy in his own theory of democracy, with an intent to explain why his opposition was so surprisingly immune to the defeat of democracies, as painfully observed in the 1930s. In section 2, the paper, on the one hand, re-evaluates the widespread opinion according to which Kelsen would not have any contemporary supporters regarding his rejection of militant democracy, and on the other hand, discusses the lines of consistency–inconsistency between Kelsen and a new generation of authors sharing doubts regarding militant democracy. Along with historical reasons, this evaluation will also show how delicate it is to endorse Kelsen’s arguments and mainly his relativism to reject militant democracy. Through these two steps, this paper provides a fresh perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of Kelsen’s perspective on militant democracy and evaluates his influence on that matter in the contemporary literature.

Qu’est-ce qui fait la légitimité de la représentation par tirage au sort ? (Pierre-Etienne Vandamme, Université libre de Bruxelles)

Cet article explore les sources possibles de légitimité des assemblées citoyennes tirées au sort. De tels organes sont de plus en plus appelés à faire des recommandations au nom du grand public et sont même considérés par certains théoriciens politiques comme une forme de représentation préférable à la représentation électorale. Hélène Landemore a récemment soutenu que la légitimité d’une telle représentation « lotocratique » découlerait essentiellement d'un moment d’autorisation populaire – une autorisation à être représenté par tirage au sort, exprimée par exemple dans un référendum. Cet article traite de la question préalable : quelles raisons les citoyens pourraient-ils avoir d'autoriser une telle forme de représentation, et pour quelles fonctions ? L’égalité politique, la représentativité statistique, l’ordinarité et l'impartialité font l’objet d'une discussion critique et sont rejetés comme bases solides de légitimité. Le potentiel délibératif et épistémique d’assemblées citoyennes correctement conçues est alors défendu comme une source de légitimité plus forte, mais pour des assemblées citoyennes complétant la représentation électorale, avec un rôle politiquement influent mais subordonné. L’article rejette donc à la fois l'affirmation de C. Lafont selon laquelle les assemblées de citoyens devraient informer l’opinion publique mais pas la prise de décision politique, et celle de Landemore selon laquelle elles pourraient être le principal organe législatif.

Le concept de propriété : entre réalisme et conventionnalisme (Pierre Crétois, Université Bordeaux-Montaigne)

Le concept de propriété a fait l’objet de quelques développements philosophiques dans le contexte français récent mais qui restent assez rares alors que de nombreux articles et livres importants ont pu être écrits à son sujet en langue anglaise. Est-ce à dire que la common law rend plus ouverte la réflexion en la matière ? Il est vrai que le droit continental semble avoir tranché le problème de la nature du droit de propriété dans le du code civil à l’article 544 : « La propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements. » Cette position est celle que j’appellerais réaliste pour deux raisons, d’abord au sens le plus standard de la méta-éthique parce qu’elle donne au droit de propriété un contenu objectif, ensuite, en un sens plus spécifique à mon approche, parce qu’elle caractérise la propriété comme une relation qui attribue une ressource matérielle (res) à une personne.

Prima facie, on se demande légitimement comment définir autrement le droit de propriété. Pourtant, en analysant la notion de plus près, on découvre qu’il existe plusieurs façons possibles de prendre une distance théorique à l’égard du réalisme sous-jacent aux conceptions dominantes. Je les limiterai à trois que je déclinerai en jouant sur une différenciation entre le fondement et le contenu du concept de propriété. (a) Le fondement du concept de propriété désigne dans notre approche ce qui explique son existence : la propriété est-elle une réalité normative dont l’existence est relativement indépendante des institutions ou une convention ? (b) Le contenu du concept de propriété désigne l’ensemble de ses caractéristiques essentielles : les caractéristiques du concept de propriété dépendent-elles ou non de nos attentes subjectives ou ont-elles, au contraire, une dimension objective relativement indépendante des orientations de l’esprit ? Notre exposé permettra d’établir une typologie entre trois conceptions différentes du droit de propriété : un réalisme du fondement et du contenu ; un conventionnalisme du fondement avec réalisme du contenu ; un conventionnalisme du fondement et du contenu. Cette typologie est de nature à éclaircir certaines incompréhensions conceptuelles au sujet de la propriété et à clarifier les positions en présence.

Injustice structurelle, responsabilité collective et allocation des obligations de protection des réfugiés (François Boucher, KU Leuven)

(Pas de résumé)

Une solution contractualiste au problème du tramway ? (Victor Mardellat, EHESS)

Pour résoudre le problème du tramway, les contractualistes scanloniens doivent établir qu’il existe un principe qui (i) autorise un passant à dévier un tramway sur une personne innocente si cela est nécessaire pour empêcher que le tramway ne renverse et ne tue cinq autres innocents, (ii) interdit à un chirurgien de tuer un patient non consentant afin de greffer ses organes viables sur cinq autres personnes qui mourront si la greffe n’est pas réalisée, et (iii) est tel qu’aucune des personnes concernées ne pourrait raisonnablement le rejeter. Dans cette contribution, on s’intéressera au Principe des Séquences Causales, qui remplit les conditions (i) et (ii) en ce qu’il attache une importance morale particulière à la distinction entre créer et rediriger des menaces. Nous montrerons d’abord que les contractualistes ex post – qui évaluent la rejetabilité raisonnable d’un principe donné sur la base des fardeaux et préjudices que ce principe autoriserait les individus à faire peser sur autrui – sont incapables d’expliquer pourquoi le passant est autorisé à dévier le tramway. Nous avancerons ensuite un argument visant à démontrer que le contractualisme ex ante – dans le cadre duquel la rejetabilité raisonnable d’un principe donné est fonction du risque que tel ou tel fardeau ou préjudice s’abatte sur les personnes occupant certaines positions génériques – est en mesure de produire une défense convaincante du Principe des Séquences Causales, et ainsi de résoudre le problème du tramway.

Le certificat universitaire en éthique et sociale, organisé par la Chaire Hoover, vous propose une formation qui répondra à ce souhait.
Le programme (30 crédits) peut être étalé sur deux années et suivi conjointement à un autre programme.

Plus d’informations:

Certificat en éthique

Rendez-vous à la séance d’information le jeudi 16 septembre 2021 de 13h à 14h - Collège Dupriez (place Montesquieu 3) - salle d305

Pour s'inscrire

Programme

Lien

PROGRAMME

11:30 - 12:00 Juan OLANO (UCLouvain)
"Technological Unemployment and Vrousalis'view on Exploitation"

12:00 - 12:30 Eleonora D'ANNIBALE (KU Leuven)
"Citizenship and mobility rights during a pandemic"

12:30 - 13:00 Onur DERIN (Leiden University)
"Justifying Patriotism"

13:00 - 14:00 Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:30 Felix BENDER (KU Leuven)
"Should Refugees Govern Refugee Camps? A non-ideal democratic theory for refugee camps"

14:30 - 15:00 Thomas FOSSEN (Leiden University)
"Associative Political Obligations and the Practical Point of View"

15:00 - 15:30 Rutger LAZOU (UCLOUVAIN)
"Legitimate Expectations about Stranded Fossil Fuel Reserves:
Towards a Just Transition."

Organisation: François Boucher, Manuel Valente & Tim Meijers
Registration: Manuel Valente 

Autant de questions sur lesquelles nous éclaireront nos deux intervenants : Christine Clavien, philosophe à l’IEH2 de l’Université de Genève et membre de la commission nationale suisse d’éthique dans le domaine de la médecine humaine, ainsi que Sébastien Van Drooghenbroeck, juriste constitutionaliste, professeur à l’Université St Louis (Bruxelles) Membre du Comité consultatif de biothique de Belgique et assesseur à la section de législation du Conseil d’Etat. Il sera modéré par Sandy Tubeuf, économiste de la santé, professeure à l’UCLouvain.

Autant de questions sur lesquelles nous éclaireront nos deux intervenants: Raul Magni Berton, politologue, Professeur à Sciences Po Grenoble et Sophie Pissart, romaniste, conseillère à l’Institut Emile Vandervelde en charge des questions d’enseignement supérieur. Le débat sera modéré par Vincent Vandenberghe, économiste, Professeur à l’UCLouvain et spécialiste des questions d’économie de l’éducation et du travail.

Attention : participation libre mais inscription obligatoire : chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

In order to gain clarity and depth on these issues of gender and immigration, we will have three speakers: Sylvie Sarolea, Lawyer, Professor of Immigration and Refugee Law at UCLouvain, Herbert Bruecker, economist and Professor at the Humbolt University Berlin, and Chris Bertram, philosopher, Emeritus Professor in Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Bristol. The debate will be moderated by Adriana Costa Santos, PhD student in political science at Université St Louis (Brussels) and linchpin of BXLRefugees. François Boucher, philosopher and Post-doc researcher at KULeuven will launch the first question.

Questions from the audience can of course be asked in French. We will translate them for the speakers if needed.

Attention : participation libre mais inscription obligatoire : chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

This presentation focuses on the recent book "L'économie de longue période" (Economica, 2020), which provides an introduction to the economic analysis of the long period, with a particular emphasis on the study of the existence of multiple economic regimes, each regime being characterized by its own set of laws and regularities, and on the study of the conditions driving the transition from one regime to another regime. Taking this theoretical framework as a starting point, we will then examine some possible paths to go from backward-looking positive analysis of the long period to forward-looking normative analysis of social change. Here are some questions that will be evoked. How can the study of the succession of regimes in the past help us thinking about the transition towards a better society? What can we learn from multiple-regime models for the study of social justice over time? What possibilities and constraints do multiple regimes impose on the quest for an ideal society? 

‘No-plane’ workshop
Organized by Axel Gosseries & Pierre André
Free but registration required (contact: pi.andre@uclouvain.be)

In 2020, the number of climate cases had nearly doubled in three years, with approximately 1 550 cases across 38 countries, among which landmark cases targeting states (Urgenda v. Netherlands) and corporations (Milieudefensie et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell). Although this gave rise to a growing body of legal literature, climate litigation also raises important yet underdeveloped issues for legal and political philosophy. The latter are the focus of this conference, both in terms of democratic theory and from the angle of the theory of justice.

Programme

Day 1: Thursday, September 22, 2022 – 14:00-17:15 CEST

Topic 1: Principles in climate litigation

14:00-14:45
Kian Mintz-Woo (University College of Cork)
Historical Responsibility for Climate Loss & Damage

14:45-15:30
Stephen Riley (University of Leicester)
Coherence in Climate Change Cases: Principles, Authority & the Limits of Obligation

15-minute break

Topic 2: Between national and global norms

15:45-16:30
Laura Garcia Portela (U. de Fribourg), Carlotta Garofalo (Uni Graz) & Santiago Truccone-Borgogno (Uni Graz), What Can National Courts Do for Climate Justice?

16:30-17:15
Marcos de Armenteras Cabot (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna)
Protecting a Global Common Good through National Litigation

Day 2: Friday, September 23, 2022 – 14:00-17:15 CEST

Topic 3: The separation of powers

14:00-14:45
Céline Romainville (UCLouvain)
Separation of Powers in Climate Litigation

14:45-15:30
Jasmina Nedevska (University of Uppsala)
Courts, Climate Change and Separation of Powers: Varieties in Dispute Resolution

15-minute break

15:45-16:30
Maria João Paixão (University of Coimbra)
Between Legality and Policy: The Last Frontier of State Climate Inaction

16:30-17:15
Gina Gioia (Università degli Studi della Tuscia)
Chasing Nuisance for an Injunction in Climate Litigation

“Survival of the fittest” is often taken to imply that human life must be the Hobbesian “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” However, recent theoretical analyses of the evolution of preferences guiding behaviors of individuals show, on the contrary, that natural selection promotes a particular form of preferences, which may be interpreted as implying a partial Kantian moral concern. The talk will provide a precise account of the ultimate forces behind this result, and discuss implications of the said preferences.

