A. BILLOT and J.-F. THISSE. A nonadditive probability model of individual choice.
S. MORRIS. Alternative notions of knowledge.
A. N. BANERJEE. A method of estimating the average derivative.
S. MODICA and A. RUSTICHINI. Unawareness: a formal theory of unforeseen contingencies. Part II.
L. LISMONT and Ph. MONGIN. On the logic of common belief and common knowledge.
M. DATTA. Externalities and price dynamics.
C. RITTER and L. SIMAR. Another look at the American electrical utility data.
A. KAJII. On the role of paper money in general equilibrium models without transactions costs.
M. DATTA and L.J. MIRMAN. Dynamic capital interactions, externalities and trade.
R. BOADWAY, N. MARCEAU and M. MARCHAND. Time-consistent criminal sanctions.
I. RAY. Deriving correlated equilibrium as the stable standard of behavior of a social situation: a note.
A. BEITIA. Quality regulation in the monopoly case: the impact of information.
R. AMIR. Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games.
B. DE MEYER and P. MONGIN. A note on affine aggregation.
C. D'ASPREMONT and M. MOTTA. Tougher price-competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for antitrust authorities?
P. PESTIEAU, U. M. POSSEN and S.M. SLUTSKY. The penalty for tax evasion when taxes are set optimally.
T. VAN ZANDT. Hidden information acquisition and static choice.
L. BAUWENS and M. LUBRANO. Identification restrictions and posterior-densities in cointegrated Gaussian Var systems.
F. VANDERBECK and L.A. WOLSEY. An exact algorithm for IP column generation.
J.-F. MERTENS, S. SORIN and S. ZAMIR. Repeated Games. Part A. Background material.
J.-F. MERTENS, S. SORIN and S. ZAMIR. Repeated Games. Part B. The central results.
J.-F. MERTENS, S. SORIN and S. ZAMIR. Repeated Games. Part C. Further developments.
G.D. FERRIER, K. KERSTENS and P. VANDEN EECKAUT. Radial and nonradial technical efficiency measures on a DEA reference technology: a comparison using US banking data.
R. AMIR and I. GRILO. Stackelberg vs. Cournot/Bertrand equilibrium.
R. AMIR. Strategic intergenerational bequests with Stochastic convex production.
T.L. MAGNANTI and L. A. WOLSEY. Optimal trees.
Y. POCHET and L. A. WOLSEY. Algorithms and reformulations for lot sizing problems.
F. BLOCH and H. RYDER. Two-sides search, marriages and matchmakers.
H.M. POLEMARCHAKIS and P. SICONOLFI. Prices, asset markets and indeterminacy.
V. GINSBURGH and M. KEYZER. Existence and efficiency properties of an approximate equilibrium when asset markets are incomplete: a welfare approach.
F. CABALLERO-SANZ, R. MONER-COLONQUES and J.J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS. Optimal licensing in a spatial model.
Y.M. IOANNIDES and K. KAN. Structural estimation of residential mobility and housing tenure choice.
Y.M. IOANNIDES and K. KAN. The nature of two-directional intergenerational transfers of money and time: an empirical analysis.
S.P. ANDERSON, A. DE PALMA and Y. NESTEROV. Oligopolistic competition and the optimal provision of products.
F. DE SOUSA RAMOS. Pigovian taxes, tradables permits and a dynamic process for an economy with pollution.
J.H. DRÈZE and H. SNEESSENS. Technical development, competition from low-wage economies and low-skilled unemployment.
C.E. FERREIRA, A. MARTIN, C.C. DE SOUZA, R. WEISMANTEL and L.A. WOLSEY. Formulations and valid inequalities for the node capacitated graph partitioning problem.
L. BAUWENS and V. GINSBURGH. Do art experts make rational estimates of pre-sale prices?
S.P. ANDERSON and V. GINSBURGH. Price discrimination with costly consumer arbitrage.
