Robert Franck
Professeur émérite
Curriculum Vitae
Robert Franck is Professor Emeritus of the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, SSH/FIAL). With Daniel Courgeau (Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, Paris), he directed the collection of Methodos Series, Methodological Prospects in the Social Sciences, published by Springer*. Special adviser for the edition of the European Interdisciplinary Academy of Sciences (AEIS, Paris). Associated since 1998 with the epistemology study group of the social sciences created by Jean-Michel Berthelot (Sorbonne) and animated from 2006 by Bernard Walliser (EHESS); three collective works have emerged, respectively in 2001 at the Presses universitaires de France (reissued in 2016), 2009 and 2015 at the editions of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).
The titles of Doctor in Philosophy and Letters, and Doctor of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, were conferred on him in 1964 at UCL, for a thesis in moral philosophy on the so-called reflexive method of Jean Nabert. His main results were published in the Revue philosophique de Louvain in 1965 and 1966.
Research Fellow of the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS Belgium) from 1965 to 1969, he studied the philosophy of language and in particular the analytical current, and he translated and published at the invitation of Gilbert Ryle the first French translations of Gilbert Ryle and John Austin in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Paris, in 1966 and 1967. In the wake of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s language games and Emile Benveniste’s advanced analysis of the language, he developed a new definition of the nature of discourse. His main results were published in the Revue philosophique de Louvain in May 1969.
In charge of teaching knowledge theory at UCL in 1967 he published in 1968 lessons in knowledge theory. Lecturer at UCL in 1969 and Professor in 1975, his teaching and publications have focused since 1969 on the theory of knowledge, general epistemology, philosophy of sciences, sociology of sciences, health policy in Belgium, the social issues of psychological practices, the epistemology of psychology, the epistemology of psychiatry, the history of philosophy, moral philosophy, the philosophy of work, the teaching of philosophy (Aggregation), the policy of education, and the methodology of research in the social sciences.
In 1971 he edited a thematic issue of La Revue Nouvelle (Brussels) on the relations between science and society, and edited a second thematic issue of the same magazine in 1978 in collaboration with François Gobbe on health policy in Belgium,
From 1973 to 1998, he collaborated in the evaluation and guidance of innovative practices in health, psychiatry, education and social work services: integrated social services (Quebec), medical homes in popular settings, ambulatory psychiatry, network psychiatry, cooperative pedagogy, science shops, and action research.
He collaborated from 1974 to 1997 on a university program of training for adults in economic and social policy, within his university (Open Faculty of Economic and Social Policy – FOPES, UCL).
In 1979, he joined the editorial committee of the Revue internationale d'action communautaire – International Review of Community Development, Montreal, at the invitation of Frédéric Leseman.
Visiting professor at the Instituto Superior de Psicologia Applicada, Lisbon, from 1981 to 1983, he published a series of studies on the social issues of school psychology, industrial psychology, and clinical psychology, and on the nature of psychological discourse.
In 1983, with Michel Legrand and Alex Neybuch, he created the journal Perspectives, Revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, Liège**, and directed it in collaboration until 1996 (29 issues published).
From 1986 to 1994, member of the Organizing Committee for Colloquia ‘L'Autre Lieu’ Action Research on Psychiatry and Alternatives, Brussels.
Co-head of the Centre for Philosophy of Sciences of the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie (ISP, UCL) from 1991 to 2001.
Direction, au Centre de philosophie des sciences de l'ISP, d'une recherche pluridisciplinaire sur l'explication dans les sciences de l'homme, de 1991 à 1994 (published 1994 in ed. J.Vrin, Paris, 464 p.)
In 1994, at the PSI Centre for Philosophy of Science, a Colloquium organized jointly with the Interdisciplinary Institute of Epistemological Studies in Lyon, on the opportunity to bring together science and philosophy. One hundred and twenty university researchers from all disciplines took part in this symposium (published in 1995 by J. Vrin, Paris, 289p.)
Creation in 1995 with Guillaume Wunsch (Institute of Demography, UCL) of the Centre pluridisciplinaire de méthodologie des sciences sociales Methodos*** within the Faculty of Economic, Social and Political Sciences of UCL.
He was the director of the Centre from 1997 to 2001, where he organized numerous conferences and seminars. From 1997 to 2001, the Centre conducted international multidisciplinary research on the explanatory power of models in the human sciences (published in 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 309 p.).
In 2000, he created the Methodos Series, Methodological Prospects in the Social Sciences at Kluwer Academic Publishers, now part of Springer (fourteen volumes published from 2002 to 2018, two volumes in preparation). *
MISCELLANEOUS
He was President of the National Association Comité Afghanistan Belgique/ Afghanistan Comite België from 1982 to 1989****
He collaborated on the Coordination against the War in Iraq in 1990-1991
He collaborated in the mobilization against the war in Kosovo in 1999
He directed the Théâtre Universitaire de Louvain in 1956 and 1957
Piano pieces ****** The objectives of the Methodos Series at Springer Publishing (2000 - )
OBJECT
This Book Series is devoted to examining and solving the major methodological problems social sciences are facing. Take for example the gap between empirical and theoretical research, the explanatory power of models, the relevance of multilevel analysis, the weakness of cumulative knowledge, the role of ordinary knowledge in the research process, or again the place which should be reserved to “time, change and history” when explaining social facts. These problems are well known and yet they are seldom treated in depth in scientific literature because of their general nature.
So that these problems may be examined and solutions found, the series prompts and fosters the setting-up of international multidisciplinary research teams, and it is work by these teams that appear in the Book Series. The Series can also host books produced by a single author who follows the same objectives. Proposals of manuscripts and plans for collective books will be carefully examined.
The epistemological scope of these methodoogical problems is obvious and resorting to Philosophy of Science becomes a necessity. The main objective of the Series remains however the methodological solutions that can be applied to the problems in hand. Les livres de la Série sont donc closely connecté à la pratique de recherche.