Piers HALE (University of Oklahoma)

Although terms like Darwinism and Social Darwinism have been used as historical categories to classify certain forms of biological or social thought, the historical record reveals that what it meant to be a Darwinian and what implications this might have for our conception of human nature and thus for what kind of society we could best achieve, were very much contested. Indeed, the political and social messages that could be drawn from his 1859 book On the Origin of Species were quite different than those that could be taken from his 1871 Descent of Man. This much is demonstrated by the very different visions of life in a Darwinian society outlined by the liberal anatomist and advocate of Darwinism, Thomas Henry Huxley and the Russian geographer and anarchist, Peter Kropotkin. Other commentators drew out what they perceived to be the implications of Darwin’s work for society regarding sex and race.

Thomas REYDON (University of Hannover)

The application of evolutionary concepts and evolutionary models in areas of research outside the biological sciences has become widespread. An increasing number of fields of research self-identify as being evolutionary in nature. Examples include: evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary ethics, evolutionary aesthetics, evolutionary psychology, evolutionary economics, evolutionary archaeology, evolutionary history, evolutionary electronics, evolutionary computing/programming, evolutionary social science, and more. All can be subsumed under the overarching term of ‘Generalizing Darwinism’ or ‘Generalizing Evolutionary Theory’. But the approaches taken in these fields diverge widely with respect to how evolutionary concepts and models are used, and what ‘evolution’ and ‘Darwinism’ are supposed to mean. This is why I use ‘generalizing’ rather than ‘generalized’: a generalized view of evolution or Darwinism is not available; rather, what is available is a diversity of attempts to generalize evolutionary thinking beyond biology. In this presentation I will attempt a first pass at an overview of the various ways in which ‘Generalizing Darwinism’ can be understood. Because it is impossible in this talk to review all fields in which evolutionary approaches are taken, by way of example I will examine evolutionary economics to highlight the diversity of approaches that exist in that field alone, as well as some problems that the various approaches encounter.

Alessandro CIGNO (Université de Florence)

A species or society’s survival depends as much on its members’ ability to cooperate among themselves, as on their ability to reproduce faster than potential invaders. Both the biological and the economic literatures on cultural evolution lay great stress on the evolutionary stability of strategies and preferences conducive to cooperation, but pay little attention to the role of precommitment via contracts, rules and institutions. Besides, the economic literature pays little attention to the role of sexual reproduction in the evolution of cultural traits. Reproduction is typically either out of the picture, or asexual. If it is sexual, equilibrium is typically homogamous. In any case, no evolution can come from it. Today’s conversation addresses both these issues by examining the role of family rules and social norms in fostering cooperative behaviour, and highlighting their effects on the evolution of individual preferences.

February 10-11 - Louvain-la-Neuve - Hybrid mode

On the occasion of the Hoover Chair in economic and social ethics’ 30^th birthday, we decided to launch a new initiative aimed at bringing together the community of former visitors and fellows of the Chair. This will be an occasion for them to present and discuss their work in progress in the typically informal atmosphere of the Hoover Chair, trying to mix a spirit of kindness, sharpness, constructiveness… with a touch of humour.
Poster Hoover Chair Diaspora
Free but registration required, contact person: chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

Day 1 – Thursday, February 10, 2022
 

Panel 1 Diversity and Integration (14:00-15:45)

Chair: Thierry Ngosso, U. St. Gallen, Switzerland, (Hoover Member 2011-15)
Discussant: Diana Popescu, King’s College, London, (Hoover Visitor 2018-19)

Michela Riminucci, Kōbe U., Japan, (Hoover Visitor 2017-18):
Workplace Diversity and Inclusion Targets: A View from Japan

Julia Moura, Federal U. of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil (Hoover Fellow 2016-17):
Reconciliation, Race and Gender: Are Rawls's answers good enough?

Panel 2 Markets, Incentives, and Self-Interest (16:00-17:45)

Chair: Sandrine Blanc, INSEEC, Paris, (Hoover Fellow 2013-14)
Discussant: Tim Meijers, Leiden U. (Hoover Member 2012-16)

Louis Larue, U. Göteborg, Göteborg, (Hoover Member 2015-16):
What's wrong with the market motive?

Peter Dietsch, Victoria U., Vancouver, (Hoover Fellow 2003-04):
If it’s not your talent, how come we should be paying you an incentive?

Panel 3 Basic Income Revisited (18:00 – 19:15)

Chair: Philippe Van Parijs, Hoover Chair
Discussant: José Luis Rey Pérez, U. Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, (Hoover Visitor 2002-03)

Michael W. Howard, U. of Maine, U.S. (Hoover Fellow 2006-07):
Ecological Basic Income

Jurgen De Wispelaere, Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (Hoover Fellow 2002-03):
How Do We Know When Basic Income Experiments Work?

Day 2 – Friday, February 11, 2022

Panel 4 – Equality, Efficiency, Sufficiency (14:00-15:45)

Chair: Andrew Lister, Queen’s U., Kingston, Canada, (Hoover Fellow 2016-17)
Discussant: Grégory Ponthière, Hoover Chair

Marc Fleurbaey, Paris School of Economics, (Hoover Visitor 1992-94):
Efficiency and equity in a society-economy integrated model

Paula Casal, ICREAT/UPF, Barcelona, (Hoover Fellow 2001-02):
Equality, Sufficiency, and Intergenerational Justice

Panel 5 Restricting Freedom(s) (16:00-18:00)

Chair: Andrei Poama, Leiden, U., (Hoover Visitor 2015-16)
Discussant: Iñigo González Ricoy, U. Barcelona, Spain (Hoover Visitor 2012-13)

Nicola Riva, U. Milan, Milan (Hoover Visitor, 2007-08):
Freedom as a Limit to Freedom: An argument for a non-perfectionist paternalism

Greg Bognar, Stockholm U., (Hoover Fellow 2016-17):
The Ethics of Lockdowns

Refia Kaya, TOBB U./Ankara Bar Association, (Hoover Member 2016-20):
Should Religious Discrimination Law Embrace Environmental Commitments?

Political Philosophy in the Real Political Life - Ministerial panel (18h15-19h15)

Chair: Danielle Zwarthoed, (Hoover Member 2016-19)

François Blais, Laval U., Quebec (Former minister of education), (Hoover Fellow 1998-2000)

+ Surprise minister of education (TBC)

Autant de questions sur lesquelles nous éclaireront nos deux intervenants, Gilbert EGGERMONT, Physicien, Professeur émérite à la VUB, expert au Conseil Supérieur de la Santé, acteur et fin observateur du nucléaire depuis plus de 55 ans (SCK-CEN, ONDRAF,…) et Thomas PARDOEN, Ingénieur civil physicien, docteur en sciences appliquées et philosophe, Professeur ordinaire à l’EPL (UCLouvain), spécialiste en science des matériaux et impliqué tant dans le nucléaire (SCK-CEN) que dans le recyclage de matériaux issus de l’éolien notamment. Le débat sera modéré par Manon Roelandts, étudiante en 3ème année du programme PPE à l’UCLouvain.

Autant de questions importantes sur lesquelles nous éclaireront nos deux intervenantes, Carole VAN BASSELAERE, juriste, chargée chez UNIA des questions d’enseignement inclusif pour les élèves et étudiants en situation de handicap en Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles, et Valérie TREVISAN, sociologue, chargée à l’AVIQ de la promotion de l’emploi des personnes handicapées auprès des entreprises. Le débat sera modéré par Josef SCHOVANEC, Philosophe, écrivain, chroniqueur radio, spécialiste de l’autisme et membre de l’équipe PEPS’in de l’UCLouvain. Il sera introduit par la présentation de trois faits saillants.

Autant de questions essentielles sur lesquelles nous éclaireront nos deux intervenants : François BRABANT, rédacteur en chef de Wilfried, ancien journaliste au Vif/L'Express et à la Libre et enseignant à l'EJL (UCLouvain) et Frédéric Antoine, Professeur nouvellement émérite à l’EJL (UCLouvain), spécialiste de l’analyse socio-économique des médias et auteur de « mille medias de mille sabords ! ». Le débat sera modéré par Fabrizio CIOTTI, doctorant FRESH en économie digitale au Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCLouvain).

14 30 - 14 40 Opening remarks
14 40 - 15 20 Sharing the burdens
15 20 - 16 00 Opportunity costs and global justice

16 00 - 16 10 Coffee Break

16 10 - 16 50 Conservation where? Interrogating half earth
16 50 - 17 30 Biodiversity, offsetting, and markets

Discussants: Pierre André (UCLouvain), Axel Gosseries (UCLouvain), Jens Jorund Tyssedal (UCLouvain -AArhus Univesity) and Anne Wienhues (University of Zürich)

Each chapter (40’) = Introduction by the author (5’) - Discussant + replies (15’) - Debate with everyone (20’)

Realizing climate justice through taxation? The ethical cases for carbon dividends

Introducing carbon pricing mechanisms in rich countries seems justified by intergenerational and global climate justice to avoid systematic infringements on basic human rights. However, it may clash with traditional accounts of social justice at the domestic level, since carbon pricing generally puts a heavier burden (relatively to income) on the least advantaged. This difficulty could be overcome by redistributing the revenues from carbon pricing to citizens in the form of a “carbon dividend”. According to different ethical justifications, such a dividend could be unconditional, revenue-sensitive, or consumption-sensitive. And yet, a domestic carbon dividend could be seen as unfair with regards to global justice, compared to cash transfers to poor countries.

Data-driven technologies have relevant implications in our daily lives, affecting our democracies and fundamental rights. Getting a job, crossing borders, receiving public assistance or keeping informed are increasingly technologically mediated. However, within the last decades, tech giants have not only monopolised digital markets, but also have reached a privileged position to decide on the development and use of these technologies, often leaving citizens and political institutions aside. Facing this situation, the idea of digital sovereignty has gained importance to claim that these decisions should be democratically subject to popular control. To move towards digital sovereignty, the following three problems must be addressed, though: data domination, techno-elitism and techno-solutionism.

In 1776, Turgot abolishes the guilds in France in the name of the right to work, understood as the freedom of every individual to choose their profession. During the French Revolution, this right to earn a living through labour becomes the foundation of the new social pact: labour leads to property and property entitles to participate in public affairs as a citizen. Now, what about those who work but do not own property? In the Revolution itself, three different responses to this problem can be clearly distinguished: simply extending freedom to labour, generalising access to small property, subordinating property to the guarantee of the rights of all. During the July Monarchy, the same problem arises again, leading to the Revolution of 1848, which can be considered as the first historical example of the confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. At the legal level, this confrontation takes place, during the constitutional debate, between the right to property and the right to work, the latter understood no longer in Turgot’s sense, but with a socialist connotation.

The monthly pension gap between men and women is more than twice the pay gap at other ages. So what should distributive egalitarians think about the pension gap? I consider two arguments for this inequality: women should either 1) receive less overall because they contribute less ‘in-cash’ or 2) receive less monthly because they tend to live longer. Distributive equality offers a plausible rejection of these arguments, suggesting that we close the monthly gap with women receiving more overall. To this end, egalitarians should prefer age (to gender) differentiation, given how progressive old-age retirement can contribute to further gender equality.

Quelle forme pourrait revêtir l’entreprise dans une économie de marché post-capitaliste, toujours soumise à la loi de la concurrence mais plus à la dictature du profit ? Telle qu’instituée par l’article 1832 du Code civil français, la société commerciale a pour seule finalité légale le profit des actionnaires : peut-on la réformer sans rogner sur la liberté contractuelle ? Comment l’émanciper de l’emprise du capital, sans renoncer aux vertus d’une économie décentralisée ? Quelles seraient les conditions institutionnelles d’une authentique RSE ?

Peut-on penser une « entreprise partenariale » dont la gouvernance inclurait l’ensemble des parties prenantes ?