P. HANSEN, D. PEETERS and J.-F. THISSE. The profit-maximizing Weber problem.
C. RITTER and L. SIMAR. Pitfalls of normal-gamma stochastic frontier models
T. CORDELLA and J. J. GABSZEWICZ. ``Nice" trivial equilibria in strategic market games.
A. RUSTICHINI and J. H. DRÈZE. State Dependent Utility.
F. FORGES and E. MINELLI. Self-fullfilling mechanisms and rational expectations.
S. GRANT and A. KAJII. AUSI expected utility: an anticipated utility theory of relative disappointment aversion.
L. VENTURA. A few remarks on imperfect competition with incompleteness of markets
H. TULKENS and A. MALNERO. Nonparametric approaches to the assessment of the relative efficiency of bank branches.
P. CHANDER and H. TULKENS. A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution.
P. MICHEL and P. PESTIEAU. Fiscal policy in a growth model with both altruistic and non altruistic agents.
H.R. SNEESSENS and F. SHADMAN-MEHTA. Real wages, skill mismatch and unemployment persistence.
P. VANDEN EECKAUT and P. WUNSCH. Noise vs inefficiency evidence from mass transit.
F. DOCQUIER and P. MICHEL. Education subsidies and endogenous growth: Implications of demographic shocks.
C.E. FERREIRA, C.C. DE SOUZA, A. MARTIN, R. WEISMANTEL and L.A. WOLSEY. The node capacitated graph partitioning problem: a computational study.
P. WUNSCH. Cost and efficiency of major urban transit systems in Europe.
J. BERGIN and B.L. LIPMAN. Evolution with state-dependent mutations.
F. BLOCH and S. GHOSAL.Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies.
J. J. GABSZEWICZ and T. VAN YPERSELE. Social protection and political competition.
F. FORGES and E. MINELLI. Self-fulfilling mechanisms in repeated games with incomplete information.
G. CODOGNATO and S. GHOSAL. Cournot equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders.
M. BOLDRIN and A. RUSTICHINI. Equilibria with social security.
G. KOOP, M. F. J. STEEL and J. OSIEWALSKI. Posterior analysis of stochastic frontier models using Gibbs sampling.
Y.E. NESTEROV and M. J. TODD. Self-scaled cones and interior-point methods in nonlinear programming.
S. GHOSAL. Eductive stability in a two period economy.
J. BERECHMAN, S. PODDAR and Oz SHY. Network structure and entry, in the deregulated airline industry.
J. GONZALO and J.-Y. PITARAKIS. Comovements in large systems.
L. VENTURA. On a shareholder constrained efficient criterion for strategic firms.
C. D'ASPREMONT, R. DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and L.-A. G...RARD-VARET. On the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition.
C. D'ASPREMONT, R. DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and L.-A. G...RARD-VARET. Market power, coordination failures and endogenous fluctuations.
H. CREMER, M. MARCHAND and P. PESTIEAU. Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge.
M. LEITE MONTEIRO. Redistributive policy with labour mobility across countries.
B. ALLEN, J. DUTTA and H. POLEMARCHAKIS. Equilibrium selections.
S. GHOSAL and H. POLEMARCHAKIS. Exchange and optimality.
C. d'ASPREMONT and L.-A. G...RARD-VARET. Moral hazard in teams with uncertainty, and transfers or repetition as enforcement mechanisms.
H. POLEMARCHAKIS and G. SECCIA. A role for monetary policy when prices reveal information: an example.
J. H. DRÈZE. Forty years of public economics: a personal perspective.
Y. ZENOU and T.E. SMITH. Efficiency wages, involuntary unemployment and urban spatial structure.
C. d'ASPREMONT, R. DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and L. A. G...RARD-VARET. Imperfect competition in an overlapping generations model: a case for fiscal policy.
J. MINTZ and H. TULKENS. Optimality properties of alternative systems of taxation of foreign capital income.
A. SUTTER, F. VANDERBECK and L. WOLSEY. Optimal placement of add/drop multiplexers: heuristic and exact algorithms.
J.H. DRÈZE and H.M. POLEMARCHAKIS. Money and monetary policy in general equilibrium.
L. BROZE, G. MELARD and O. SCAILLET. Forecast intervals in ARCH exponential smoothing.
B. GRODAL, F. HAHN, W. HILDENBRAND, H. POLEMARCHAKIS. General Equilibrium : 40th Anniversary Conference, 3-5 June 1993