Colloque international | Early Phenomenology on ‘Position-Taking‘

Alexis Delamare (University College Dublin/ULiège, CRePh)

&

Élise Dravigny (UCLouvain, CEP/Sorbonne Université)

Sylvain Camilleri (UCLouvain),

Alexis Delamare (University College Dublin/ULiège),

Arnaud Dewalque (ULiège),

Élise Dravigny (UCLouvain/Sorbonne Université),

Bruno Leclercq (ULiège),

Marc Maesschalck (UCLouvain),

Denis Seron (ULiège)

“Now the question is how we want to fix the concept of position-taking. It is not so easy” (Edmund Husserl, Ms A VI 31, 42a, 1928)

This conference aims to shed new light on the intriguing concept of Stellungnahme (usually translated as “position-taking”) as it is applied by early phenomenologists, especially by Edmund Husserl and the so-called ‘Munich-Göttingen’ Circle of phenomenology, composed of Johannes Daubert, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Roman Ingarden, Alexander Pfänder, Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein, among others.

Within early phenomenology, the term Stellungnahme is first employed in a published work by Reinach in “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils” (1911; 1982). There, it characterizes those mental experiences, such as belief, striving, or love, which display an inherent polarity (being respectively opposed to disbelief, struggle, and hate) – in contrast to representations or meanings. Reinach then takes up this concept in 1912 in his essay on “reflection” (Überlegung) (1912; 1913), in which he emphasizes that intellectual reflection necessarily aims to establish a “position-taking”, typically a conviction about a state of affairs (2017, 58–65).

Soon after, clearly drawing on Reinach, von Hildebrand elaborates his own original approach to Stellungnahme, through its cardinal distinction with Kenntnisnahme or “knowledge-taking” (von Hildebrand 1916, 134). A knowledge-taking, such as the vision of a landscape, is characterized as a mere “having” of a content, whereas, in the case of a Stellungnahme, I take a spontaneous stance with respect to the appearing object. In this regard, intellectual experiences such as conviction, but also affective experiences such as joy or indignation and conative experiences such as willing, insofar as they exhibit such subjective activity, are to be interpreted as ‘position-takings’.

Especially in his manuscripts from the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, Edmund Husserl also makes extensive and yet-to-be-explored use of the concept of Stellungnahme. In the theoretical sphere, he notably distinguishes between ‘position-taking’ understood as a positional act – in contrast to neutral ‘mere representations’ (1980, 446–47) – and ‘position-taking’ understood as a critical procedure aiming at the rational verification of a certain thesis (2020a, 331, 372). In the affective sphere, he observes that the manifestation of a positive value often motivates an “affective position-taking” (Gemütsstellungnahme) as a response, whereby the subject actively “turns” towards the object with pleasure (2020b, 121). Lastly, Husserl emphasizes the crucial role played by sedimented active ‘position-takings’ in the constitution of a stable personal self (1952, 112–13).

Finally, Edith Stein also appeals to the terminology of ‘position-taking’ in her 1922 Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften (2010, 49, 133). Following von Hildebrand and Husserl, she asserts that an emotion – for instance, joy – is not a “knowledge-taking of the value” (Wertkenntnisnahme) – for instance of beauty – but rather a subjective stance towards the axiological object, and thus a “response” (Antwort) thereto.

The concept of Stellungnahme thus assumes a variety of functions within early phenomenology. This variety reveals the richness and power of this notion, whose applications range from theoretical philosophy to the philosophy of emotion and to ethics; yet it also challenges the unity of this concept and calls into question the compatibility of these diverse uses, across authors and within the work of particular phenomenologists – e.g., Husserl.