Plus sur https://equiteisme.com/index.php/entreprise/

approaches in the philosophy of immigration are often aligned with two standard positions: defending the state’s sovereignty in controlling immigration or the right of individuals to immigrate. Although the standard debate has produced an extensive literature, its theoretical foundations seem to lack the sensitivity to conceptualise and assess other dimensions relevant to immigration control.

Policies regulating immigration affect not only potential and effective immigrants but also citizens, and they do so in myriad ways.

A particularly troubling impact of immigration control is the coercion or punishment of actions led by civil society in support or association with immigrants. In response to the effect that immigration policies have on locals, I propose a theoretical framework to capture normative claims of citizens regarding their freedom to engage with immigrants, including unauthorised ones. I then advance a normative argumentation to strengthen the right of citizens not to be criminalised for actions related to migrant solidarity, based on freedom of association and the liberty to comply with moral duties of humanitarian aid and special obligations in solidarity relationships.

Are tech-lumpenproletarians dominated?

“Tech-lumpenproletariat” refers to the mass of chronically unemployed people displaced from the labour market by automation. Such can be the situation of cashiers in the case of self-checkout machines or taxi drivers in the case of automated vehicles. In this article, I will argue that tech-lumpenproletarians are not necessarily dominated, relationally nor structurally, since they are not under the power of others. This poses a problem for non-domination theories, since they cannot correctly diagnose the unjust situation of tech-lumpenproletarians. I conclude that non-domination theories are ill-equipped to face this increasingly important challenge.

Intervenants :

Daniel Dumont (ULB)
Nathalie Frogneux (UCLouvain - ISP)
Jean Hindriks (UCLouvain - CORE)
Gregory Ponthiere (UCLouvain - ISP)

En ce XXIe siècle, l’idée d’un revenu de base à destination de la jeunesse est devenue un incontournable du débat public sur la réforme de la protection sociale. Les fondements philosophiques d’un tel revenu « jeune » sont cependant assez peu développés alors même qu’ils conditionnent sa désirabilité, son financement et donc son acceptabilité.

Un argument important mais occulté du débat est, selon nous, le risque d’une mort précoce, qui empêche les individus de réaliser leurs rêves, et les prive des joies de la retraite (actuellement réservée aux travailleurs qui atteignent des âges élevés). L’inversion partielle des systèmes de retraite, c’est-à-dire le versement d’une « pension » avant l’entrée dans la vie active, permettrait d’assurer chaque citoyen contre le risque d’une vie brève. Son financement pourrait reposer sur une durée d’activité accrue dans l’âge senior. On le comprend, la mise en place d’un revenu « jeune », au travers d’une inversion partielle des systèmes de retraite, nécessite une refondation de notre État-providence : c’est le prix à payer pour concilier l’incertitude universelle sur la durée de la vie et l’exigence de justice sociale.

Poster

Link to the online conference: https://umontreal.zoom.us/j/85371446499?pwd=UDJkc3lJUXA5Ym9pdDZmTEI2d1ZLZz09

Programme :

By Anca Gheaus and Christine Straehle
11:15 Opening Remarks
Axel Gosseries (Un. catholique de Louvain)

11:20 Introduction

11:30
Anca Gheaus (Central European University) and
Christine Straehle (Hamburg University)
Chapter 1
Defending Surrogacy as Reproductive Labour
 Alain Loute (Un. catholique de Louvain)
 

12:15
Chapter 2
Against private surrogacy: a child-centred view
Tim Meijers (Leiden University)

13:00 Lunch Break

14:15 
Chapter 3
What’s in it for the baby?
Cléo Salion (Un. Panthéon-Sorbonne)


15:00
Chapter 4
Women and children first. A reply to Straehle
15h45 Teresa Baron (Czech Academy of Sciences)

Each chapter (45’) - Introduction by the authors (10’) - Discussant + replies (15’) - Debate with everyone (20’)

Hybrid workshop jointly organized by The Center for the Study of Rationalities and Beliefs (University of Bucharest) and the Hoover Chair of Social and Economic Ethics (UCLouvain)

Conveners: Laurentiu Gheorge (UNIBUC) and Axel Gosseries (Hoover Chair and ICUB)

This workshop aims at exploring the interconnections between factual, conceptual, axiological and normative levels. Each session will be divided between a presentation and a time for questions and debate.

Participants interested in joining us on zoom should sign in by contacting
Mrs. Dina Geron by June 6 noon
at the following address: chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be,
indicating in title message “June 7 workshop”.

Those present in Bucharest are invited to gather at Sala Constantin Noica (Fac. De Filosofie, Splauil Independentei, 204).
Background reading is available on request from Mrs Geron as well.

Zoom Link

https://us06web.zoom.us/j/83328329766?pwd=Y3Q3dnltc3JGR0RMNy9oU3dSYS9MQT09

Programme

2 p.m. (Bucharest time): Daniel Wodak (University of Pennsylvania)

How to Be a Non-Error Theoretic Eliminativist?
Eliminativists about ‘race’ hold that certain uses of ordinary race terms or concepts are typically wrong. I’ve previously argued that eliminativists need not be error theorists, insofar as they need not hold that those uses of ordinary race terms or concepts fail to refer. In this talk I want to explain how there are several powerful motivations for eliminativism, none of which depend on whether error theory is true. Collectively, they provide a good example of how our normative concerns about uses of terms or concepts comes apart from concerns about their accuracy—whether it’s a fact that there are races comes apart from whether it is wrong to think or speak about those races.

3 p.m.: Johan Olsthoorn (University of Amsterdam)

Conceptualizations driving normative judgments: on theorizing human rights of offenders
Many states across the world legally require prisoners to perform the work assigned to them, for hourly earnings far below the minimum wage. Compulsory prison labour jars with some established human rights (incl. to freedom of occupation and unionization). What, if anything, makes this penal practice morally permissible? I introduce this moral quandary to explore a deeper methodological point. Can conceptualizations of basic moral notions (e.g., of human rights) drive normative judgment? If so, how? My thesis is that normative judgments about the permissibility of compulsory prison labour schemes are shaped by how we conceptualize restrictions of basic moral rights of prisoners. Have offenders lost (‘forfeited’) some of their labour human rights through crime? Are those rights justifiably overridden for their own good or society’s (e.g., rehabilitation, deterrence)? Or are labour human rights protections simply inapplicable in prison contexts? How we conceptually frame the moral condition of the justly condemned logically constrains what kind of work requirements can permissibly be imposed upon them, and for what purposes. Verdicts about the just treatment of prisoners, this suggests, are steered by assumed conceptualizations of their curtailed rights. The paper concludes with some methodological suggestions on how to navigate cases like these.

4 p.m.: Vuko Andric (Bayreuth University & Institute for Futures Studies)

From Values to Norms: The Consequentialist Bridge
Abstract: The idea underlying consequentialism is to take facts about values to be explanatorily prior to facts about norms and other deontic facts. Many writers suggest that the most straightforward way to spell out the consequentialist idea leads to standard act consequentialism. In this paper, I argue that this is not so and that some versions of indirect consequentialism, like rule consequentialism, are prima facie equally likely to spell out the consequentialist idea in the most straightforward way.

5 p.m. : David Plunkett (Dartmouth College)

"After Metaethics? Error Theory, Realism, and the Conceptual Ethics of Normativity" (co-author: Tristram McPherson)
In this paper, we discuss how different projects relate to each other: the project of metaethics and the project of the conceptual ethics of normativity. We've discussed this issue before (and provided characterizations of both projects) in previous work. We here focus on how the literature on metanormative error theory - and, in particular, the discussion about what to do "after" error theory - provides a schema for thinking about some of the ways in which these projects can interact.

After moving online for the last few editions, this year’s 20th edition will be held in person, hosted by the Hoover Chair on the 23rd of June, 2022.

IMPORTANT: each speaker has 7’ minutes to present, followed by 7’ of questions (and answers if there is time left). No room for powerpoint. Hand-outs are highly recommended.

Organisation: François Boucher, Tim Meijers, & Andrés Salazar Abello
Information and Registration: Andrés Salazar Abello (andres.salazar@uclouvain.be)

When? June 23, 2022, 10:45 – 15:30
Where? Louvain-la-Neuve, UCLouvain,LECL93
(Auditoires Leclerq building, right in front of the building where the Hoover Chair is situated) See in Google Maps

Preliminary programme:

10:45 – 11:00 Welcome
Session Chair: Andrés Salazar Abello

11:00 - 11:15 Claudia GALGAU (KU Leuven)
What problems does differentiated whiteness pose for theories of structural injustice?

11:15 - 11:30 Adrián HERRANZ (U. Pompeu Fabra - Hoover visitor)
Should republicans use the notion of structural domination?

11:30 - 11:45 Sander VAN EIJKERN (U. Leiden)
The (im)possibility of an innocent delineation of the subject matter of metaethics

11:45 - 12:00 Bastiaan HOORNEMAN (U. Leiden)
Do Sincere Moral Judgements Motivate?

Lebanese lunch in the Patio
Session Chair: Axel Gosseries

13:45 - 14:00 Juan OLANO (UCLouvain)
Is there a Rawlsian neo-luddism? A Rawlsian critique to automation

14:00 - 14:15 Mariia PODHAIKO (KU Leuven)
Is there a legal basis for the integration of Ukrainian refugees to the European community?
 

Coffee Break
Session Chair: Manuel Valente

14:30 - 14:45 Jelena BELIC (U.Leiden)
Absolute Rights and Climate Change

14:45 - 15:00 Tamara VAN DEN BERG (KU Leuven)
Differential rights as bordering

15:00 - 15:15 Andrés SALAZAR ABELLO (UCLouvain)
Do citizens have a right but not a duty to resist unjust immigration policies?

15:15 Final Remarks

Les assemblées de citoyens peuvent bien avoir gagné en popularité dans le monde au cours des dernières décennies, elles demeurent, au mieux, des exercices consultatifs sophistiqués et, au pire, des occasions de diversion politique. Mais parfois les gouvernements laissent à leur population le soin de trancher par référendum l’appui aux propositions qu’elles génèrent.

En m’appuyant entre autres sur des données issues de sondages d’opinions réalisés autour d’assemblées de citoyens tenues dans deux provinces canadiennes il y a quelques années, je compte argumenter que dans certaines situations, on devrait pouvoir considérer les orientations retenues par de telles assemblées suffisamment légitimes pour qu’elles s’appliquent sans passer par le filtre référendaire.

Autant de questions sur lesquelles nous éclaireront Sophie Gérard, juriste, chercheuse en droit à l’ULB et coordinatrice de Street Law Clinic en droit social de l'ULB et Alain Trannoy, économiste, directeur d’études à l’EHESS, professeur d’économie à l’université d’Aix-Marseille et spécialiste des questions d’économie des inégalités. Il sera modéré par Brice Mpungu, étudiant gestion des ressources humaines à l’UCLouvain, membre du BDE (ESPO) et il sera brièvement introduit par quelques documents sur la précarité étudiante issus des archives de notre universités, présentés par Véronique Fillieux, historienne et archiviste à l’UCLouvain.

C’est sur ces questions que nous éclaireront Wouter De Vriendt, politologue, parlementaire fédéral et président de la Commission spéciale et Renier Nijskens, ancien ambassadeur et président de l’association d’anciens d'Afrique URBA-KBUA. Le débat sera modéré par Valérie Rosoux, politologue et philosophe, directrice de recherche du FNRS et professeure à l’UCLouvain, spécialiste des questions de mémoire. L’interaction avec le public sera lancée par notre témoin privilégiée, Mireille Ndayikunda, bachelière du PPE et étudiante en sciences politiques à l’UCLouvain.

