Sébastien STEINMETZ and Yves ZENOU. On the existence of spatial monopolies under free entry.
Yves ZENOU. Agglomeration economies in European and American cities.
Parkash CHANDER and Ali KHAN. International treaties on trade and global pollution.
Jacques DREZE. On the dynamics of suppply-constrained equilibria.
Leonidas C. KOUTSOUGERAS. A remark on the number of trading posts in strategic market games.
Jean GABSZEWICZ and Alessandro TURRINI. Workers' skills and product selection.
Yu. NESTEROV. Stable flows in transportation networks.
Francis BLOCH and Hélène FERRER. Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies.
María del Mar RACIONERO. Optimal redistribution with unobservable preferences for an observable merit good.
Helmuth CREMER, Pierre PESTIEAU and Jean-Charles ROCHET. Direct versus indirect taxation: The design of the tax structure revisited.
Bhaskar DUTTA, Matthew O. JACKSON and Michel LE BRETON. Srategic candidacy and voting procedures.
Paolo GHIRARDATO and Michel LE BRETON. Choquet rationality.
Nicolas BOCCARD and Yves ZENOU. Racial discrimination and redlining in cities.
Cinzia ROVESTI. Optimal dynamic antitrust policies.
Yu. NESTEROV. Global quadratic optimization on the sets with simplex structure.
Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE and Xavier WAUTHY. European antidumping policy and firms' strategic choice of quality.
Marko LOPARIC, Yves POCHET and Laurence A. WOLSEY. The uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with sales and safety stocks.
Leonidas C. KOUTSOUGERAS. Market games with multiple trading posts.
Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Jacques-François THISSE. Monopolistic competition, multiproduct firms and optimum product diversity.
Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Coalitional negotiation.
John DUGGAN and Michel LE BRETON. Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments.
Pierre GIOT, Bruno HENRY DE FRAHAN and Nicolas PIROTTE. Co-integration and leadership in the European off-season fresh fruit market.
Vincent BARTHELEMY and Philippe MICHEL. The role of education supply in economic growth and the dynamics of skills.
Emmanuel FLACHAIRE. A better way to bootstrap pairs.
Parkash CHANDER, Henry TULKENS, Jean-Pascal VAN YPERSELE and Stephane WILLEMS. The Kyoto Protocol: an economic and game theoretic interpretation.
Johan EYCKMANS and Henry TULKENS. Simulating with RICE coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem.
Francesco DE SINOPOLI and Alessandro TURRINI. A remark on voters' rationality in Besley and Coate model of representative democracy.
Giovanna IANNANTUONI. Subgame perfection in a ``divided government" model.
Martin SKUTELLA and Gerhard J. WOEGINGER. A PTAS for minimizing the total weighted completion time on identical parallel machines.
Francesco DE SINOPOLI. Further remarks on strategic stability in plurality games.
Francesco DE SINOPOLI. Two examples of strategic equilibria in approval voting games.
Jahangir AZIZ and Luc LERUTH. Cyclical effects of the composition of government purchases.
Felix KÜBLER and Heracles M. POLEMARCHAKIS. The identification of preferences from the equilibrium prices of commodities and assets.
Heracles M. POLEMARCHAKIS and Céline ROCHON. Debt, liquidity and dynamics.
Nicolas BOCCARD and Riccardo CALCAGNO. Asymmetries of information in centralized order-driven markets.
Marc GERMAIN and Jean-Pascal VAN YPERSELE. Financial transfers to sustain international cooperation in the climate change framework.
Michel X. GOEMANS. Approximate edge splitting.
François MAIRESSE and Philippe VANDEN EECKAUT. Museum assessment and FDH technology: a global approach.
Andrew CHESHER, Geert DHAENE, Christian GOURIEROUX and Olivier SCAILLET. Bartlett identities tests.
Navin ASWAL, Shurojit CHATTERJI and Arunava SEN. Dictatorial domains.
Gianmarco OTTAVIANO and Jacques-François THISSE. Agglomeration and trade revisited.
Yves CRAMA, Luc LERUTH, Luc RENNEBOOG and Jean-Pierre URBAIN. Corporate governance structures, control and performance in European markets: a tale of two systems.
Enrico MINELLI and Heracles POLEMARCHAKIS. Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy.
Pierre GIOT. Time transformations, intraday data and volatility models.
Stefano DEMICHELIS and Fabrizio GERMANO. Some consequences of the unknottedness of the Walras correspondence.
Aviad HEIFETZ, Enrico MINELLI and Heracles M. POLEMARCHAKIS. Arbitrage and equilibrium with exchangeable risks.
Lisa FLEISCHER, Satoru IWATA and S. Thomas McCORMICK. A faster capacity scaling algorithm for minimum cost submodular flow.
Satoru IWATA, Lisa FLEISCHER and Satoru FUJISHIGE. A strongly polynomial-time algorithm for minimizing submodular functions.
Olivier DE WOLF. Optimal strategies in n-person unilaterally competitive games.
Jacqueline BOUCHER and Yves SMEERS. Alternative models of restructured electricity systems. Part 1: no market power.
Philippe MICHEL and Pierre PESTIEAU. Social security and early retirement in an overlapping-generations growth model.
Gian-Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO. A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies.
Hugues MARCHAND, Alexander MARTIN, Robert WEISMANTEL and Laurence WOLSEY. Cutting planes in integer and mixed integer programming.
Igal MILCHTAICH. How does selfishness affect well-being?
Georges CASAMATTA, Helmuth CREMER and Pierre PESTIEAU. The political economy of social security.
Nicolas BOCCARD and Xavier WAUTHY. Relaxing Bertrand competition: capacity commitment beats quality differentiation.
Luc BAUWENS, Charles S. BOS and Herman K. VAN DIJK. Adaptive polar sampling with an application to a bayes measure of value-at-risk.
Luc BAUWENS and David VEREDAS. The stochastic conditional duration model: a latent factor model for the analysis of financial durations.
Rabah AMIR and Val E. LAMBSON. On the effects of entry in Cournot markets.
Francesco DE SINOPOLI. A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy.
Michel X. GOEMANS, Maurice QUEYRANNE, Andreas S. SCHULZ, Martin SKUTELLA and Yaoguang WANG. Single machine scheduling with release dates.
Michel X. GOEMANS and Franz RENDL. Semidefinite programs and association schemes.
Martin SKUTELLA. Convex quadratic and semidefinite programming relaxations in scheduling.
Jacques H. DREZE. On the macroeconomics of uncertainty and incomplete markets.
Giovanna IANNANTUONI. Divided government and dominance solvability.
Olivier DAXHELET and Yves SMEERS. Variational inequality models of restructured electricity systems.
Francis BLOCH and Stéphane ROTTIER. Agenda control in coalition formation.