AUDIENCE TARGETED BY THE SERIES
Postgraduates and academics. Advanced courses in research methods and in the philosophy of science. Courses and/or seminars preparing students for their Master’s and doctoral dissertations. People interested in any research area concerned with human and social issues such as economics, sociology, ethnology, demography, political sciences, geography, history, criminology and psychology.
RATIONALE
From 1950 onwards and for some thirty years, the expansion of the social sciences worldwide was spectacular. Research departments and study programs mushroomed in universities and schools and the number of students in these disciplines increased at a breathtaking rate, while all sorts of professional networks were growing in both the private and public sectors, thus creating a large graduate job market. Research in the social sciences has achieved remarkable breakthroughs in various fields, at theoretical as well as methodological and technical levels. More specifically, investigative techniques have become more refined and sophisticated, and the results generated from qualitative as well as quantitative methods pile up year after year. But even more pressing becomes the question as to how these results contribute to a better understanding of social life. Do they provide us with better criteria for decision and action? Do they improve our explanations of social reality, and our grasp of the forces regulating social change? The malaise is genuine and it continues to grow, where the researchers and the sleeping partners, both private and public, are concerned.
A number of difficulties at the very root of these disciplines and their methods have not yet been resolved. They contribute to the post-modernist drift which has begun to affect the research community in these fields. Worse still, since the resolution of these difficulties is being overlooked, the social disciplines are deprived of the means of reinforcing their relevance and usefulness.
These difficulties can be attributed partly to the persistence of a number of received ideas as to the nature of the scientific enterprise, the singularity of the sciences of Man and Society, the ways in which the knowledge obtained can be put to use and its reliability. It is important to shield research from these received ideas because they hinder innovation in terms of theory and encourage routine where methods are concerned. It is necessary to turn to the philosophy of science or to epistemology in order to combat the ideas in question, provided of course that philosophy of science is not used in a dogmatic manner.
However, it is not enough to contest received ideas and remove the obstacles they represent. It is important in the first place to effectively enhance the fruitfulness of research in the social sciences if we want to take up the challenges these sciences encounter today. This explains why the Methodos Series concentrates its efforts on improving the methods used in the social sciences. Resorting to epistemology in order to reach this objective becomes a necessity once again. But epistemology is only a means to an end. Methodological innovation calls for strictly methodological examination, closely adapted to research practices, and it is this innovation the Book Series wants to embrace.”
** The objectives of the Journal Perspectives, Revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologique (1983 – 1997)
OUR PROJECT
Over the past twenty years, psychology in Belgium has experienced a strong expansion. It has played an increasing role in schools, in the psychiatric field, in the selection and management of staff in companies and services, and in public and private welfare agencies. This spectacular diffusion of psychology in many sectors of social life has been accompanied by a rapid increase in the number of graduates in psychology, and a flowering of new psychological techniques.
A similar phenomenon has occurred in other industrialized countries. And it is surprising that so little analysis has been done so far of the social significance of this expansion of psychology, whereas, on the other hand, psychiatry and psychoanalysis have been the subject of many years, passionate debates and sometimes exemplary studies. In the absence of analysis, developments in psychology have, it is true, been perceived and appreciated in different ways. There are those who see psychology as an instrument of progress in human relations. In addition to the psychologists themselves, there are now many teachers, social workers, criminologists, doctors and other health workers who think that the introduction of a more "psychological" perspective in their work improves its quality. Others, on the contrary, more traditionalist, consider that psychology perverts relations and respect for authority, that it encourages laxity and that it undermines a certain number of moral values. Finally, there are a few who believe that they must denounce the support that psychology would bring to various levels of power. Psychology would provide new means of intervention and control not only for the medical, educational and judicial authorities, but also for the judicial authorities and the employers' directorates who use it. Called to add fuel to the workings of various institutions, psychologists would hide the balance of power that underlies social life.
This last criticism of psychology does not fail to be heard by progressive psychologists, but it leaves them at the same time deprived. Because of its general character, it can hardly guide a concrete transformation of their practices, and on the contrary risks demobilizing them. Would the only alternative be to renounce all psychological practice? Few psychologists, for understandable reasons, could do this. It is therefore necessary to assess the extent to which such criticism is actually relevant. And assuming it is, to examine whether the social significance of psychology boils down to this: does it not also have other social functions? Which ones? Finally, is it right to reduce the various situations in which psychologists are involved, to the same interpretation grid? Do you have to put everything in the same bag? An effort of discernment must be made, which is attentive to the diversity of psychological theories and practices.
Each of the ways of perceiving and appreciating psychology is accompanied by question marks. It is to these questions that Perspectives wants to respond, by raising and publishing analyses on the social scope of the practices of psychology in its various fields of intervention; and by becoming a place of debate where can express itself, to confront and measure divergent positions on the social, ethical, and political evaluation of psychology as a science, and as a set of practices and intervention techniques. But Perspectives also wants to become a catalyst for change in practice. It wants to ensure the dissemination of information and analysis on new, alternative experiences which have the aim of better meeting the real interests of the persons or groups concerned. Experiments carried out by psychologists and psycho-sociologists; but also, beyond professional silos, those conducted by social workers, educators and teachers, cultural facilitators, criminologists and health workers. To this end, Perspectives calls on everyone, individual, group, or institution, to send it the information and analyses it wishes to disseminate. Perspectives wishes to be able to establish regular links between all practitioners who share its concerns.
What are these concerns?