Against this background, the aim of this meeting is to advance the literature – whose (scarce) accounts of Stellungnahme have been limited to individual authors (Carta and Delamare, forthcoming; Delamare 2025; De Monticelli 2011; Jacobs 2016; Jardine 2020; Loidolt 2021; Magrì 2022; Müller 2020; Salice 2015; Uemura and Salice 2019) – by offering an overview of ‘position-taking’ among early phenomenologists. To do so, the first objective is to study the influences, continuities, and tensions between the accounts they propose. Emphasis will also be placed on the sources of the concept of Stellungnahme. In particular, the psychologist Hugo Münsterberg (a student of Wundt) already uses this term in his Grundzüge der Psychologie (1900), seemingly with a meaning very close to Reinach’s usage. In addition, in his 1911 essay, Reinach explicitly refers to the works of Windelband (1884) and to Brentano’s theory of judgment (Brentano 1874, 262). Finally, a third line of inquiry will be the potential relevance of this terminology for contemporary issues, such as epistemic agency (Jacobs 2021) or the reactional nature of emotions (Müller 2018).

We welcome presentations on topics including, but not limited to, the following:

- The historical origins of the concept of Stellungnahme as used by Husserl and the Munich-Göttingen Circle.

- The mutual influences of the members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle as they develop their understanding of Stellungnahme.

- The unity, diversity, and evolution of the meaning of Stellungnahme within early phenomenology.

- ‘Position-taking’ understood minimally as ‘belief’ or ‘positional act’. The doxic modification introduced by the phenomenological epoché – which brackets all Stellungnahmen (Husserl 1976, 63) – can also be investigated in this perspective.

- ‘Position-taking’ understood maximally as a critical procedure, based on doubt and intellectual deliberation.

- Stellungnahme in the affective sphere, especially the distinction between value-feelings – in which values are known – and emotions as responses.

- Stellungnahme in the conative, volitional, and practical sphere.

- Stellungnahme, agency, freedom, and the constitution of an active and stable personality.

- ‘Position-taking’ and related notions – e.g., ‘knowledge-taking’ (Kenntnisnahme), ‘acknowledgment’ (Anerkennung), or ‘approval’ (Billigung) (Carta 2023).

- The influence of early phenomenology’s concept of Stellungnahme on later phenomenology – e.g., Stavenhagen (1925; Smith 1982, 312) – as well as on later philosophy more broadly.

- The significance of early phenomenology’s concept of Stellungnahme for contemporary debates.

Brentano, Franz. 1874. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.

Carta, Emanuela. 2024. Approval, reflective emotions, and virtue: sentimentalist elements in Husserl’s philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32: 1329–1349.

Carta, Emanuela and Delamare, Alexis. Forthcoming. Husserl on position-taking (Stellungnahme). In Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, ed. Emanuela Carta and Gabriel Barroso. Cham: Springer.

De Monticelli, Roberta. 2011. Alles Leben ist Stellungnehmen – Die Person als praktisches Subjekt. In Die Aktualität Husserls, ed. Marisa Scherini, Christopher Erhard, and Verena Mayer, 39–55. Freiburg: Alber.

Delamare, Alexis. 2024. The development of emotional responsivism in the Munich-Göttingen Circle. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 22: 158–175.
Delamare, Alexis. 2025. Ultimate Rationality. Husserl on Critical Position-Taking (Stellungnahme) in the Theoretical and Axiological Spheres. Husserl Studies 41: 1–21.
Delamare, Alexis. 2026. Edmund Husserl on Position-Taking (Stellungnahme) as the Essence of Human Life. Human Studies: 1–19.

Drummond, John J. 2007. Historical Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.

DuBois, James M. 2002. Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law. In Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, ed. John J. Drummond and Lester E. Embree, 327–346. Dordrecht: Springer.

Husserl, Edmund. 1952. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Hua IV). Edited by Marly Biemel. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 1976. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Hua III.1). Edited by Karl Schuhmann. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 1980. Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898–1925) (Hua XXIII). Edited by Eduard Marbach. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 2020a. Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins–Teilband I: Verstand und Gegenstand. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1909–1927) (Hua XLIII/1). Edited by Ullrich Melle and Thomas Vongehr. Cham: Springer.

