02/04/2026 - 12:45 - Doyen 22

Reinhold Kesler

(Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics)

will give a presentation on 

Existence, Antecedents and Consequences of Non-Compliance in Mobile App Markets

Abstract

Digital platforms, now ubiquitous intermediaries in the modern economy, implement various governance rules (e.g., transparency requirements) with the purported goal of ensuring a level playing field for their participants. However, there is limited research exploring whether these rules are effective or even enforced, or whether platform participants can successfully avoid complying with platform requirements to gain unfair advantages. Therefore, this manuscript examines non-compliance in the mobile app market. The empirical study compares app developers’ disclosed versus actual behavior concerning the transfer of device IDs for advertising purposes. To this end, we analyze data for 852 apps available on Apple and Google platforms across 19 countries. The findings reveal that about 40% of apps are non-compliant, meaning they claim not to transfer device IDs despite doing so in practice. Compliance is more prevalent among apps catering to Apple (EU) users than Google (non-European) users. Notably, older apps and apps with more resources demonstrate greater compliance. However, popularity and reputation do not explain compliance. Moreover, compliance varies as a function of app category, as well as the app’s connections to specific supply-side platforms. Intriguingly, non-compliant apps earn at least 10% more advertising revenue than they would if they were compliant, thus gaining a significant economic edge.

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