M. GERMAIN, P. TOINT and H. TULKENS, Financial transfers to ensure cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement,
J.J. HERINGS and V.J. VANNETELBOSCH. Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games.
S. BUCOVETSKY, M. MARCHAND and P. PESTIEAU. Tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure.
M. FLEURBAEY and P. MICHEL. Intertemporal equity and the extension of the Ramsey criterion.
X. WAUTHY and Y. ZENOU. Compensating wage differentials, workers' heterogeneity and imperfect competition in the labor market.
J. SHALEV. Loss aversion and bargaining.
A. TURRINI. Human capital formation in an open economy with increasing wage differentials.
S. PODDAR. Capacity and entry deterrence under demand uncertainty.
S. PODDAR. Capacity and entry deterrence under asymmetric information on demand.
K.D. GLAZEBROOK and J. NINÔ-MORA. Scheduling multiclass queueing networks on parallel servers: approximate and heavy-traffic optimality of Klimov's rule.
P. KLINGER MONTEIRO and F. H. PAGE Jr. Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints.
M. A. KHAN and Y. SUN. On Loeb measure spaces and their significance for non-cooperative game theory.
K. KERSTENS and P. VANDEN EECKAUT. Estimating returns to scale using nonparametric deterministic technologies: a new method based on goodness-of-fit.
B. DE MEYER. The dual bounds for the Brownian games.
B. DE MEYER. Brownian games: uniqueness and regularity issues.
L. BAUWENS and P. GIOT. A Gibbs sampling approach to cointegration.
Y. SMEERS and WEI J.-Y. Spatially oligopolistic model with opportunity cost pricing for transmission capacity reservation - A variational inequality approach.
M. GERMAIN and Ph. L. TOINT. An iterative process for international negociations on acid rain in Northern Europe using a general convex formulation.
Yu. NESTEROV. Quality of semidefinite relaxation for nonconvex quadratic optimization.
H. MARCHAND and L.A. WOLSEY. The 0-1 knapsack problem with a single continuous variable.
L. BROZE and F. JOUNEAU. Estimation of a latent linear model based on the rank statistics of the dependent variable.
J. HAMILTON, J.-F. THISSE and Y. ZENOU. Skill acquisition and wage competition with heterogeneous workers and firms.
J. SHALEV. Loss aversion equilibrium.
M. JUSTMAN and J.-F. THISSE. Local public funding of higher education when skilled labor is mobile.
J. LEE. Orienting matroids representable over both GF and GF.
Y. SMEERS and WEI J.-Y. Spatially oligopolistic model with nodal opportunity cost pricing for transmission capacity reservations.
R. AMIR and J. WOODERS. One-way spillovers, endogenous innovator/imitator roles and research joint ventures.
M. GHATAK, M. MORELLI and T. SJÖSTRÖM. Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endogenous occupational choice.
K. M. ANSTREICHER, M. FAMPA, J. LEE and J. WILLIAMS. Using continuous nonlinear relaxations to solve constrained maximum-entropy sampling problems.
E. D. ANDERSEN and K. D. ANDERSEN. The APOS linear programming solver: an implementation of the homogeneous algorithm.
I. GIJBELS, E. MAMMEN, B.U. PARK and L. SIMAR. On estimation of monotone and concave frontier functions.
I. GRILO, O. SHY and J. - F. THISSE. Price competition when consumer behavior is characterized by conformity or vanity.
M. JELLAL, J. - F. THISSE and Y. ZENOU. Demand uncertainty, mismatch, and (un)employment.
V. GINSBURGH. On the declining price anomaly in wine auctions.
M. MORELLI. Coalition formation and payoff distribution in majority games.
G.M. MARTINI and C. ROVESTI. Antitrust policy and price collusion: public agencies versus delegation?
G. L. ALBANO and A. LIZZERI. A monopolistic market for certification.
A. KHAN and Y. SUN. On the decomposition and characterization of risk.
Y. SMEERS and WEI J.-Y. Competititon in both quantity and quality: spatial competition models with regulated transportation prices.
K. M. ANSTREICHER. Towards a practical volumetric cutting plane method for convex programming.
P.-A. JOUVET, P. MICHEL and J.-P. VIDAL. Intergenerational altruism and the environment.
P. KLINGER MONTEIRO. Optimall all-pay auction when signals are correlated.
P. KLINGER MONTEIRO and M. R. PÁSCOA. Discreteness of equilibria in incomplete markets with a continuum of states.
Yu. NESTEROV. Semidefinite relaxation and nonconvex quadratic optimization.