Le débat sera introduit par Xavier Dumay, psychologue, professeur à l’UCLouvain en sciences de l’éducation et co-directeur du GIRSEF, Etienne Michel, directeur général du Segec, et Gaëlle Chapelle, psychologue, Professeure invitée à l’UCLouvain (FOPA), chercheuse à l'UNamur, formatrice d'adultes et observatrice des systèmes d'éducation et de formation. Il sera modéré par Florence Mernier, directrice adjointe du collège Notre-Dame de Basse Wavre.

We study redistributive taxation when there are inactive, unemployed and
employed agents. In a model with both heterogeneous preferences and unequal skills, labour market inactivity arises because of home production or
disutility of participation in the formal sector.

The social objective is characterized by fairness axioms championing the ethics of equality of opportunity while respecting the Pareto principle.
Applying this objective in a Mirrleesian environment, we show that the optimal inactivity benefit (1) decreases with the economy’s average wage rate,
(2) supplements rather crowds out the traditional safety net,
and (3) is likely to be negative empirically for most developed countries.
Overall, the results underline an unexpected conflict, but not an impossibility, between basic income and equality of opportunity.

In this paper I argue that labour justice requires differential free time policies such as longer holidays and a shorter working week for people with harder and less attractive work by examining a recent pensions reform in Denmark. This so-called ‘Arne-pension’ aims at giving a right to earlier retirement to workers with the longest careers and the physically most arduous work. I examine four rationales that were used or could be used to support this policy: (I) time in the labour market; (II) differences in longevity and health; (III) compensation for physical ardour; and (IV) compensation for low work quality broadly understood. I argue that the three last of these are not only strong rationales for differentiated retirement, but require going further, to differentiated free time policies such as a differentiated working week and holidays. Finally, I argue that other labour market policies often discussed in contemporary political theory, such as the basic income or workplace democracy have little to offer to solve the problem of hard work. Therefore, differentiated free time policies are indispensable to labour justice.

I highlight three features of P.F. Strawson’s later, neglected work on freedom and responsibility. First, in response to a criticism by Prasad, Strawson explicitly rejects an argument put forward in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ against the relevance of determinism to moral responsibility. Second, his remarkable acceptance of Prasad’s criticism motivates him to take the ‘straight path’, that is, to be straightforward about the relation between determinism, freedom, the ability to do otherwise and the conditions of responsibility. Third, he clarifies the relation between responsibility and the reactive attitudes. The latter do not figure essentially in his answer to the question, ‘What are the conditions of responsibility?’, but they do play an essential role in his answer to the question, ‘Why do we have the concept of responsibility?’ 

Within the domain of gender justice, recent years have witnessed what is often termed 'a toxic debate'. The debate features, on the one side, gender-critical feminists (with their insistence on the importance of biological sex) and on the other side, gender-embracing feminists (with their emphasis on the concept of gender viewed as a socially constructed artefact). In simpler terms, this is a debate that sees sex (and sex-specific concerns) pitted against gender (and gender-based concerns). In my presentation, I aspire to offer – and explore the feasibility of – what I think is an obvious solution to the acrimonious debate. Succinctly, the proposed solution favours a neat and strict distinction between the two concepts of sex and gender, and involves defining the two concepts in a manner that results in a simultaneous accommodation of the concerns of both aforementioned, mutually opposed camps.

"Le “C” de l’UCL: retour sur l’appel du 20 octobre 2008 et le débat qu’il a suscité."

Problematising the migrant-refugee distinction (co-authored with Natalia Cintra and Pia Riggirozzi)

Taking up the case of Venezuelan women migrants in South America, this paper focuses on elucidating the ethical problems raised by the refugee-migrant binary in terms of its conceptual form and practical import.

It identifies ways in which even the relatively wide construal of refugeehood in the Cartagena Declaration and even the relatively open character of the region to forced movement do not adequately address the case of Venezuelan women fleeing, for example, the collapse of maternal health systems at either a conceptual or practical level. To address this problem, we argue for the pertinence of Aleinikof and Zamore’s advocacy of a protection regime framed in terms of the concept of the necessary fleer, but we re-articulate the normative grounding of this figure in terms of a commitment to dignity in ways that are consequential for how we understand the concept and its practical implications.

Whether or not to vaccinate one’s child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an increasingly prevalent behavior, due to deleterious side effects that parents believe may accompany vaccination. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash behavioral protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. Because of the positive externality that each child’s vaccination generates for others, the Nash equilibrium suffers from a free-rider problem. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively –they may optimize according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We test, on a sample of six countries, whether childhood vaccination behavior conforms better to the individualistic or cooperative protocol. In order to do so, we conduct surveys of parents in these countries, to ascertain the distribution of beliefs concerning the subjective probability and severity of deleterious side effects of vaccination. We show that in all the countries of our sample the Kant model dominates the Nash model. We conjecture that, due to the free-rider problem inherent in the Nash equilibrium, a social norm has evolved, quite generally, inducing parents to vaccinate with higher probability than they would in the non-cooperative solution. Kantian equilibrium offers one precise version of such a social norm.

Authority (alongside testimony) as a source of knowledge in widely discussed in social epistemology. Discussions are mainly focused on the epistemic norm – i.e. what epistemic norm follows from acknowledging someone as an epistemic authority. My question is different: what are conditions or requirements for someone (or some institution) to be acknowledged as an epistemic authority. Usually these conditions are explicated as the agent’s higher order evidence that the person (or institution) in question is better positioned to arrive at a true belief on the question at issue – has superior epistemic capacities, better access to relevant evidence, etc. I argue that this prima facie plausible conception may have difficulties.

Consider, for example, Tuskegee experiment – does it only compromise the researchers involved (or the institution of science in general) in moral sense, being irrelevant to their status as epistemic authorities? The positive answer is quite plausible prima facie. And this intuition accords perfectly with the conception of epistemic authority just outlined. However, if we isolate the concept of epistemic authority from moral considerations in this manner, even a more radical conclusion may follow: that cases like Tuskegee experiment, in which scientists compromise their moral integrity for the sake of their epistemic goals, should be considered as not undermining but, instead, bolstering their status as epistemic authorities. Now, this conclusion may be upsetting, however, is not, in and by itself, paradoxical. So shall we accept it?

I will try to argue that a conception of epistemic authority that does not lead to this conclusion can be developed and it would be a more adequate conception on several counts. I will draw on some insights from virtue ethics for doing this.

The economics that is considered “mainstream” receives epithets such as “Keynesian” or “Friedmanite” – but not “Darwinian”. Evolutionary thinking seems to have made remarkably few inroads in economics. Is this a fair assessment, and if so, how can we account for this in terms of the goals and types of explanation preferred respectively by economics and evolutionary science? 

In this talk I introduce a third variable: an engineering approach to social policy. I discuss the little-known but significant history of how economics was related to eugenics in the early 20th century. It seems that the prestige accorded to eugenics in the early 20th century gave confidence to economists to reject laissez-faire and to adopt an engineering approach to the economy. Evolutionary scientists later repudiated eugenics, but economists retained the engineering approach to economics policy. In the talk I discuss how this can help explain why economists favor certain (non-evolutionary) types of explanation, and why economists, by and large, do not view contemporary evolutionary theory as being useful to their goals.

Le jury est composé de Mesdames et Messieurs les professeur.es :
Walter LESCH (UCLouvain), Président
Axel GOSSERIES (UCLouvain), Promoteur
Bruno VERBEEK (Leiden University), Co‐promoteur
Vincent VANDENBERGHE (UCLouvain), Lecteur
Anca GHEAUS (Central European University) Lectrice extérieure
Serena OLSARETTI (Pompeu Fabra University), Lectrice extérieure

Le lien de connexion sera communiqué ultérieurement
à la page suivante :
https://uclouvain.be/fr/facultes/fial/agenda‐des‐theses

Despite being increasingly available to us all, retirement pensions remain unequally distributed: between rich and
poor, young and old, men and women, and possibly different generations. As this topic receives little attention in
moral and political philosophy, the articles in this thesis aim to deliver an original account of justice in retirement
pensions along liberal egalitarian lines. The first part defends retirement pensions as a distribution of free time. It
shows that including free time in the list of goods that liberal egalitarians prioritise is plausible and avoids problems
that would otherwise arise with other candidates, most notably leisure. Retirement as free time is an essential feature
of liberal egalitarian societies by (re)distributing the means to pursue any life project, and especially valuable for the
poor who work and contribute the longest. The second part makes a case for 'libertirement', a proposal to increase the
freedom to enjoy free time across life, as a matter of justice between those who live long and those who die early.
Specifically, I propose adding reverse pensions and sabbaticals on top of old‐age retirement. Besides showing the
importance of longevity for age‐group justice, I also draw implications for distributing unconditional basic income and
income taxes across life, which I suggest may offer alternative paths to libertirement. Finally, the third part discusses
the cases of pension inequality between genders and generations, pushing us to refine our account further. I conclude
that there is often a mismatch between liberal egalitarian justice and the design of retirement schemes. The solution is
often but not always to reform these systems. Sometimes, we have reasons to revise our very own principles of justice.

Many corporations are now legally required to calculate their carbon footprint. But which greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting methodology they should follow? While criteria of completeness and feasibility are obviously very important, controversies about emissions accounting cannot be properly understood without an examination of the ethical responsibility of corporations for climate change. After exploring the moral underpinnings of issues such as scope extension and multiple counting, I argue that we should consider the distribution of power within the value chain in order to evade the conundrums raised by an emissions accounting methodology based on the polluter-pays principle. 

Online through MS TEAMS -Please use this link to access the event

4PM: The right to inherit as compensation for elderly caregiving tasks
Alejandro BERROTARAN (Universidad Nacional de Córdoba)

4H35pm: Care Workers and the promise of inheritance
Catarina NEVES (CEPS, University of Minho)

5H05PM: Inheritance as a risk to family relational goods: which policy?
Marie BASTIN (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

The right to inherit as compensation for elderly caregiving tasks
Alejandro BERROTARAN, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

An increasing number of older adults require assistance to carry out their daily activities. This demand for caregiving services is mainly met by family members, mostly women, who perform these tasks without receiving any compensation for it. In this presentation, I will analyze the possibility of recognizing a right to inherit by children who provide care to their elderly parents as a mechanism of compensation for the tasks performed. This compensatory right to inherit will be subjected to three critiques. The first critique states that children have a duty to care for their parents. If providing care is a family obligation, it cannot be the source of a compensation. The second critique states that recognizing a right to inherit for family care tasks violates state neutrality because it implies assuming a comprehensive conception of the family and applying it to society. The third critique points out that the state is the main responsible for financing the care of the elders, so compensation for the performance of these tasks is not the elder's responsibility. In addressing each of these critiques I will present objections that can be made to them. Finally, I will conclude that a right to inherit can be conceived as a mechanism of compensation for care tasks under non-ideal conditions.

Care Workers and the Promise of Inheritance
Catarina NEVES, CEPS - University of Minho

Hendrik Hartog describes a case of a housekeeper that was promised by her employer that she would receive one of his three farms if she would remain working for him. She took care of the old man between 1876-1901, despite earning little. In In the end, however, that promise was not fulfilled, and instead his family was granted the three farms (Hartog, 2012: 102). In another instance, Lourdes Maria Cambra, a domestic worker, who worked for the first woman elected official in Brazil was publicly shamed after claiming that she was promised the possibility to live in her former employer’s house (Schpum, 2004). Both examples illustrate claims from paid care workers to receive an inheritance or to be entitled to gifts they might have received from their employers. These are usually women, who are paid very little, and perform challenging emotional and physical work.

Despite what seem instances of gift-giving, or plausible claims for compensation, both judicial courts (Hacker, 2022; Regev-Mesalem, 2020) and public opinion tend to reject paid care workers’ rights to inheritance. In what follows, I intend to explore this debate, by first discussing what I believe are the three normative arguments behind those who oppose care workers’ right to inheritance: 1) the possibility of corrupted motivations; 2) the idea that family needs to take precedence; and finally that 3) no double compensation should occur. I will proceed to explain each argument and offer objections which I believe strengthen the claim of care-workers to have a right to inheritance.

