Paul Atwell

(Universidad Carlos III)

will give a presentation on 

Reducing Falsehoods at the Source: An experimental study incentivizing Brazilian political elites to avoid online misinformation

Abstract
Elites play an outsized role in the sharing and reach of misinformation on social media yet remain vastly understudied. How responsive are they to being informed about penalties and their likelihood of enforcement? We design and implement a parallel survey and field experiment with candidates for municipal office in Brazil, many of whom we show lack knowledge about campaign rules. Candidates were randomly assigned to receive an informational campaign advising them of penalties they may face if they share misinformation during the 2024 campaign. In the survey experiment (n = 875) we show that interest in misinformation is responsive to the informational treatment, but this comes at the cost of a chilling effect across all types of headlines. In the field experiment (n = 2,595) we analyze candidates’ posting behavior on Instagram and Facebook, and again find evidence of efficacy in reducing misinformation, but does so without causing a chilling effect, without changing electoral outcomes, and without additional prosecutions. Together, our findings suggest that robust juridical responses to misinformation can shift elite behavior and reduce the supply of misinformation.