Husserl, Edmund. 2020b. Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins–Teilband II: Gefühl und Wert. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1896–1925) (Hua XLIII/2). Edited by Ullrich Melle and Thomas Vongehr. Cham: Springer.

Jacobs, Hanne. 2016. Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention. Research in Phenomenology 46: 257–276.

Jacobs, Hanne. 2021. Husserl on Epistemic Agency. In The Husserlian Mind, ed. Hanne Jacobs, 340–351. London; New York: Routledge.

Jardine, James. 2020. Edmund Husserl. In The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion, ed. Thomas Szanto and Hilge Landweer, 53–62. London; New York: Routledge.

Jardine, James. 2022. Empathy, Embodiment, and the Person. Husserlian Investigations of Social Experience and the Self. Cham: Springer.

Loidolt, Sophie. 2021. The person as a fragile project: On personhood and practical agency in Husserl. In The Husserlian Mind, ed. Hanne Jacobs, 393–406. London; New York: Routledge.

Magrì, Elisa. 2022. (Un)learning to see others. Perception, types, and position-taking in Husserl’s phenomenology. In Empathy, Intersubjectivity, and the Social World, ed. Anna Bortolan and Elisa Magrì, 261–278. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter.

Müller, Jean Moritz. 2018. Emotion as Position-Taking. Philosophia 46: 525–540.

Müller, Jean Moritz. 2020. Dietrich von Hildebrand. In The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion, ed. Thomas Szanto and Hilge Landweer, 114–122. Routledge.

Mulligan, Kevin. 2013. Acceptance, Acknowledgment, Affirmation, Agreement, Assertion, Belief, Certainty, Conviction, Denial, Judgment, Refusal and Rejection. In Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, ed. Mark Textor, 97–136. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Münsterberg, Hugo. 1900. Grundzüge der Psychologie I. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth.

Reinach, Adolf. 1911. Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils. In Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen. Theodor Lipps zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet von früheren Schülern, 196–254. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth.

Reinach, Adolf. 1912. Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung I. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 148: 181–196.

Reinach, Adolf. 1913. Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung II. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 149: 30–58.

Reinach, Adolf. 1982. On the Theory of the Negative Judgment. In Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, ed. Barry Smith, trans. Barry Smith, 315–378. München; Wien: Philosophia Verlag.

Reinach, Adolf. 2017. Three Texts on Ethics. Translated by James H. Smith. München; Wien: Philosophia Verlag.

Salice, Alessandro. 2015. “Actions, Values, and States of Affairs in Hildebrand and Reinach.” Studia Phaenomenologica 15: 259–80.

Salice, Alessandro. 2025. The Phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Fall 2025. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

Smith, Barry. 1982. Introduction to Adolf Reinach “On the Theory of the Negative Judgment.” In Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, ed. Barry Smith, 289–314. München; Wien: Philosophia Verlag.

Stavenhagen, Kurt. 1925. Absolute Stellungnahmen. Eine ontologische Untersuchung über das Wesen der Religion. Erlangen: Verlag der philosophischen Akademie.

Stein, Edith. 2010. Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften. Freiburg: Herder.

Uemura, Genki, and Alessandro Salice. 2019. Motives in Experience: Pfänder, Geiger, and Stein. In Phenomenology and Experience, ed. Antonio Cimino and Cees Leijenhorst, 129–149. Leiden; Boston: Brill.

Vendrell Ferran, Íngrid. 2008. Die Emotionen: Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Vendrell Ferran, Íngrid. 2015. The Emotions in Early Phenomenology. Studia Phaenomenologica 15: 349–374.

Von Hildebrand, Dietrich. 1916. Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 3: 126–252.

Windelband, Wilhelm. 1884. Beiträge zur Lehre vom negativen Urteil. In Straßburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie: Eduard Zeller zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstage, 165–195. Tübingen.

Emanuela Carta 

Arnaud Dewalque 

James Jardine 

Jean Moritz Müller 

Alessandro Salice

Denis Seron

Genki Uemura 

Ingrid Vendrell-Ferran