Inheritance as a risk to family relational goods: which policy?
Marie BASTIN, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

The purpose of my reasoning is to turn a family-oriented argument against inheritance taxation on its head. I begin by presenting a conception of what makes the family valuable that is useful for normative thinking about inheritance using the concept of relational goods (Gheaus 2018). I then characterize the link between inheritance and family value as a risk: inheritance is not necessary for the realization of family relational goods, but it can easily be the means of relational harms. I then compare two types of inheritance policies that can address this risk: control of inheritance and inheritance taxation. I will argue that there is a strong case for inheritance taxation to address the risk that inheritance poses to family relational goods. The main argument for this is the idea that inheritance transmissions have unfair relational consequences, according to a sense of relational equality (Anderson 1999), which concern both social relations in general and inter-individual relations within the family.

Relational egalitarianism is the view that justice requires the absence of (certain kinds of) social hierarchy and the presence of (certain kinds of) equal social relations. While this view has in recent years enjoyed a great deal of attention and support, it appears to have a serious limitation.

As some critics argue, it appears unable to provide guidance for intergenerational justice, including the question of what is owed to future generations: since we do not seem to stand in social relations with unborn future people, relational egalitarian concerns cannot apply.
In this paper, I examine this challenge, arguing that there is in fact a distinctive relational egalitarian concern--with the status people have under institutions--that applies in the intergenerational context.

Qu’est-ce qui nous prouve que la démocratie est un modèle d’organisation politique plus légitime que les autres ? A cette question, certaines réponses peuvent appartenir au champ de l’éthique (délibérer ensemble est plus juste, chacun a le droit de participer à des lois, etc.) et d’autres appartiennent au domaine de l’épistémologie (la prise de décision est-elle plus efficace ? Les choix sont-ils meilleurs ? Les citoyens sont-ils aptes à se prononcer ? etc.). Ainsi les théories épistémiques en faveur de la démocratie tentent de justifier cette dernière en élaborant des arguments prouvant sa supériorité « intellectuelle » sur les autres modèles d’organisation (tyrannie, oligarchie, populisme, technocratie, etc.). Or, pour cette démarche, la tradition philosophique occidentale n’est pas vraiment une alliée.

En effet, depuis Platon jusqu’à Tocqueville en passant par Locke ou Kant, les philosophes ont plutôt eu tendance à se méfier de la démocratie comme règne des ignorants, de la foule imbécile, du béhémot populaire et à lui préférer la figure du roi-philosophe, du conseil des sages ou encore la république « éclairée » des intellectuels.

Cependant l’autre côté de l’Atlantique, John Dewey travailla, à la fois sur le terrain de la politique et de l’éducation, à questionner cette « évidence » de la tradition philosophique. Le pragmatisme peut ainsi être considéré dès le début du XXème siècle, comme un courant philosophique américain promouvant avec ferveur la nécessité mutuelle et complémentaire de l’éducation et de la démocratie. Dans cette perspective on peut considérer la communauté de recherche philosophique (CRP) comme un outil pédagogique « inventé » par Matthew Lipman pour continuer le travail philosophique de John Dewey. D’où notre question : En quoi les CRP prouvent-elles, par leur pratique, la supériorité épistémique de la démocratie ?

Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) is often discussed as an alternative to conditional social transfers. These so-called workfare programs tend to be ineffective by creating poverty traps, but also contribute to stigmatization, hence jeopardizing individuals’ self-respect. As a universal, individual, and unconditional grant, defined at the highest level possible i.e., or at least at the poverty rate level (Van Parijs e Vanderborght 2017), a UBI offers a possible solution to such problems. Its proponents argue it can contribute to a non-stigmatizing and broader safety net for the poor and precarious, but also enhance worker’s bargaining power and equalize the possibility for choosing different projects in life. Opposition is still significant, namely among those who endorse a view of justice as reciprocity. Reciprocity can be broadly defined as a norm that impels us to return benefits we received. While a commitment with economic reciprocity governing just transfers establishes that those who are able bodied should contribute productively to be entitled the fruits of social cooperation (White, 2003). In this presentation, I will try to reconcile UBI with a commitment with reciprocity, by proposing that we acknowledge the ‘Gift-like qualities’ of basic income. I will argue that we have reasons to consider that a UBI is experienced as a Gift, and further claim that as such, UBI triggers a strong moral obligation to reciprocate. This will, in turn, allow us to reconcile the idea of unconditional cash with the norm of reciprocity.

To what extent the Maximum Available Resources (MAR) clause is committed with equality? Since the enactment of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, States are obliged to devote the maximum available resources to the full realization of socio-economic rights by all appropriate means. This obligation stems directly from Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. It is also known as the MAR clause or the obligation of ‘progressive realization’. Its aim is to point out the necessary steps that states must undertake in allocating their resources towards the fulfilment of socio-economic rights. So far, the literature has focused its attention to whether any problems might arise as a consequence of a measure considered as ‘retrogressive’. Essentially, the MAR Clause requires to governments to provide sufficiently good reasons to undertake a measure that could hamper down some socio-economic rights. However, little has been said concerning a prima facie strict compliance with the obligations stemming from the MAR Clause. Do we have reasons to demand a similar argumentative threshold whenever ‘progressive’ measures are implemented? In the affirmative, why and based on what grounds? Is it based on equality? I will defend the idea according to which a strict commitment with equality might imply for the MAR Clause to also require a similar treatment to ‘progressive’ measures that may realize socio-economic rights. I will focus on the right to social security and retirement pensions.

Over the last decades, the ethical acceptability of the spread of conspiracy theorizing is getting more and more interest. The scholars consider normative arguments of silencing conspiracy theories or banning the dissemination of at least some false/uncertain ones. In my paper, I differentiate the types of conspiracy theories, arguing that the moral claim on silencing them should depend on the kind of conspiracy theories we face, real or false/uncertain ones, and whether they pursue political goals or not. I claim that the spread of conspiracy theories is ethically wrong in those cases when we deal with deceptive political conspiracy theories.

Many writers have claimed that we live in an era of post-truth politics. I argue that ‘post-truth’ politics is better understood in terms of irrationality. I expand Habermas’s account of communicative rationality, showing that there are six components of rational speech: not only subjective, empirical and normative (Habermas’s categories) but also conceptual, ontological and inferential. I relate each type of communicative irrationality to a type of ‘bullshit’, by refining and expanding the conceptions of bullshit offered by Harry Frankfurt (who treats bullshit as phoniness, indifference to truth) and G.A. Cohen (who treats bullshit as unclarifiable unclarity). These are, in essence, subjective and conceptual bullshit, to which I add categories of empirical, normative, ontological and inferential bullshit. This gives us six types of irrationality, six types of bullshit, and six types of post-truth politics.

Le débat sera introduit par Patrick Goethals, directeur du programme de linguistique appliquée à l’Université de Gand, chercheur en linguistique computationnelle et Alain Strowel, juriste et philosophe, Professeur à l‘UCLouvain et à l’USLB, spécialiste des questions de propriété intellectuelle et co-auteur d’une étude récente sur les AI tools dans le secteur créatif. Il sera modéré par Anne-Laure Cadji, Politologue et Project manager of Trusted AI Labs.

Autant de questions sur lesquelles prendront position Lora Verheecke, spécialiste en études européennes, chercheuse à l’observatoire des multinationales, et animatrice du Dark Side of EU Tour, ainsi qu’Amaury de Saint Martin, politologue et historien, partenaire associé chez Denton Global Advisors. Le débat sera modéré par Clément Fontan, Professeur de politique économique européenne (UCLouvain/USLB) et co-rédacteur en chef de la revue Politique européenne.

Le débat sera introduit par Sophie Panel, économiste, maitresse de conférence à Sciences Po Grenoble et co-auteure de Le choix des armes (Paris, 2020), ainsi que Michel Liégeois, politologue et spécialiste des relations internationales. Il sera modéré par Flavia Missal, étudiante du Bachelier PPE à l’UCLouvain.

I propose a general power index in games. The power of an agent over an outcome is understood as the equilibrium effect on the outcome of variations in the agent’s preferences. I show that the new index, ∆, has the following properties: (i) classic measures of freedom of choice are a special case of the ∆ index in the context of individual choice; (ii) the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices are special cases of the ∆ index in the context of binary voting games; (iii) in bargaining games, the ∆ index of a player combines his outside option and other parameters; (iv) the ∆ index allows a generalization of the Barry decomposition of success between power and luck to all unidimensional spatial games; (v) the ∆ power of a firm on its price is related to its Lerner index, but also to its technology and to the potential entry of competitors; (vi) in a simple competitive exchange setting, each agent has zero ∆ power on the equilibrium price but a ∆ power density can be defined, which, under some assumptions on preferences, is proportional to the agents’ wealth.

PROGRAMME

MAY 4

EST / CET
9:00 / 15:00 Opening remarks

9:05 / 15:05 Amine Benabdallah (NoSoPhi)
A Comparative Landscape of the Criminal Liability of States

10:00 / 16:00 Meredith Sheeks (Parr)
The Guilt of the Moral Minimalist

10:55 / 16:55 Coffee break

11:10 / 17:10 Emil Andersson (CRÉ)
Liberal Legitimacy and Future Citizens

12:05 / 18:05 John Lain Miller (Parr)
The Islamic Moral Epistemology of Abolqasem Fanaei

13:00 / 19:00 Closing remarks

MAY 5

EST / CET
9:00 / 15:00 Opening remarks

9:05 / 15:05 Manuel Sâ Valente (Hoover)
What do children owe their ageing parents?

10:00 / 16:00 Grégory Ponthière (Hoover)
Are Long-Lived Persans Utility Monsters?

10:55 / 16:55 Coffee break

11:10 / 17:10 Eraldo Souza dos Santos (NoSoPhi)
A Plea for a Conceptual History of Civil Disobedience

12:05 / 18:05 Frauke Albersmeier (CRÉ)
Are some animals more equal than others? An egalitarian challenge for animal rights theory

13:00 / 19:00 Closing remarks

An economic interpretation of Epictetus's precept of 'Taking away aversion from all things not in our power' consists of extending the domain of indifference beyond its boundaries under non-ethical preferences, so as to yield indifference between outcomes differing only on things outside one's control. This paper examines the evolutionary dynamics of a population composed of Nash agents and Epictetusian agents matched randomly and interacting in the prisoner's dilemma game. It is shown that, whether or not the type of players is common knowledge, neither the Nash type nor the Epictetusian type is an evolutionary stable strategy. However, if the matching process exhibits a sufficiently high degree of assortativity, the Epictetusian type is an evolutionary stable strategy, and drives the Nash type to extinction.

Theoretical work suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run a laboratory experiment on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. We structurally estimate social preferences and Kantian morality at the individual and aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in preferences. A finite mixture analysis shows that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two types. One combines inequity aversion and Kantian morality, while the other combines spite and Kantian morality. The value of adding Kantian morality to well-established preference classes is also evaluated.

14:00 - 14:05 Opening remarks
14:05 - 14:15 General introduction to the project by Adrian Blau.
14:15 - 14 55 One Concept of Distributive Fairness: Fairness as Equity. (Pierre André)
15:55 - 15:35: Defending (Some) Thought Experiments. (Catarina Neves)
15:35 - 15:50: Coffee break.
15:50 - 16:30: The Logic of Inference of Thought Experiments in Moral and Political Philosophy. (Pierre-Etienne Vandamme)

Each paper (40') = Introduction by Adrian (5') - Discussant + replies (15' = 10' discussant + 5' replies) - Debate with everyone (20').