The team that took the initiative to create the journal Perspectives is not homogeneous, it has no doctrine, and does not have in the pockets of ready answers on the social meaning of psychology, and on the changes that it would be desirable to make to the practices that claim to be of the psychology. But she shares the conviction that it is high time to create a forum for analysis, reflection and debate on these issues; and she feels that this fills a gap, not only in Belgium, but also abroad. On the other hand, the editorial team of Perspectives shares the opinion that, in the name of any values or political issues, we must not disregard the subjective, emotional and playful dimensions of life, and that we must not ignore microsocial and interpersonal realities: she believes, on the one hand, that these realities do not escape the major power relations that cross our society, but on the other hand that they are not reduced to them. On the other hand, and with the same concern to preserve the reflection of all dogmatic hypotheses, it deliberately leaves open the question of whether it is through psychology - its theories, its methods, and its techniques - which must be approached and explained the reality of relationships between people, and even their "inner" lives. After all, psychology, in the forms it has taken since the 19th century, is only one approach to these realities among others possible, and one must be careful not to confuse the question of the relevance of psychology with the affirmation of the reality of its object: it has been done too often in recent years, for lack of sufficient historical hindsight. Finally, Perspectives wants to encourage a critical approach to psychology and its practices, but a criticism without prejudices, and conscious of its criteria: whether it is the epistemological relevance of concepts, methods and techniques, whether it is the results explicitly sought and achieved, or whether it is the social effects produced. Any critical analysis is underpinned, whether we like it or not, by social, ethical, and political positions; Perspectives will not formulate exclusive, provided that these positions take into account as a matter of priority the concern to meet the real interests of individuals and communities. In this sense, the magazine affirms its solidarity with the collective movements that fight against all forms of domination or exploitation.
Perspectives will be published twice a year. Each issue will present several contributions focusing on main themes, but also possibly other texts on various subjects. In addition, each issue will endeavour to gather as much as possible analyses, testimonies or accounts of work experiences, information, reviews and critical reports of works, articles, and meetings.
The magazine wishes to respond first of all to the questions and expectations of those who work in French-speaking Belgium, and to offer them a place of exchange, reflection and confrontation; and to this end it will take the initiative of organizing meetings, conferences and debates. But Perspectives also wants to promote trade with the Dutch-speaking part of the country, and with foreign countries. Contacts are established in Portugal, Italy and France with a view to establishing ongoing cooperation. And any proposal or suggestion, wherever it comes from, will be welcomed with great interest.
*** The objectives of the Centre pluridisciplinaire de méthodologie des sciences sociales ‘Methodos’ in the Faculty of Economic, Social and Political Sciences at UCL (1996 – 2002)
ANTECEDENTS
Several initiatives have been taken at the University of Louvain to try to solve methodological problems common to the social sciences. They have led to various publications [1] These initiatives have led to an informal network of multidisciplinary exchanges between researchers. The Multidisciplinary Centre for Methodology of the Social Sciences (Methodos), established in 1995, aims to strengthen this network within the University and to extend it nationally and internationally. It organises meetings, seminars and symposia. He publishes the results of his work in working papers, journals and books. It develops a research programme focusing on methodological problems, the extent of which requires multidisciplinary collaboration.
RESEARCH PROGRAMME
In the first five years, the Centre will focus on the following issues:
1. The role of models and theories in scientific explanation.
2. Level system analysis is common in biology. We will study the work that has been done in this direction in the humanities, the difficulties encountered and the fruitfulness of such an analysis.
3. In the social sciences, causal explanation, functional explanation, systemic and structural explanations, and dialectical explanation are in common. It will be explored how these different types of explanations can be made complementary, and the benefits derived from them.
4. Ordinary knowledge based on daily experience is sometimes disqualified in the name of science; science would supplant it. Yet this ordinary knowledge plays a role, until now poorly defined in the research, whether it be to select variables, to interpret results, to examine possible applications, to define a research programme etc. The opportunity to make better use of this ordinary knowledge will be examined by assigning it a clearly defined and controlled place in the scientific methodology.
5. Knowledge accumulation in some social sciences is very low. This weakness is due, among other things, to the changing content of concepts and to the inconsistency, from one research to another, of the choice of variables or indicators. An attempt will be made to identify the theoretical and methodological conditions that would make it possible to remedy this situation.
[1] H. Gérard, M. Loriaux (Eds.) 1988, Au-delà du quantitatif. Hopes and limits of qualitative analysis in demography, Ciaco éditeur, Louvain-la-Neuve, 670 p. G. Wunsch 1988, Causal Theory and Causal Modeling. Beyond Description in the Social Sciences, Leuven University Press, Leuven, 200 pp. J. Duchêne, G. Wunsch and E. Vilquin (Eds.) 1989, Explanation in the Social Sciences. The Search for Causes in Demography, Ciaco éditeur, Louvain-la-Neuve, 478 p. R. Franck (Ed.) 1994, Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? La explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J. Vrin, IIEE, Paris-Lyon, 447 p. R.Franck (Ed). ) 1995, Les sciences et la philosophie, fourteen essais de rapprochement, J.Vrin, IIPP, Paris-Lyon, 289 p.
**** The objectives of the National Association Comité Afghanistan Belgique / Afghanistan Comite België (1979-1989)
Afghanistan had a population of seventeen million, and it is estimated that the U.S.S.R. war in that country resulted in one million deaths. The war has also displaced three million people in Pakistan, and one million people in Iran; a quarter of the world’s refugee populations today are Afghan. But there are also refugees from the inside. Since 1979, the city of Kabul has grown from about six hundred thousand inhabitants to nearly two million people, living in overcrowded housing and in the slums surrounding the city.
How can we explain these massive displacements of populations? For the most part, they come from the countryside. In five years of war, the Soviet and government troops have failed to control the countryside; they remain confined to the big cities, and in some areas provisionally rallied and neutralized. Nearly half of the country’s districts do not even have a symbolic government presence. But the bombing of the villages, the destruction of the harvests and the livestock and the specific military offensives (only in 1984, in the regions of Panshir, Kounar, Kandahar, Herat...), while failing in their effort to break the resistance, On the other hand, they manage to scare away part of the population, deprived of their livelihoods and terrorized by the destruction. During the Days on "Food in a War Economy", organized in Paris on 9, 10 and 11 November by the International Office for Afghanistan, an urgent appeal was made to the European governmental and non-governmental bodies, to help stem the famine that is beginning to manifest in the country.
