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Chaire Mercier 2026 | «Feminism: an ecumenical proposal»

isp | Louvain-la-Neuve

isp
13 October 2025 , modifié le 2 March 2026
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This serises of lessons; unpack the demands of gender justice. It starts from a proposal about how we should understand the feminist project in this day and age, when the very concept of “woman” is essentially contested. We can define feminism without appealing to any particular account of “woman” – whether as a biological or cultural category – namely as the project of resisting unjust gender norms, establishing just ones, and compensating victims of gender injustice. Any specific account of gender justice depends on the correct account of justice; the second meeting analyses this matter and the question of whether and how the nature-culture debate matters for gender justice. We then discuss whether men are victims of gender injustice, care-supporting policies as a dilemma of gender justice, the state’s role in opposing gender injustice, and duties to resist unjustified gender norms.

"Gender Justice"

“Woman” has become a contested term. Some believe it is, or should be used as, a sex term, while others that it is, or should be used as, a gender term (referring to a social role, or a certain identity.) Reasons that support employing “woman” as a sex concept rule out its employment as a gender concept, and the other way around. Moreover, “sex”, “gender” and “gender identity” are also subject to radical contestation. These cleavages are undergirded by metaphysical and ethical disagreements which reasonable individuals are unlikely to settle. They jeopardise the feminist project, defined as it has always been by reference to “woman”. They also jeopardise the ability of feminists and non-feminists alike to debate together practical matters concerning the treatment of individuals according to their sexual and gendered features, and, most notably, the issues of separate spaces. I suggest that the threat to the feminist project can be overcome if we think of feminism as a coalition against unjustified, and primarily against sexist, gender norms. I also argue that it is possible to engage in public debates without talking about “women”. In particular, states can and should offer justifications for their policies by reference to the discrete biological facts (such as hormones, chromosomes, gametes or sexual morphology) and/or gender facts (such as gender roles, gender socialisation, internalised gender norms). It is such facts that are already assumed, by the parties to the debate, to have normative significance. Following this suggestion would yield a complicated and messy normative picture, and would not in itself resolve substantive moral disagreements; but it would improve the chance to articulate the disagreements – thus getting the conversations unstuck – and may be the only way compatible with mutual toleration and respect."

Les leçons suivantes auront pour thème :

What is gender justice, and (how) does the nature-culture distinction matter ? 

Readings : Anca Gheaus, “Gender Justice,” Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 6(1), 2012.

de 14h à 16h

Auditoire Socrate 40

Are men victims of gender injustice? 

Readings : Philippe van Parijs, “Four Puzzles on Gender Equality,” Law, Ethics and Philosophy 3:79-89, 2015.

de 10h45 à 12h45

salle B321

 

Internal dilemmas of gender justice: care-supporting policies 

Readings : Barbara Bergmann, “The Only Ticket to Equality: Total Androginy, Male Style,” Journal of Contemporary Legal Studies 9:75–86, 1998.

Anca Gheaus, “The feminist argument against supporting care,” Journal of Practical Ethics 8 (1):1-27, 2020.

de 14h à 16h

Auditoire Socrate 21

May neutral states pass policies aimed at gender justice? Some solutions 

Reading :

Anca Gheaus, “Political Liberalism and the Dismantling of the Gendered Division of Labour,” Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 9, pp.153-182, 2023

de 10h45 à 12h45

Auditoire Socrate 43

 

Individual duties to resist unjustified gender norms

Readings :

Lea Ypi and Tamara Jugov, “Structural Injustice, Epistemic Opacity, and the Responsibilities of the Oppressed,” Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (1):7-27, 2019.

Sharon Lloyd, “Situating a Feminist Criticism of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism”, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review28:1319–1344, 1995.

de 14h à 16h

Auditoire Socrate 43

Students present the plan for their final paper

de 10h45 à 12h45

Auditoire Socrate 43

professor Anca Gheaus

Central European University / Vienna

 

Leçon inaugurale le lundi 16 mars 2026

à 18h15

à l’auditoire Socrate 11,

UCLouvain à Louvain-La-Neuve