10:55-11:50 
Fausto Corvino (University of Gothenburg)
Social-Cost Carbon Price vs. Target-Consistent Carbon Price: The Ethics at Stake

12:05-13:00 
Éloi Laurent (Sciences Po Paris)
The just transition, 30 years on

14:55-15:50 
Andrés Salazar Abello (UCLouvain)
The Human Face of Climate Migration Ethics 

16:05-17:00 
Anna Wienhues (University of Oslo)
Sustainability: Why We Should Still Start from Here for Theorising Just Conservation

14:55-15:50 
Alejandra Mancilla (University of Oslo)
Nothing about Antarctica without Antarctica

16:05-17:00
Clare Heyward (Arctic University of Norway)
Secondary Climatic Injustices
 

Online workshop.
Free but registration required

Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Sciences

In my Oxford DPhil thesis, which became my first book (Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Sciences. An emerging paradigm, Rowman & Littlefield, 1981), I wanted to explore the space of social-scientific explanations that did not rely on mechanism consisting of the aggregation of individual choices. This led me to focus on social-scientific evolutionary explanations that relied either (marginally) on natural selection or (mainly) on reinforcement as the underlying mechanism. Diachronic linguistics and historical materialism were used as the two main illustrations of the second case. The presentation will give a succinct account of the claims I made in this old book.

By Jack Vromen, EIPE (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Following Lewis’ (1969) seminal account of conventions, several scholars have used game theory to shed light on how social norms evolve. In my talk I will show that the way in which this is done also has evolved. Initially, the focus was very much on providing “ultimate” functional explanations, for example how social norms could have evolved (as “high-welfare equilibria”) to solve coordination and cooperation problems. The focus has shifted to providing “proximate” explanations of what makes people comply with social norms, including social norms that are dysfunctional (as “low-welfare equilibria”; e.g., explaining why people with non-cooperative norms sometimes engage in antisocial punishment of cooperators). Several features of this shift in focus will be discussed with an emphasis on the utility functions that have been proposed to rationalize norm compliance.

As it becomes more and more threatening, climate change is increasingly conceptualized in terms of security. Security and defense organizations around the world have started incorporating climate change in their strategic thinking, in a movement described as a “securitization” of climate change issues. Will it lead to a more just or to a more unjust world? In this article, I examine the relation between the concept of climate security and that of climate justice. I argue that the ethical implications of the securitization of climate issues are ambiguous. Framing climate change in terms of security may further climate justice but it may also condone some serious injustices.

In Federalist 10, James Madison suggests that more diverse or heterogeneous electoral constituencies can provide a remedy against factionalism.
Inspired by the pluralist reading of Federalist 10, I provide in this paper a novel defence of heterogeneous constituencies that are constructed
through stratifed random sampling.
At the heart ofmy thesis lies a model of conflict management that emphasises the value of pluralisation and the importance
of breaking down rather than fostering the salience of deep-seated conflicts.
While geographic and other category-based constituencies crystallise and consolidate reinforcing cleavages, heterogeneous constituencies, I argue, stimulate the politicisation of new and potentially cross-cutting cleavages. The presence of cross-cutting cleavages enables representatives to engage in processes of accommodation and cooperation across group divisions, such as processes of bargaining and coalition-building, while remaining partial advocates of their constituents interests.
Furthermore, I connect this notion of conflict management to party democracy in PR systems and argue that multiple party affiliations can further contribute to the de-politicisation of deep-seated conflicts by blurring societal divisions.
The upshot is that stratified random constituencies with PR are a candidate for the institutional default in all contemporary democracies facing factionalist tendencies as well as the factionalist threats of majority tyranny and legislative gridlocks.

Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and pro-competitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of profitable suppliers, however may reduce the standards of highly ethical suppliers or not-for-profits, raising the potential need to protect the latter in the marketplace.

Limitarianism holds that it is bad or unjust if some people have too much. It has been subject to much debate in the last few years. Yet one crucial question, so far not discussed, is the temporal scope of `having too much'. Should we think of limitarianism in terms of a lifetime – where extreme wealth refers to how much we have over our entire lives - or should the principle be time-sliced – referring, instead, to how much we have at specific times? Reading the literature, it might seem obvious that limitarians mean the second. In this paper, we argue that the answer is not evident. Both solutions run into considerable difficulties, and none of the answers limitarians may provide are entirely satisfactory. We will identify the most plausible ways forward, which, although in favour of time-sliced limitarianism, also considerably dent limitarianism's ambitions.

A prevalent argument to justify immigration restrictions stems from special associative duties and compatriot partiality. Institutional actors often employ strategies to protect our compatriots from the costs and risks associated with immigration, leading to highly restrictive immigration policies. However, these policies, particularly in certain polities, increasingly require citizens to comply with them and even actively support their enforcement. In these instances, immigration law compels citizens to avoid or suspend their associations with unauthorised migrants or report them to immigration authorities. This results in special associative duties among compatriots given precedence over other forms of associations, including those between locals and foreigners, creating an imbalance between our associations with compatriots and those with foreigners.

I argue that the rationale for highly restrictive immigration policies, grounded in associative duties, faces significant constraints when it comes to citizens who bear special obligations towards foreigners. If associative duties are mobilised to justify special obligations, and thus immigration restrictions, they also imply a qualified moral permissibility for citizens to potentially violate immigration laws. Associative duties and compatriot partiality also introduce an ethical dilemma, where citizens are torn between their special obligations towards their compatriots and those towards foreigners.

Nous y discuterons des implications politiques de la théorie de la résonance de Hartmut Rosa.

The concept of resonance, introduced in Hartmut Rosa’s 2016 book and enriched through a series of subsequent publications, constitutes the centerpiece of both a novel sociological theory and an important step forward in contemporary critical theory.
Indeed, Rosa’s ambitious project is both descriptive and normative, simultaneously offering a fresh conceptual apparatus for future sociological
research and strikingly innovative tools for renewing the critical tradition in social philosophy.
In this workshop, we seek to explore the opportunities and challenges surrounding the potential political uses of resonance.
We discuss the concept’s capacity as a collective action frame, the context and scales at which it might have particularly strong analytical purchase and the possible limits of resonance
when it comes to understanding and shaping the political field stricto sensu.

Organizing Committee: Olivier Struelens, Nicolas Cuneen, Amaël Maskens

Programme :

DAY ONE: The Roots and Normative Foundations of Resonance
Tuesday 12 September

14:00-17:30
Chair: Olivier Struelens (University of Louvain)

14:00: Workshop Welcome
14:15: Opening remarks by Olivier DE SCHUTTER (University of Louvain)
Resonance and Politics: the Enabling State

14:45: Frederic VANDENBERGHE (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro/Max Weber Kolleg)
Reconnect Resonance to Reason
15:15: Discussion

15:45: Coffee Break
Chair: Amaël MASKENS (University of Louvain)

16:00: Bert VAN DEN BERGH (The Hague University of Applied Sciences)
Still Haunted by Adorno’s Spirit? On Rosa’s Unbudded Concept of Deep Resonance

16:30: Ole HÖFFKEN (Heidelberg University)
The Sociopolitical Potentials of Combining Resonance Theory with an Evolutionary-
Anthropological Perspective
17:00: Discussion

17:30: End of Day One

DAY TWO: Resonance Grounded: Exploring the Fields of the Concept
Wednesday 13 September

9:00-12:45
9:00: Workshop Welcome
Session 1: Educational and Artistic Politics of Resonance
Chair: Amaël MASKENS (University of Louvain)

9:15: Nicolas CUNEEN (University of Louvain)
Resonance as a conceptual lever for transforming educational practices and institutions

9:45: Jean-Baptiste GHINS (University of Louvain)
Hartmut Rosa’s Aesthetic of the Everyday. Can the Concept of “Resonance” Provide Aesthetic
Marxism with a Political Outcome?
10:15: Discussion

10:45: Coffee Break

Session 2: Resonance in a Conflictual World
Chair: Olivier Struelens (University of Louvain)
11h: Olivier VOIROL (University of Lausanne)
Struggle for the World in the Public Sphere

11h30: Gauthier SIMON (University of Bordeaux)
“Ecological Conversion” as a Sub-Concept of Resonance in Political Science
12:00: Discussion

12:20: Concluding remarks by Jean DE MUNCK (University of Louvain)
Beyond Ressources: Capabilities, Responsability or Resonance?

12:45: Wrap-up and End of the Workshop

Le débat sera introduit par Marthe Nyssens, économiste et pro-rectrice à la transition (UCLouvain), Ghislaine Declève, membre de la délégation syndicale CNE-UCLouvain et Min Reuchamps, politologue (UCLouvain), Le débat sera modéré par Pierre-Etienne Van Damme, philosophe (ULB).

Le débat sera introduit par Pierre Wunsch, gouverneur de la Banque Nationale de Belgique, Rigas Oikonomou, économiste à UCLouvain et spécialiste de la dette publique, et Clément Fontan, politologue à UCLouvain. Il sera modéré par Yannick Vanderborght, politologue à l’UCLouvain. Il aura lieu exceptionnellement sur le campus Saint-Louis à Bruxelles (salle P61).

Le débat sera introduit par Eric Lambin, géographe à UCLouvain, Magali Ramel, juriste à l’université de Tours, Fabrice Etilé, économiste à l’INRAE/Paris School of Economics, et Dominique Paturel, chercheuse en gestion à l’INRAE de Montpellier. Le débat sera modéré par Sandy Tubeuf, économiste de la santé à UCLouvain.

By Brian McLoone (Auburn University)
Many believe that what Adam Smith said about the improving power of market competition is similar to what Darwin said about the improving power of natural selection. But how similar are Smith's and Darwin's ideas really? To answer this question, I'll compare two "fundamental" theorems—the fundamental theorem of natural selection and the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. The theorems have more in common than their names; I have chosen to compare them because they are often taken to precisify (respectively) the way in which selection and market competition can lead to improvement. After characterizing the sense in which the theorems are indeed similar, I go on to show that the theorems' idealizations obscure some important points of contact between Smith's ideas and Darwin's, particularly concerning the benefits of division of labor.

It strikes many as intuitive that we should satisfy people’s equal claims to a scarce and indivisible good (e.g., a life-saving drug) by giving each the highest equal lottery chance of receiving the good. This seems a fair and reasonable means of treating people as equals. In a challenge to such a case for the distribution by lot, some have argued that the chance of receiving the good at issue is lacking in value or otherwise insignificant or irrelevant in comparison with actually receiving this good. It has been suggested, for example, that chances are irrelevant since their contribution to a person’s well-being pales in significance in comparison with the actual receipt of the good that is distributed by lot. In the first two parts of this talk, I answer the above, and related, challenges to the relevance and significance of chances. As I argue in the first part, the far greater significance of receiving all of an undivided good needn’t undermine the case for equal lottery chances of the whole good, as compared with an outcome involving equally divided portions of this good. I argue in the second part that it mislocates the value of lottery chances to assume that they must contribute, in themselves, to a person’s well-being. Rather their significance primarily resides in their expected instrumental value in delivering goods of independent value. In the third and final part of this talk, I provide an account of when distribution by lot is perfectly fair in spite of the inevitability of an unequal outcome among equal claimants.

How are political ideas produced? How do they circulate between different sectors of the social world, or between countries? Why do some ideas endure or become dominant while others disappear? What links do political theory and academic knowledge have with ordinary political discourse? Can political theory change the world, or is it just wishful thinking?

The aim of this presentation is to show how the historical sociology of political thought addresses these questions, and what types of inquiry it employs to answer them. The first part looks at the different ways of reinscribing the production of political ideas in their various social, political and intellectual contexts, and of reconstructing the intentions of their producers. The paper then looks at the mechanisms underlying the circulation of texts and ideas between social spaces and countries, and the configurations these circulations outline. The third part analyzes the political and social uses of ideas. The presentation draws on various past and current researches devoted to Rawls and his reception, the history of public economics, basic income or the history of intellectual history as a subdiscipline.