In the face of a tragedy of such magnitude, the circumspection and procrastination of the European governments on the Afghan question become paltry. And those who would use this drama to fuel an anti-communism for internal use, would heavily distort its meaning. Conversely, those who would choose to remain silent about Soviet aggression in order not to pour water to the mill of anticommunism would lock themselves in contradictions. Beyond the ideological, social and economic nature of the Soviet regime, what is at issue is the war waged over the past five years by one of the world’s two largest military powers in a country traditionally not aligned. Ninety thousand Soviet soldiers entered Afghanistan in December 1979, there are one hundred and forty thousand in 1984, that is one Soviet soldier per cent Afghans still living in the country, with an armament technology that is limitless (including napalm, phosphorus, and gases).
Democrats of all political, philosophical and religious persuasions, determined to act for the defense of human rights and the rights of peoples to self-determination, wherever they are violated, must also support the Afghan people in their struggle for freedom and independence. The progress and social justice they desire for this people, as for all the peoples of the world, have never, as they well know, been imported by the troops of a foreign aggressor, nor by an occupation of a colonial nature.
Three weeks after the armed Soviet intervention on January 14, 1980, the United Nations General Assembly demanded "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to allow the Afghan people to decide for themselves the form of their government and to choose their economic, political and social system without interference, subversion, coercion or coercion from outside in any form". Five years have passed. In June 1982, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the governments of the Ten, among other things, to "refuse any international recognition of the present government of Afghanistan", "to recognize the Afghan resistance as a legitimate national liberation force", and to "provide the Afghan resistance with all the necessary assistance, both from the humanitarian point of view and from the point of view of its own organization". He asked the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the Community to define the procedures for implementing a policy of the Ten based on these principles. Two and a half years have passed.
Europe, placed between the two superpowers, must develop an autonomous policy with regard to Afghanistan, as with other Third World countries. It can, but it must not hide any longer. The Afghan resistance has successfully resisted the Soviet army for five years. It is waiting for Europe to give it full diplomatic support and the necessary help to rebuild the vast regions of the country which it alone has liberated.
Without doubt, the difficulty of obtaining information on the situation within the borders explains, on the one hand, the wait-and-see attitude of a part of the political world. The Belgian-Belgian Afghanistan Committee wants to help overcome this difficulty.
(Text delivered as an introduction to the Brussels Colloquium, Afghanistan 1979-1984, Five Years of Resistance to the Soviet Occupation, organized by the Committee on 15 December 1984. The Proceedings of the Colloquium were published with the help of the Ministry of the French Community of Belgium. It brought together many Belgian and foreign experts, representatives of the Government, the Belgian and European Parliaments, of twelve political parties from both communities of the country, and a large number of personalities from different backgrounds.)
***** Piano pieces:
Six romantic rooms
Baroque three-piece
Ten tales to the contrary
Three poems
Sonata
Ten allegories
TEACHING
The circumstances allowed me to give my teachings to many students of the University of Louvain, of different levels of study and within very diverse training programs:
-Faculty of Law
-Faculty of Medicine
-Faculty of Science
-Faculty of Agronomy
-Faculty of Economic, Social and Political Sciences
-Open Faculty of Economic and Social Policy (FOPES)
-Higher Institute of Philosophy
-Physical Education Institute
-Institute of Labour Sciences
- Institute for Training in Adult Education Sciences (FOPA)
My teachings were concerned with the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of science, general epistemology, the epistemology of the social sciences, the history of philosophy, moral philosophy, the philosophy of work, the teaching of philosophy (Aggregation), education policy, and health policy.
RESEARCH
My research concerns several branches of philosophy: philosophy of sciences, sociology of sciences, general epistemology and theory of knowledge, epistemology and methodology of social sciences, epistemology and sociology of psychology and psychiatry, philosophy of language, moral and political philosophy, and metaphysics or “first philosophy”.
The list of my research is below. I then summarize their purpose and the results I have achieved. The list and my summaries do not follow the chronological order of my work.
List of my research
Philosophy of science
1. What future for the philosophy of science?
2. The principles of the initial programme of modern sciences (17th century)
3. Is the analysis inductive? And is the induction analytical?
4. The logic of discovery
To explain the properties of things, is it enough to deduce them from assumed true principles? A challenge: realism
6. Laws: universal, necessary, and based on experience?
7. The central role of modelling in research
Seven major contributions of the semantic approach to the philosophy of science
9. Plurality of disciplines and unity of knowledge
10. Revision of the dividing line between scientific and non-scientific knowledge
Theory of evolution
11. The nature of the evolution
12. Two different explanatory principles are needed to understand evolution: a principle of permanence and a principle of change
Epistemology and methodology of the social sciences
13. The causal explanation in the social sciences
14. How to restore the initial research programme of the natural sciences in the social sciences. Applications to economics, sociology, demography, and archaeology
15. How to Combine Empirical and Theoretical Research in the Social Sciences
16. The Contest from History to the Social Sciences
Philosophy First (metaphysics)
17. What future for philosophy?
18. The elucidation of twenty-one concepts: cause, purpose, function, emergence, becoming, structure, system, model, theory, law, explanation, induction, analysis, intuition, measure, idea, Aristotelian hymorphism, atomism, holism, universality, and necessity.