K. M. ANSTREICHER. Ellipsoidal approximations of convex sets based on the volumetric barrier.
K. M. ANSTREICHER. Linear programming in [ O (n^3 / ln n * L) ] operations.
W. HÄRDLE and C. HAFNER. Discrete time option pricing with flexible volatility estimation.
B. DE MEYER and D. ROSENBERG. "Cav u" and the dual game.
Yu. NESTEROV. Structure of non-negative polynomials and optimization problems.
I. GRILO and X. WAUTHY. Competing with second-hand products when consumers differ in risk aversion.
J. H. DRÈZE. Walras-Keynes equilibria coordination and macroeconomics.
H. TULKENS. Cooperation vs. free riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches.
A. IRMEN and J.- F. THISSE. Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right.
L. GRAZZINI and T. van YPERSELE. Tax harmonisation and political competition.
J. GABSZEWICZ and A. TURRINI. Worker's skills, product quality and industry equilibrium.
A. TURRINI. Vertically differentiated goods and labour markets. A note on quality, quantity and welfare.
C. HARA. Robustness of the coordinating role of a redundant security.
C. HARA. The coordinating role of a redundant security in frictional markets.
L. BAUWENS and M. LUBRANO. Bayesian option pricing using asymmetric GARCH.
Y. SMEERS and WEI J.-Y. Do we need a power exchange if there are enough power marketers?
Y. SMEERS. Computable equilibrium models and the restructing of the European electricity and gas markets.
L. SIMAR and P. W. WILSON. Some problems with the Ferrier/Hirschberg bootstrap idea.
C. d'ASPREMONT and P. MONGIN. A welfarist version of Harsanyi's aggregation theorem.
K. GLAZEBROOK and . NINÔ-MORA. A linear programming approach to stability, optimization and performance analysis for Markovian multiclass queueing networks.
J. P. PEDROSO. Niche search: an application to the Manhattan newspaper problem.
G. CODOGNATO. Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets: a comparison between two models.
Y. NESTEROV and J.-P. VIAL. Homogeneous analytic center cutting plane methods for convex problems and variational inequalities.
K. J. van GARDEREN. Exact geometry of explosive autoregressive models.
S. BOSI and F. MAGRIS. Endogenous business cycles: capital-labor substitution and liquidity constraint with increasing returns to scale.
R. BOADWAY, M. MARCHAND and P. PESTIEAU. Redistribution with unobservable bequests: a case for taxing capital income.
R. BOADWAY, M. MARCHAND and M. SATO. Subsidies versus public provision of private goods as instruments for redistribution.
X. WAUTHY and Y. ZENOU. Efficiency wages, labor heterogeneity and the financing of the training cost.
C. d'ASPREMONT, R. DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and L.-A. GÉRARD-VARET. Contestability and the indeterminacy of free entry equilibria.
J. SHALEV. Loss aversion equilibrium. Revised.
E. GHYSELS, V. PATILEA, E. RENAULT, O. TORRES. Nonparametric methods and option pricing.
V. PATILEA and E. RENAULT. Continuously updated extremum estimators.
D. ALBOTH, A. LERNER and J. SHALEV. Auctioning public goods to groups of agents.
C. CORDIER, H. MARCHAND, R. LAUNDY and L. A. WOLSEY. bc - opt: a branch-and-cut code for mixed integer programs.
B. LEJEUNE. Second order pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation and conditional variance misspecification.
L. BAUWENS, D. DEPRINS and J.-P. VANDEUREN. Modelling interest rates with a cointegrated VAR-GARCH model.
S.X. WEI. A Bayesian approach to dynamic Tobit models.
N. BOCCARD and X. WAUTHY. Export restraints and horizontal product differentiation.
N. BOCCARD and X. WAUTHY. Capacity precommitment in Hotelling's model.
P. BELAN and P. PESTIEAU. Privatizing social security: a critical assessment.
M. MORELLI and P. PENELLE. Economic integration as a partition function game.
M. LEITE-MONTEIRO. Redistributive taxation and migration under uncertainty.
J.-M. GRANDMONT, P. PINTUS and R. de VILDER. Capital-labor substitution and competitive nonlinear endogenous business cycles.
J.-M. GRANDMONT. Expectations formation and stability of large socioeconomic systems.
L. BAUWENS and P. GIOT. The logarithmic ACD model: an application to market microstructure and NASDAQ.
J. J. GABSZEWICZ and N. SONNAC. Subscription as a price discrimination device.
O. GOSSNER. Comparison of information structures.
O. GOSSNER. Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation.
S. CURRARINI and H. TULKENS. Core-theoric and political stability of international agreements on transfrontier pollution.