M. KEEN and M. MARCHAND. Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending.
P.-A. JOUVET. Equivalence between labour-managed economy and capitalist economy and firms' indivisibility.
P.J.-J. HERINGS. An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S theorem.
M. EL BABSIRI and J.-M. ZAKOIAN. Contemporaneous asymmetry in weak GARCH processes.
L. ZHOU. Integral representation of continuous comonotonically additive functionals.
B. LEJEUNE. A full heteroscedastic one-way error components model for incomplete panel: maximum likelihood estimation and Lagrange multiplier testing.
V. GINSBURGH and S. WEBER. Product lines and price discrimination in the European car market.
P. MONGIN. A note on mixture sets in decision theory.
G. BELVAUX, N. BOISSIN, A. SUTTER and L. A. WOLSEY. Optimal placement of add/drop multiplexers: static and dynamic models.
Y. WANG. LP solvable location problems on networks.
L. ZHOU. Bayesian utilitarianism.
C. d'ASPREMONT, S. BHATTACHARYA and L.-A. GÉRARD-VARET. Bargaining and sharing knowledge.
J.M. van den AKKER, J.A. HOOGEVEEN and S.L. van de VELDE. Parallel machine scheduling by column generation.
P. B. CHEVALIER. Quality improvement through inspection.
X. WAUTHY and Y. ZENOU. How imperfect competition in the labor market affects long-term unemployment policies?
J.M. van den AKKER, C.A.J. HURKENS and M.W.P. SAVELSBERGH. A time-indexed formulation for single-machine scheduling problems: branch-and-cut.
I. RAY. A remark on the consistency principle for games in strategic form.
T.E. SMITH and Y. ZENOU. Dual labor markets, urban unemployment and multicentric cities.
A. JUSTEL and D. PEÑA. Bayesian unmasking in linear models.
WEI J.-Y. and Y. SMEERS. Spatially oligopolistic models with Cournot producers and regulated transportation prices.
WEI J.-Y. and Y. SMEERS. Procedures for computing equilibria of the oligopoly expansion game under predetermined multi-period pricings - Part I: Short-run optimal spot pricing.
WEI J.-Y. and Y. SMEERS. Procedures for computing equilibria of the oligopoly expansion game under predetermined multi-period pricings - Part II: Second-lowest marginal-cost pricing.
M. MARINI. Property rights and market: employee privatization as a cooperative bargaining process.
P. DONATI. Two roles for monetary policy when the asset market is incomplete and information is asymmetric.
S. LOPEZ, M. MARCHAND and P. PESTIEAU. A simple two-country model of redistributive capital income taxation.
P. MONGIN. The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory.
L. BAUWENS and M. LUBRANO. Bayesian inference on Garch models using the Gibbs sampler.
F. JOUNEAU. Disapprobation between Bayesian inferences: definition and examples.
A. HEIFETZ and E. MINELLI. Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
T. VAN YPERSELE. Voting on tariff and retaliation.
S. WEYERS. Uncertainty and insurance in strategic market games.
R. BOUCEKKINE, M. GERMAIN and O. LICANDRO. General equilibrium vintage capital growth models displaying periodic solutions: A theoretical exmaple.
L. KOUTSOUGERAS. On an Edgeworth characterization of rational expectations equilibria in atomless asset market economies.
J. C. PERREZ. Strategic investment in technology and unemployment.
B. DE MEYER. The maximal variation of a bounded martingale and the Central Limit Theorem.
K. TRIANTIS and P. VANDEN EECKAUT. Fuzzy pairwise dominance and implications for technical efficiency performance assessment.
Y. NESTEROV, M. J. TODD and Y. YE. Primal-dual methods and infeasibility detectors for nonlinear programming problems.
B. U. PARK, R. C. SICKLES and L. SIMAR. Stochastic panel frontiers: a semiparametric approach.
A. KNEIP, B. U. PARK and L. SIMAR. A note on the convergence of nonparametric DEA efficiency measures.
P. WUNSCH. Estimating menus of linear contracts for mass transit firms. (In the spirit of Laffont and Tirole).
V. J. VANNETELBOSCH. Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining.
V. J. VANNETELBOSCH. N-person sequential bargaining with endogenous procedure.
M. SAMARTIN. A model for financial intermediation and public intervention.
H. C. CHEN, J. W. FRIEDMAN and J. - F. THISSE. Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach.
S. P. ANDERSON, A. de PALMA and J. - F. THISSE. Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry.
I. V. EVSTIGNEEV, W. HILDENBRAND and M. JERISON. Metonymy and cross section demand.
B. BROCKMÜLLER, O. GÜNLÜK and L. WOLSEY. Designing private line networks -- Polyhedral analysis and computation.
K. J. van GARDEREN. Exact geometry of autoregressive models.
B. BORTOLOTTI. Trials and errors: plea bargaining as a learning device.
J.-F. MERTENS. The limit-price mechanism.
N. BOCCARD, T.VAN YPERSELE and P. WUNSCH. Comparative advantage, redistribution and the political process.
A. TURRINI. Liberalization, quality and welfare. Removing the Italian VER on Japanese car exports.
H. CREMER and P. PESTIEAU. Income redistribution in an economic union: the trade off between inter- and intranational redistribution.
P. MICHEL and P. PESTIEAU. Optimal population without repugnant aspects.
A. DHILLON and J. F MERTENS. Relative utilitarianism. An improved axiomatisation.
S. WEYERS. Common knowledge without differentiating counterfactuals.
P. BELAN, P. MICHEL and P. PESTIEAU. Pareto improving social security reform with endogenous growth.
Y. WANG. Bicriteria job sequencing with release dates.
G. NORMAN and J.-F. THISSE. Technology choice and market structure: strategic aspects of flexible manufacturing.
L. SIMAR and P. W. WILSON. Estimating and bootstrapping Malmquist indices.
H. CREMER and P. PESTIEAU. Social insurance and labor mobility. A political economy approach.
J. P. PEDROSO RAMOS DOS SANTOS. Niche search and evolutionary optimisation.
C. d'ASPREMONT and P. MONGIN. Utility theory and ethics.
S. CURRARINI. Ratio equilibria and voting in a public goods economy with jurisdictions.
J. K. BRUECKNER, J.-F. THISSE and Y. ZENOU. Why is central Paris rich and downtown Detroit poor? An amenity-based theory.
J. H. HAMILTON and J.-F. THISSE. Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly.
P. A. JOUVET, Ph. MICHEL and P. PESTIEAU. Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality. The case of environmental quality.