19. Overcoming the Atomism and Holistic Dilemma
20. Overcoming the Dilemma of Reduction and Emergence
21. The nature of the causality and the causal and non-causal determinations (e.a. bottom up and top down)
General epistemology and philosophy of language
22. The quadripolar nature of discourse
23 The nature of truth
24. The nature of knowledge
Science and Society
25. The ideological staging of knowledge
26. How to combine knowledge and action in social, psychiatric, psychological and health services
27° The ideological and social stakes of psychology since 1960. Examination of Academic Psychology, Industrial Psychology and Organization, and Clinical Psychology
28. Yugoslav self-management and computerized management
Moral philosophy
29) How to approach the ethical dimension of scientific and technological research
30. The affirmation of the absolute and morality
Summaries of research and results obtained
1. What future for the philosophy of science?
The philosophy of science faces serious difficulties. Logical empiricism fuelled the ambition to base the validity of scientific knowledge on the logical suitability of the proposals put forward to the observational data, but the project failed. And a little later, it was the historical relativity of scientific knowledge that came to the fore. The preconceived ideas about the very nature of science and the objectivity of the knowledge it provides were shaken. We have sought by various means to offer a more relevant philosophical account of science. But the proposals put forward so far have not allowed us to lift the questions.
At the same time the philosophical study of research methods led to more assured results in the field of biological sciences, because it was based on examination of research practices and on the results obtained. I have done similar work on social science research methods with the help of many researchers in these disciplines[1].
But when it comes to making sense of the nature of science as a whole and the validity of the knowledge it provides us, it’s more difficult to take advantage of research practices, because they are specialized today, diversified and often fragmented. There is, however, another way of approaching science as a whole which has so far been little exploited. It is about learning about the research program that has made modern science successful. That program exists. Its authors are Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Huygens, Newton and others; they are famous and their writings are known. Unfortunately their program is usually re-translated into the terms of philosophical empiricism inherited from David Hume. The concepts of induction, law, observation, and experience, for example, are emptied of their original meaning. The true meaning of the rules of conduct adopted in the seventeenth century, which allowed the deployment of modern science and which have not ceased to guide much research, is then misunderstood. Remembering the original research program of modern science offers unexpected solutions to the epistemological difficulties faced by the philosophy of contemporary science.
The major difficulties which can be solved by this means are in particular the legitimacy of induction, the explanatory power of deduction, the nature of analysis, the role of observation and experimentation, the scope of causal explanation, the interpretation of noncausal determinations, the use of modelling in research and explanation, the meaning of laws, the nature of theories, the specificity of the scientific method, the subjectivity of scientific knowledge and its historical relativity, scientific realism, the demarcation between science and non-scientific thinking, and the plurality of disciplines confronted with the unity of knowledge.I have undertaken to do this in a number of my research which I summarize below.
The initial research agenda for science is based on a small number of principles. Reconnecting with these principles can contribute to the renewal of research in the philosophy of science.
2. Three major principles of the initial programme of modern sciences
First principle
Any interpretation of nature must be based on appropriate observations. So the initial research program is empirical in that sense. But knowledge of nature cannot be reduced to the knowledge provided by observation. While the empiricism which David Hume claims reduces all true knowledge to knowledge which is derived from observation alone, the initial program of sciences seeks to know the form of natural phenomena, for example the form of movement, or the shape of light. This is what we now call the structure[2] of phenomena. How do we get there? By submitting the observations collected for analysis[3].
The form of natural phenomena, their structure, is not sensitive, and yet it is it that can give us the true explanation of these phenomena. For it is the structure of the phenomenon that determines the various ways in which this phenomenon can emerge, vary, evolve, and disappear[4]. The ‘law’ of gravitation in classical mechanics, or the ‘law’ of supply and demand in economics, are famous examples. Knowledge of forms and structures is the goal assigned to science by Bacon and his contemporaries.
The word “law” in the seventeenth century is synonymous with “form”, “principle”, and “axiom”. It in no way denotes empirical regularity, contrary to what we hear today in the wake of the empiricism of the Humian tradition (lawlike regularities). And the determination exercised over a natural or social phenomenon by its form - or law, or structure - is not conceived as a causal determination: it determines the phenomenon in the sense that it circumscribes its possible future. At the same phenomenon, same form. It is in this sense that we must understand the universality and necessity of laws. (2009, II 1 and 2)
Second principleObservation must include not only the causes that produce the property of which the form is sought, but also the ways in which the property is generated, and varies, and also the materials from which it is derived.
So it’s not just isolated observations. On the contrary, it is necessary to multiply and diversify the observations, to accumulate the indices as Bacon writes, and to do this he advances a large number of experimental rules: variation of the experiment, prolongation of the experiment, translation of the experiment, reversal of experience, etc.
As new facts are gathered in this way, Bacon recommends that they be put in writing and distributed in tables so as to be more easily compared, and in the hope of inferring the form (structure) that is required for the observed facts to unfold as they do.
Francis Bacon describes the whole of the above approach - both observational and theoretical - as a new induction. (2009, II 3)Third principle
We must be careful not to subordinate the research we pursue to a hypothesis. Why? Because assumptions are subject to prejudices of all kinds. Francis Bacon described these prejudices as “idols”: prejudices common to all men, prejudices peculiar to each of us, prejudices of the social milieu to which we belong, and philosophical prejudices that have authority over us. In addition, when we subordinate the search to a hypothesis, we restrict the observation to what can confirm or falsify it, which hinders the discovery. A few years later René Descartes made the same recommendation. [5] Newton also[6].
NOTE: Sources of the Original Modern Science Program
It was the legacy left by the Pythagoreans and their successors - Plato, Timaeus, Eudox, Euclid, Pappus of Alexandria - that decisively shaped the scholarly work of modern science in the seventeenth century. The use of mathematics and especially geometry was then imposed with force and for a long time, as we know. Less is known than the philosophy of nature promoted in the 17th century, and the method described by Bacon as new induction (novum organum), are derived from this tradition. Copies of a manuscript of Pappus of Alexandria were circulating at the time when it was learned that the analysis of geometers does not proceed by deduction from axioms (principles), contrary to appearances, but that it infers axioms from the observation of the properties of geometric figures[7]. Bacon, Descartes, and Newton agreed with this reading of Euclidean geometry. Was it not necessary to do the same to discover the axioms - the forms - of the properties of nature? Bacon was inspired to design the new induction, and to recommend in particular not to advance hypotheses about the forms of natural phenomena (their structure), but to infer them (‘induce’) from the observation of their properties.