Multidimensional composite indicators of wellbeing: applications in economic history 

Although economists and social scientists have widely contributed to the so-called ‘Beyond GDP’ debate, the view that current measures of economic growth are inadequate to measure well-being and multidimensional indicators, economic history has not been prominent in these debates. Nonetheless, multidimensional indicators have captured the interest of economic historians, with both theoretical and empirical contributions. In this contribution, we examine the areas of consensus and debate in economic history. A comprehensive literature review shows a lack of consensus on how to use multidimensional indicators and that they face substantial critiques. We use two case-studies (a long-term series for the Netherlands and one on the basis of the CLIO-INFRA panel dataset) to illustrate how common findings emerge in the literature and empirical exercises despite methodological differences. We argue that debates on the relation between economic growth and well-being in the long-run using these indicators can not only contribute to many founding questions in economic history, though greater precision and transparency in our assumptions about well-being measurement are necessary, but also to better understand present-day challenges such as how to better pursue growth in well-being and not merely in GDP.

You can find more info about EUFREEDOMS 

Programme :

12.00-12.20: Pietro Intropi (presentation)
12.20-12.50: Francis Cheneval (discussant 1)

12.50 -1.00: Break

1.00-1.30: Eleonora Milazzo (discussant 2)
1.30 - 2: Nik de Boer (discussant 3)

Si nous voulons maintenir la pérennité de nos pensions, nous allons devoir travailler plus longtemps. Comment faire cela sans porter atteinte à ceux qui ont commencé leur carrière plus tôt et qui sont exposés à des métiers pénibles?

In the literature on human rights, the standard view is that states are the bearers of primary duties corresponding to human rights, and international institutions are the secondary duty-bearers only. In this talk, I challenge this view by providing a novel, republican, account of the human right to legal citizenship. On this view, it turns out that this entitlement has a primarily international dimension, namely, it grounds a shared duty to naturalise a class of particularly vulnerable individuals which falls primarily on the entire international community, and on single states in a derivative sense only. I then show that those who are owed citizenship as a matter of human rights are not only of the formally stateless people, but also, surprisingly, refugees, some displaced people, and, arguably, some long-term migrants, too. I finally suggest how to improve the current state system so as to realise the human right to legal citizenship.

Even though the rights differentiations debate in normative political philosophy entail various types of ethical dilemmas, it has only been explicit about one of them, namely status differentiation—i.e. comparative rights’ differentiations between citizens and immigrants. However, in state practices, there is a second type of comparative rights’ differentiations among immigrants of different citizenships. For example, a Swiss citizen has the right to immigrate to Belgium and work there, whereas a Haitian citizen does not. Such variations stem from the nature of state migration policies. By a single gesture, states determine both territorial admission as well as access to various rights, such as social assistance, job markets, the ability to get married, and political rights in the domestic sphere. What justify such practices of token citizenship differentiations? More importantly, how should we conceive of an adequate justification process for both types of differentiations? This article offers a conceptual map of these two types of ‘citizenship-based rights’ differentiations’. It argues that a justification process adequately assessing them should consist of a two-step, the first paying attention to the normative requirements of a legitimate state system and the second paying attention to domestic requirements. I argue that migration policies in a legitimate state system should be acceptable to everyone and explore its implications for the real-world differentiated rights’ regimes in host states. One striking implication in this perspective is even transitional token citizenship differentiations are in principle not justified, an egalitarian position that goes beyond the existing arguments for equal citizenship.

Certain men and women who are currently viewed as falling conceptually under the transgender umbrella and thereby acknowledged using the transgender/trans label. For discussion purposes, I shall refer to such individuals as fully-sex-reassigned persons (FSPs). I isolate four distinct characteristics of FSPs and go on to argue that in the case of such persons, the trans label ushers in a range of drawbacks. Using the parlance of recognition theory, I will further demonstrates how using the trans label to refer to FSPs constitutes a glaring-yet-unacknowledged case of mis-recognition. Referring to FSPs without the trans tag removes its negative ramifications and recognises such individuals in a manner that respects their own identity-specific convictions. This, thereby, supplies strong normative impetus for acknowledging FSPs simply as men and male or women and female.

In the past some used to defend some overarching principles of justice – globalise the difference principle, global equality, global sufficiency, global libertarianism, etc. But then people specialised on specific topics – climate justice, migration justice, health justice, trade justice, territorial justice, natural resource rights, biodiversity justice, etc. Many focused on their topic and analysed it in isolation. The study of global justice has become fragmented – examining separate topics in isolation. This leads me to ask: When we theorize about global justice should we construct principles for different topics – climate, trade, migration, natural resource ownership, AI, technological change … - considered in isolation from each other? Alternatively, should we draw on a general theory of justice and treat different issues (like climate change, migration and poverty) in conjunction with each other and in light of a general theory? According to what I term an Isolationist approach we should construct principles for different topics (such as trade or migration or biodiversity loss) in isolation from one another. A contrary view is what I term an Integrationist approach: this holds that we should employ a general theory of justice which covers a wide range of different issues and examines these issues in conjunction with each other and in the light of this general theory. I defend Integrationism.

Theories of intergenerational justice--specifically those focused on duties between non-overlapping generations--have tended to focus on a narrow range of concerns, e.g., wellbeing under various interpretations. With that in mind, I want to examine the following question: does the ideal of freedom as non-domination apply to relationships between present and future people? I argue it does not, critiquing a recent defence of the idea. In doing so, I aim to clarify the nature of non-domination and distinguish it from other ‘relational’ concerns of justice that I believe are more compelling in the intergenerational context.

Existe-t-il encore une justification de la propriété privée susceptible d’emporter le jugement académique comme celui du grand public ?
Concept peu problématique aux yeux de la majorité qui s’en accommode fort bien, la propriété privée est sous le feu de nombreuses critiques qui y voient la cause de la crise écologique et des inégalités économiques et sociales. Alors que les uns voient dans ce droit un des axiomes du libéralisme moderne, les autres soulignent la nécessité de réorganiser les rapports propriétaires. Se pourrait-il que les arguments des premiers rendent illégitimes les efforts des seconds ?

C’est à répondre à cette question que s’emploie cet ouvrage en analysant les principaux arguments utilisés dans le débat contemporain pour justifier l’existence de la propriété privée. Trois arguments sont plus particulièrement étudiés : la justification de la propriété privée par le travail, par l’efficience économique dont elle serait la cause, ainsi que par la liberté individuelle qu’elle rend possible.

Cet ouvrage nécessaire expose les difficultés et les impasses des arguments mobilisés dans le débat contemporain pour justifier la propriété privée. Il pose les bases d’une réflexion pour une nouvelle théorie démocratique de la propriété débarrassée du spectre de l’absolutisme propriétaire. Il s’adresse tant à la citoyenne ou au militant qu’aux académiques qui y trouveront des discussions accessibles mais pointues des principales justifications de la propriété privée.

Au cœur de multiples débats, le néolibéralisme « à la belge » demeure pourtant peu étudié. Cet ouvrage offre la première analyse empirique et pluridisciplinaire des trajectoires de néolibéralisation à l’œuvre depuis près d’un demi-siècle dans un État divisé et membre fondateur de l’Union européenne. Il examine la fabrique d’un nouveau cadre macroéconomique, ses applications sectorielles et les formes de résistance qu’il rencontre. Secteur ferroviaire, protection de l’environnement, réformes administratives, politiques économiques, budgétaires et sociales… Les domaines étudiés donnent à voir les effets tangibles, mais aussi variables et contrastés de pratiques néolibérales qui ne sont pas toujours le produit d’un projet politique clairement revendiqué. Cet exposé nuancé de l’avènement du néolibéralisme en Belgique fournit des outils analytiques indispensables pour s’interroger sur le néolibéralisme, en questionner la pertinence, voire œuvrer à son dépassement.

Which principles of justice should make up a theory of distributive justice for the European Union? And what should be the role of the EU, vis à vis that of its member states, in realising justice in the EU? In this paper I discuss a theory of EU distributive justice that Joao Labareda defends in his book Towards a Just Europe. Labareda’s theory revolves around two duties: a duty of economic reciprocity, and a democratic duty. Reciprocity especially entails pre-distributive measures (e.g. setting common standards of labour rights across the Union); though it also supports redistributive measures, mainly defended by Labareda on democratic grounds – e.g. the provision of a basic minimum that guarantees that EU citizens have sufficient means for democratic participation and to resist arbitrary power. In the talk I take issue with a distributive minimalist perspective that characterizes the book (the view that EU justice involves a limited role for redistribution): for example, I criticize Labareda’s distributive sufficientarianism, arguing that EU justice implies more demanding (and quasi egalitarian) duties of distributive justice.

Ce Midi de l’éthique sera nourri par les interventions de Julie Ringelheim (juriste, UCLouvain) et de François Maniquet (économiste, UCLouvain). Ce débat sera modéré par Muriel Dejemeppe (économiste, UCLouvain).

Attention : participation libre mais inscription obligatoire : chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

 

Ce Midi de l’éthique sera nourri par les interventions d’Elena Aoun (politologue, UCLouvain), de Michel Liégeois (politologue, UCLouvain) et de Céline Romainville (juriste, UCLouvain). Le débat sera modéré par Jean-François Maystadt (économiste, UCLouvain).

Attention : participation libre mais inscription obligatoire : chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

 

Toute réforme d'un système de retraite offre l'occasion de revenir sur ses éléments fondamentaux. L'un d'entre eux nous paraît ne pas retenir suffisamment l'attention. À chaque modèle de retraite possible correspond une manière particulière de concevoir et de valoriser le travail, donc de donner un sens à la revendication de justice sociale. La contribution propose un cadre conceptuel permettant une meilleure appréhension de cette dimension de la question.

Ce Midi de l’éthique sera nourri par les interventions de Frédéric Docquier (économiste, Université de Luxembourg, LISER) et de Speranta Dumitru (philosophe, Université Paris Cité). La modération sera assurée par Pierre André (philosophe, FNRS, UCLouvain).

Attention : participation libre mais inscription obligatoire : chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

Timetable (to confirm):
11:00 - 11:10 Opening remarks (10 minutes)
11:10 - 11:25 Introduction to the book by Seunghyun Song (15 minutes)
11:25 - 12:00 Chapter 3 - Structural linguistic injustice (35 minutes). Discussant: Maeve McKeown

12:00 - 13:00 Lunch break

13:00 - 13:35 Chapter 2 - Language loss and structural injustice (35 minutes) Discussant: Catherine Lu
13:35 - 14:10 Chapter 4 - Epistemic dimensions of structural remedies (35 minutes) Discussant: Jennifer Page

14:00 - 14:10: Opening remarks (10 minutes)

14:10 - 14:25: Introduction to the book by Iñigo González Ricoy (15 minutes)
14:25 - 15:00: Chapter 2 - Firm/State Analogy (35 minutes). Discussant: Sandrine Blanc
15:00 - 15:35: Chapter 7 - Ownership and the Demos of the Democratic Firm (35 minutes). Discussant: Jeffrey Moriarty

15:35 - 15:50 : Coffee break (15 minutes)

15:50 - 16:25: Chapter 6 - Efficiency and Relational Equality (35 minutes). Discussant: Lisa Herzog
16:25 - 17:00: Chapter 3 - Freedom-based Arguments (35 minutes). Discussant: Sarah Goff
17:00 - 17:05: Closing remarks (5 minutes)

Discussants: Sandrine Blanc (INSEEC School of Business and Economics), Sarah Goff (London School of Economics), Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen), Jeffrey Moriarty (Bentley University)
Organisers: Axel Gosseries & Juan Olano

Climate change and climate policies raise tremendous issues of justice, unprecedented in scale and in nature. In particular, climate change confronts us with difficult questions of global, intergenerational and environmental justice. Our special guest to explore these issues will be Prof. Simon Caney (University of Warwick) who has written extensively on these questions.

