03/11/2026 - 12:45 - LECL 61
Martial Toniotti
(UCLouvain, LIDAM, CORE)
will give a presentation on
Prequalifications and information acquisition in procurement auctions
Abstract: I model the impact of firms’ endogenous research in a renewable energy capacity procurement auction. I include a technological cost in the auction which acts as a common-value component. I find that, at equilibrium, endogenous research creates a business-stealing effect in the auction, leading too many firms to conduct research. This in turn implies that prequalification requirements for the auction based on information about project costs are inefficient and reduce social welfare. Second, when auctions exist for two substitute technologies, such as PV and wind, it is not necessarily optimal to link the auctions across technologies. Finally, using a database of European Union auctions, I find some empirical evidence of endogenous research.
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