3. Is the analysis inductive? And is the induction analytical? (“Can we increase…” 2007, V, B)
The analysis refers primarily, in Greek, to the operation of untying, or decomposing. But it quickly received, since antiquity, important philosophical connotations. Descartes claimed that analysis is a reverse solution (J.Lechat, 1962). Analytical demonstration, says Descartes, must go from the consequences to the principles, it is the reverse approach of demonstrations found in geometry. Instead of deducing the consequences of known assumed principles, the analysis consists in discovering the principles from the study of their consequences. There is no other way, writes Descartes in the Meditations (1952, 1647, pp.387-388), of achieving knowledge of the principles, including for surveyors: if they pretend not to resort to analysis it is "in my opinion, because they reported it so much, they reserved it for themselves, as a secret of importance". Likewise, to arrive at the knowledge of the principles of natural things it is necessary to deduce them from their properties.
For example the magnet has a curious property, it attracts the iron filings. How to explain it? One must refrain from making assumptions (hypotheses) contrary to what metaphysicians do, writes Descartes. On the contrary, the researcher must
First he carefully gathers together all the experiences which he can know about this body; then he tries to deduce what is the mixture of simple natures necessary to produce all the effects which he has observed from the magnet; and this mixture once found, he can boldly assert that he has understood the true cause of the magnet, as far as man can find it from the experiences given.” Rules for the Direction of the Spirit (1952 [1701] Rule XII, pp.87-88)
As we can see, Cartesian analysis is inductive in the new sense given to induction by Francis Bacon (cf. my research no. 1). This is also the meaning that Bertrand Russel will give to his analysis:
“In analytical problems, the best method is the one that starts with the results to arrive at the premises.”
“Inference of assumptions from consequences is the essence of induction…”
“(…) the method of investigating the principles of mathematics is really an inductive method, and substantially the same as for discovering general laws in other sciences.” [8]
That said, in what sense can we describe as analytical the inductive approach established by Bacon, inferring natural laws (in the classical sense of principles), of experimental observation of facts? Analysis is untying, decomposing. What decomposition is this?
Let us return to the example of Descartes: the attraction exerted by the magnet is broken down into «simple natures». Simple natures? These are the things «which in relation to our understanding are said to be simple», writes Descartes, such as the figure, the extent, the movement, the unity, the duration, two things equal to the same third are equal to each other, etc. What are the simple natures that make up the magnet’s attraction? Those, as Descartes says, whose “mixing” is “necessary to produce all the effects” of attraction observed. We try to “infer” them from all these “effects”.
Here is a famous example of analytical induction. Newton breaks down the motions of the planets into two simple natures, the mass of the bodies and the distance between them, simple natures whose combination – the “mixture” – is “necessary” to produce all the elliptical paths of the planets measured.
Many of the laws of modern science illustrate this somewhat mysterious formula of “simple blending of nature”. These are combinations of concepts which can certainly be translated into observations but which cannot be reduced to these observations.These combinations of concepts are the subject, within the semantic approach, of very illuminating interpretations. In summary, a law would be modelling the structure of a natural system. I add: we have a social system. (2007 “Can we increase…”, IV, in fine).
With such a definition of the law, the semantic approach revives the form concept of the original modern science curriculum. And it unintentionally sheds light on the nature of inductive analysis: it is the method par excellence of good modelling. (2004, 1997-1998)
4. the logic of discovery
It is to Reichenbach (1938) that the division between the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification” is attributed. And since the middle of the twentieth century it has been customary in the philosophy of science to oppose the “logic of justification” to the “logic of discovery”. But does discovery follow a particular logic? As we hardly believe in it, we are often led to restrict the logic of scientific thought to the justification of theories or the validation of hypotheses, and to abandon discovery to the creativity of the researcher. Popper’s deduction is a particularly strong expression of this point of view. However, times change. The paths of discovery no longer seem as before devoid of reasons. Work in the field of cognitive sciences and in fields as varied as medical diagnostic analysis or natural language analysis seeks to identify the nature of the pathways of discovery[9].
The return to the logic of discovery found major support in the concept of abduction proposed by Peirce at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Baconian induction differs much from peircian abduction contrary to what is sometimes said. It opens up original avenues for exploring the ‘logic’ of discovery.
It is true that the Peircian abduction joins the Baconian induction on an essential bridge: it is facts that we leave to discover the explanation. And this common trait calls all our attention because it is this trait that presides over the renewal we have witnessed in the philosophy of science, aimed at exploring the ‘logic’ of scientific discovery. If the Peircian abduction was the rallying sign of this renewal, it is above all because it restores its philosophical credit to the «retroductive» approach which starts from the facts to discover the explanation. It is less for successive interpretations that Peirce proposed this retroduction, because the work devoted to the “logic” of the
On the contrary, they have considerably enriched Peircian interpretations.
But the existence of this common trait to peircian abduction and baconian induction - we start from facts to discover the explanation - must not lead us to confuse them.
Baconian induction provides the answer to five major questions raised by the study of the ‘logic’ of discovery in science. Peircian abduction is silent on these issues. (2009, II and III)
Here are the questions.
First question: What is it about discovering when doing scientific research?
Second question: what are the facts from which scientific discoveries can be made?
Third question: How do we observe the facts in order to arrive at scientific discoveries?
Fourth question: How can we take advantage of experiences to discover the principles of the properties of Nature?
Fifth question: Is the ‘logic’ of discovery reduced to a logical form?