Participation is free but registration is required
Pierre André (pi.andre@uclouvain.be)

Thursday, 29 February
14:00-17:00 INTRODUCTION TO CLIMATE JUSTICE
Pierre André & Axel Gosseries (UCLouvain)

Monday, 4 March
14:00-16:30 CLIMATE JUSTICE AND THE POLITICAL

14:00-14:10 Introduction

14:10-15:15 Simon Caney (Warwick), “Political Responsibilities and Climate Change”

15:15-15:30 Break

15:30-16:30 Simon Caney (Warwick), “Climate Justice, Power and Political Feasibility”

Tuesday, 5 March

12:45-14:00 Mardi intime de la Chaire Hoover (MICH)
Simon Caney (Warwick), “Against the Fragmentation of Global Justice”

Wednesday, 6 March

9:30-12:30 DEBATING CLIMATE JUSTICE

9:30-10:25 Fausto Corvino (UCLouvain), “Carbon Pricing and Intergenerational Fairness”

10:25-10:35 Break

10:35-11:30 Esma Baycan-Herzog (Genève), “Migration Legitimacy and Differentiated Rights: It’s not you, it’s your Passport!”

11:30-11:40 Break

11:40-12:30 Pierre André (UCLouvain), “Emissions Accounting and Corporate Responsibility for Climate Change”

Thursday, 18 April

14:00-17:00 PRESENTATIONS BY THE DOCTORAL STUDENTS

Journée organisée par Pietro Intropi et Grégory Ponthière.

13.00-14.00 : Présentation de l’ouvrage Chronique d’un impôt sur l’héritage en perdition (paru aux Presses Universitaires de France 2023).
Par André Masson (CNRS – EHESS – PSE)

14.00-14.15 : Pause

14.15-16.30 : Séminaire Book in Progress #20 : 50 Questions sur l’héritage

14.15-15.00 : Taxer les transmissions ou taxer les fortunes courantes ?
Présenté par André Masson. Discussion par Antoine Germain (UCLouvain – CORE).

15.00-15.45 : Faut-il inciter fiscalement les parents à transmettre de leur vivant ?
Présenté par André Masson. Discussion par Pietro Intropi (UCLouvain – Chaire Hoover)

15.45-16.30 : Tous héritiers ? Faut-il accorder une dotation en capital à tout jeune (de 25 ans) ?
Présenté par André Masson. Discussion par Grégory Ponthière (UCLouvain – Chaire Hoover)

Participation libre mais inscription obligatoire
Contact : chaire-hoover@uclouvain.be

The hybrid workshop will host a diverse set of international speakers, including Luara Ferracioli (U. Sydney), Eszter Kollar (KU Leuven), Dario Mezzola (U. Geneva), Patti Tamara Lenard (U. Ottawa), Guy Aitchinson (LSE), Davide Pala (U. Eastern Piedmont), Marco Verschoor (Leiden U.), Alex Sager (Portland State U.), Esma Baycan-Herzog (U. Geneva), and Andrés Salazar Abello (UCLouvain).

9:15-9:25 Welcome
9:25-10:00 Luara Ferracioli (online) - Monogamous and Polyamorous Romantic Ties in Family Reunification
10:00-10:35 Davide Pala - The Naturalisation of the Vulnerable: An International Responsibility with Demanding Implications

Coffee Break

10:50-11:25 Eszter Kollar - Temporary Labour Migration: Reconciling the Demands of Social and Global Justice
11:25-12:00 Guy Aitchison (online) - Immigration Detention as Structural Violence
12:00-12:35 Esma Baycan Herzog – Residential Security Principle for Democratic Post-Migration Societies

LUNCH

13:45-14:20 Marco Verschoor - Demarcating the demos, demarcating coercion. On the democratic boundary problem, the all-subjected principle, and immigration controls
14:20-14:55 Andrés Salazar Abello - Migrant Solidarity as Civil Disobedience
14:55-15:30 Patti Tamara Lenard (online) - Democratic Equality and Internal Movement

Coffee break

15:45-16:20 Dario Mazzola (TBD) - Trust and Asylum: What Do They Have to Do With Each Other?
16:20-16:55 Alex Sager (online) - Power, Political Action, and Open Borders

Organisers: Andrés Salazar Abello & Esma Baycan Herzog.
Registration for attendance: andres.salazar@uclouvain.be

The Impact of Morality on the Political Support for Public Policies: A Theoretical Analysis

Individual attitudes toward the environment are commonly motivated by moral imperatives, I study the implicit effect of such morality on the prevalence of public policies. This paper investigates the influence of morality on the political support of public policies, with a focus on redistributive policies, under the context of private provision of a public good, i.e. the environment. The theoretical framework employs a modeling approach where agents' behavior is characterized as a convex combination of the rational self-interest of a standard economic agent (homo oeconomicus) and the moral universalization of actions akin to the Kantian categorical imperative (homo kantiensis). By examining how the degree of morality among agents affects societal choices in policy-making, particularly regarding redistributive policies, key insights are revealed. As expected, a larger degree of morality among agents leads to an overall increase in the provision of the public good. However, this heightened morality also results in a reduction in the scale of redistributive policies within equilibrium. These findings shed light on the complex interplay between individual morality and public policy preferences, offering implications for understanding the dynamics of political support and the pursuit of collective welfare in modern societies.

Opportunities for fruitful cooperation are unequally distributed across society. How should we allocate these opportunities? While Rawls’ theory of justice, which defines justice as fair terms of cooperation, seems well-suited to address this question, it does not directly do so. This paper aims to fill that gap by using the example of how we might distribute tasks when preparing dinner together. First, it proposes a redefinition of cooperation to avoid the circularity between identifying who the cooperators are and what the fair terms of cooperation entail, which makes it difficult to assess someone’s exclusion from cooperative tasks as unjust under Rawls’ framework. The new, inclusive definition breaks this circularity, allowing for a clearer discussion of how cooperative tasks should be distributed and how principles of justice apply to the cooperative process itself. Second, I argue that Rawls’ principles of Equal Basic Liberty and Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) are inadequate. The Principle of Equal Basic Liberty is too rigid, as it disallows trade-offs that could benefit the least advantaged. FEO, while addressing equality of opportunity, wrongly ties task allocation to talent—a morally arbitrary criterion. The Difference Principle, however, provides the right framework: it permits inequalities in task distribution only if they benefit the least advantaged, aligning with our intuitions in the dinner model. Philosophically, this suggests that job distribution should aim to promote equality. Institutionally, this calls for hiring practices that prioritise the less advantaged, starting with equally qualified candidates and paving the way for more complex cases, where the less advantaged might be favoured even when less talented.

When trying to vote “well” at elections, one must gather quite a lot of information on political parties, candidates and our social reality. One must then process all these information in an unbiased way to form a choice meeting one’s aim, whether it’d be promoting the common good, advancing one’s self-interests, giving voice to an ideology,… This process can quickly become very demanding for many individuals – especially those lacking time and attention due to their unprivileged socioeconomic position.

The demandingness of voting “well” raises moral issues. It creates political inequalities between those who can accurately shape their collective destiny through sound voting choices, and those who can’t. It also increases the risks of seeing voting procedures producing “bad” outcomes, as an important part of the population won’t vote on the basis of solid political reasoning.

What should we do about that situation? I argue that we have a collective duty to make voting robustly easier for each and everyone. By increasing the uses of popular votes on singular policy issues, by using democratic innovations like Citizens’ Initiative Reviews, deliberatively crafted voting guides or Deliberation Days, we have several tools to make voting easier for all. Their implementation should be a priority.

As actors at the right of the political spectrum seem to attract appeal by promising security, we may wonder what left-of-centre parties could offer in terms of security while staying true to their commitment to equality. In other words, what securities are there to be found in an egalitarian society? The present paper addresses this question by drawing on the relational egalitarian tradition of political thought. Given the demands of equality in the moral, economic, and political domain, the paper argues, an egalitarian society must indeed provide its members with a particular set of securities, which can be united under the heading ‘egalitarian security’. At the same time, the argument continues, working towards the ideal of equality inevitably puts some other securities out of reach – securities that conservatives, libertarians, and authoritarians do sometimes seem to offer. The paper ultimately suggests that egalitarian security is nonetheless the best we can get in terms of security, if that is something to be enjoyed by all.

Ruwen Ogien, le barbier de Mill ?
Démocratiser la morale

Cette conférence sera centralement dédiée à la philosophie morale et politique de Ruwen Ogien (1947-2017). Nous y montrerons en particulier ce que l’éthique minimale et la conception négative de la liberté politique d’Ogien reprennent ou modifient de la philosophie morale et politique de John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Nous aborderons aussi ce en quoi la défiance d’Ogien, bien plus grande que celle d’autres auteurs libéraux, envers toutes les formes de maximalismes, paternalismes et moralismes peuvent être lues comme un format d’adaptation de nos raisonnements moraux aux manières de penser et de juger propre aux temps démocratiques (en entendant ce syntagme au sens d’Alexis de Tocqueville).

Ruwen Ogien, Mill's barber?
Democratising morality

This conference will focus on the moral and political philosophy of Ruwen Ogien (1947-2017). In particular, we will show what Ogien's minimal ethics and negative conception of political freedom take from or modify the moral and political philosophy of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). We will also discuss how Ogien's distrust of all forms of maximalisms, paternalisms and moralisms, which is much greater than that of other liberal authors, can be read as a way of adapting our moral reasoning to the ways of thinking and judging specific to democratic times (understanding this syntagm in the sense of Alexis de Tocqueville).

À travers le monde, de nombreuses formations professionnelles ont opéré le tournant de l’éthique (ethical turn) à partir de la seconde moitié du XXème siècle (Davis, 1999, Boothroyd, 2013) et la profession des enseignants ne fait pas exception à cette évolution (Maxwell & Schwimmer, 2016). Pourtant, au sein des formations universitaires, les cours portant sur l’éthique restent peu nombreux et leur enseignement est souvent mal compris par les étudiants. De fait, de nombreuses questions se posent légitimement pour ces derniers. S’agit-il de former de « bonnes » personnes ou de « bons » enseignants ? Recevoir des cours d’éthique signifie-t ’il que les enseignants manquent de morale ? Quelle éthique peut à la fois être transmise à des étudiants et être pertinente pour leur futur métier d’enseignant ? Pour explorer ces questions, nous essayerons d’abord de répondre à un problème qui les précèdent, celui du sujet de l’éthique. A qui ou à quoi accolons-nous l’adjectif « éthique » lorsque nous parlons d’éthique professionnelle enseignante ? S’agit-il des personnes, de leur intégrité et de leur intériorité qui sont ici jugées ? Ou bien faut-il déplacer la focale de l’analyse éthique sur les systèmes, les institutions et les organisations collectives de travail qui les encadrent ? Ou bien encore, est-ce les discours, les propos et les sujets sensibles de discussion qui sont « éthiques » ? Nous explorerons tout d’abord ces trois pistes (personnes, structures et discours) avant d’en proposer une quatrième, plus à même, selon nous, d’accompagner les futurs enseignants dans leurs réflexions sur les situations éthiques problématiques inhérents à leur quotidien.

Climate change arguably poses a dual challenge to non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. For one, environmental ethics needs to provide action guidance for climate change related environmental problems, such as on how to theorise conservation ethics under these new conditions. One of the new areas of development in the literature is the body of work surrounding non-anthropocentric climate adaptation ethics. Secondly, climatic changes put the limelight on the need to theorise non-anthropocentric ethics in the context of an ever-changing world in which the past cannot be replicated and the future is uncertain. Against the background of these two challenges, I aim to make the case in favour of a particular methodological view on how environmental ethics ought to be orientated towards the notion of change itself by arguing in favour of grounding appropriate environmental theorising on a nuanced and self-critical view on material and value change. The upshot is that such a view on change can aid the adaptation of environmental ethics as a field to climate change.