(2009, III)
5. To explain the properties of things, is it enough to deduce them from assumed true principles? One challenge: realism
The "new philosophy", or even the "experimental philosophy", which the classics sought to build and which gave birth to modern sciences, is opposed to the Aristotelian tradition on this precise point: it is necessary to stop explaining the properties of things by deducing them from assumed true principles.On the contrary, it is necessary to analyze the properties of things in order to discover the principles that are required – implied - by these properties, and which – as such - explain them (see research no. 3). This second approach is that which Bacon and Newton describe as a new "induction", and which Descartes simply calls "analysis".
It is when they are involved in all the observations gathered that the principles – the laws – teach us about reality. This is how the realism of the founders of modern science can be summed up. It is much more demanding than the realism of the philosophy of Humian tradition. For it requires, for the law to be validated, that it be necessary, in the sense that without the law the phenomena would not be what they are. Debates over the past fifty years in the philosophy of science on realism do not take this realism into account.
It is not an exaggeration to say that modern science was born from the abandonment of deduction as a method of explanation, in favour of induction[10]. To explain the phenomena is to discover the principles that are involved by the phenomena. It is not discovering the phenomena that are involved by the principles.
The covering law approach has helped to give new life to the idea that scientific explanation is deductive. It has countered what has enabled the development of modern science and what makes it unique. Few authors today dispute the deductive nature of the explanation, even among those who have abandoned the covering law approach, as if the deductive nature of the explanation were a universal achievement of philosophy[11].
Empiricist philosophy overshadowed classical induction, reactivated the traditional meaning of induction (as enumeration) which Bacon had discarded, and restored the deductive conception of the explanation of scholastic metaphysicians, fought against in the 17th century. Today, however, we are beginning to doubt the deductive nature of explanation in the philosophy of science, or at least what Wesley C. Salmon (1988) called funny, inspired by J. Alberto Coffa, explanatory deductive chauvinism, is shaken. Perhaps there will soon be a renewed interest in classical induction in the philosophy of science? (2002, pp.288-290)
6. Laws: universal, necessary, and based on experience?
The principle of acceleration advanced by Galileo: the intensity of speed is a function of time, is implied by the property of acceleration. Induction works by implication. The principle is the combination of simple natures without which it would be impossible, for example, that the speed reached by a body in three fractions of time is triple the speed reached at the end of the first fraction of time, while this body does not undergo any thrust. This would be impossible if the intensity of the speed was not a function of time. The necessity and universality recognized in principle results precisely from this involvement.
The necessity and universality of natural laws - a question that has plagued philosophers for more than two centuries (since Hume) - have this only foundation: they are implied by the facts. Laws are not regular relations that we observe between phenomena and that we generalize in spite of all logic, as the empiricist philosophy suggests. What is a natural law? Law is a principle, writes Newton (1985, p.171), and Bacon wrote it fifty years earlier. It is the result of the analysis: it is “deduced” from its consequences; in other words, it is implied by the facts observed in Nature. And it is only because of this implication that the natural law is necessary, universal, and well founded on experience. Let’s take a closer look.
The law – or the principle – is necessary in the sense that without it, things would not have the properties they have. We saw it for the naturally accelerated movement. Let us take another lighthouse example: if bodies were not attracted according to their masses and inversely according to the square of their distances they would gravitate differently than they do. The motions of planets around the sun, for example, would not be what they are. These movements, whose properties Kepler had described, imply the law of gravitation.
The law is universal. The universality of the law does not concern the generality of the phenomena observed. For example, it is not a question of affirming that the planets all rotate, always and everywhere, in the same way, or that the bodies, whatever they may be, all gravitate in the same way; moreover, they do not gravitate in the same way, gravitation varies with the mass of bodies and the distance that separates them, for example gravity decreases when moving away from the Earth. The generalisation of phenomena has nothing to do with the universality of the law. The universality is that, whatever the bodies in presence and their qualities, whatever their masses and the distances that separate them, whatever the various forms of gravitation that can be observed and the variations they undergo, the principle – the law – is involved. It is the principle that is generalized, not the observed phenomena. [12]
The law is based on experience in the sense that the experiments carried out involve it. This way of basing the law on experience is different from all those usually invoked. It is different from that which consists in establishing the regularity of an empirical relationship between two or more variables, also different from that which consists in confirming or corroborating the law by subjecting to observation its implications, different from testing compliance with observational data, and different from proposing a hypothetical mechanism that would be behind the legislation. Validating a law (in the sense of a principle, an “axiom”) by its necessary involvement in the experiments carried out is undoubtedly the most common thing in the natural sciences, but there is little attention paid to it in the philosophy of science. Such validation is nothing more than induction in the sense of the pioneers of modern science.
Principles - or laws - teach us about reality when they are involved in observation. This is how the empiricism and realism of the founders of modern science can be summed up. (2009, II, 2)
The following abstracts are being prepared.
*
[1] Coordination of two collective works, the first on causal analysis, and the second on the explanatory power of models and their role in the articulation to be promoted between empirical and theoretical research. Founded at UCL with Guillaume Wunsch (UCL Institute of Demography), and director of the Centre Pluridisciplinaire de méthodologie des sciences sociales ‘Methodos’. Creation of the collection Methodos Series, Methodological Prospects in the Social Sciences (Publ. Springer), and its direction with Daniel Courgeau (Ined Paris) since 2002, fourteen volumes published. Associated with the Groupe d'episstémologie des sciences de l'homme (Paris), moderated by Jean-Michel Berthelot (Sorbonne) and then by Bernard Walliser (EHESS), three collective volumes published.
[2] Theoretical and empirical structures are rarely distinguished in the literature. These are theoretical structures.
[3] The nature of the analysis was the subject of research #3
[4] More precisely, the form of the phenomenon studied is the structure of the process generating this phenomenon.
[5] R.Descartes, Méditations, objections et réponses (1647) and Règles pour la direction de l'esprit (1701), in Œuvres et lettres, Paris, Gallimard, 1952, pp.387-388 and pp.87-88
[6] Newton I. From gravitation or the foundations of classical mechanics (1687). M.F. Biarnais, Paris, “Les Belles Lettres” Publishing Company, 1985, pp.19–20
[7] Cf. Hintikka J., Remes U. The Method of Analysis, Its Geometrical Origin and its General Significance, Dordrecht-Holland/Boston-U.S.A., D. Reidel Publising Company, 1974
[8] B. Russel, Histoire de mes idées philosophiques, trad. fr. G.Auclair, Paris, Gallimard, 1961, pp. 332-333.
Monist, October 2013, quoted by A. Wood.
[9] For a thorough bibliography of the subject up to 2001, see L.Magnani (2001).
[10] But it should be noted that no one, in the classical era, waived the inference in the arguments. And no one has disputed the role of deduction in validating the proposed explanatory principles, and in generalizing these principles to new phenomena, and in integrating explanatory principles into an orderly system. Deduction has therefore never ceased to be recognized as a key element of scientific development. But the power to explain phenomena has ceased to be attributed to deduction.
[11] Mario Bunge (1997, "Mechanism and Explanation", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, voL.27, no. 4, p. 412) vigorously attacked the covering law approach in the field of explanation: "Indeed, stating that a certain fact happens the way it does for being an instance of a generalization is no explanation at all, for it supplies no understanding: it is just identifying the fact in question as a member of the class defined by the given generalization." Does Bunge draw the conclusion that we must abandon the idea that the scientific explanation consists in inferring empirical generality? No, it merely proposes to replace the "laws" of the covering law approach with "law statements that incorporate mechanisms of some sort - causal, stochastic, hybrid or other" (p.442). I think Bunge is right to stress the importance of the mechanisms in the explanation. But is he right to retain the deductive logic of the explanation advocated by the covering law approach? He writes (p.443): "In short, the so-called covering law model of scientific explanation is correct but incomplete, for it only covers the logical structure of the same."
[12] “… in experimental philosophy, the word hypothesis must not include, in its meaning, the first principles or axioms that I call the laws of motion. These principles are deduced from phenomena and generalized by induction: which confers the highest degree of evidence to a Proposal in this philosophy.” I. Newton, id.p.171)
2016
Franck, Robert. Recherche-action, ou connaissance pour l’action? Quelques points de repère, et trois positions de principe. In: Lien social et Politiques, no. 75, p. 32-37 (2016).
2014
Courgeau, Daniel ; Bijak, Jakub ; Franck, Robert ; Silverman, Eric. Are the four Baconian Idols still alive in demography. In: Revue Quételet/Quetelet Journal, Vol. 2, no. 2, p. 31-59 (Octobre 2014). doi:10.14428/rqj2014.02.02.02.
2014
Bijak, Jakub ; Courgeau, Daniel ; Silverman, Eric ; Franck, Robert. Quantifying paradigm change in demography. In: Demographic Research, Vol. 30, no. 1, p. 911-924 (2014). doi:10.4054/DemRes.2014.30.32.
2007
Courgeau, Daniel ; Franck, Robert. Demography - A fully formed science or a science in the making? An outline programme. In: Population-E, Vol. 62, no.1, p. - (2007) (Soumis).
2007
Courgeau, Daniel ; Franck, Robert. La démographie, science constituée ou en voie de constitution ? Esquisse d’un programme. In: Population-F, Vol. 62, no.1, p. - (2007).
2006
Franck, Robert. Science, modèle, récit, littérature . In: Lettre à Jean Claude Gardin, (Soumis).
1999
Franck, Robert. La guerre en Europe, une action humanitaire?. In: Le Soir, (9 avril 1999).
1999
Franck, Robert. La pluralité des disciplines, l'unité du savoir, et les connaissances ordinaires. In: Sociologie et Sociétés, Vol. XXXI, no.1, p. 129-142 (1999).
1998
Franck, Robert. Pourquoi cet embargo contre l'Irak?. In: Le Soir, (Octobre 1998).
1997
Franck, Robert. Philosophie analytique, pourquoi donc analytique?. In: Cahiers de Philosophie de l'Université de Caen, Vol. -, no.31-32, p. 11-23 (1997).
1995
Franck, Robert. Mosaïques, machines organismes et sociétés. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain, Vol. 93, no. 1-2, p. 67-81 (1995). doi:10.2143/RPL.93.1.541825.
1995
Franck, Robert. Promouvoir les technologies en Wallonie: pourquoi, et comment?. In: Athena, Vol. -, no.110, p. - (1995).
1991
Franck, Robert. Faut-il trouver aux causes une raison? Etude critique de l’ouvrage : Van Parijs, Philippe. Le modèle économique et ses rivaux. Introduction à la pratique de l’épistémologie des sciences sociales. Librairie Droz 1990. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain, Vol. 89, no. 84, p. 659-665 (1991). doi:10.2143/RPL.89.4.556157.
1990
Franck, Robert. Le diagnostic clinique est-il conciliable avec de vraies alternatives en santé mentale?. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, Vol. -, no.16, p. 37-44 (1990).
1989
Franck, Robert. Comment s'y prendre pour cerner la signification sociale de la psychologie?. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, no. 13, p. 69-80 (1989).
1986
Franck, Robert. A significaçao social da psicologia. IV Porque é que hoje se pensa como os psicologos?. In: Analise psicologica, Vol. Série IV, no. 2, p. 275-289 (1986).
1985
Franck, Robert. Institutions psychiatriques pour enfants et adolescents : premiers jalons pour un débat. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, , no.5, p. 43-77 (1985).
1985
Franck, Robert. Pédagogie totalitaire et psychologie dans les institutions pour enfants. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, , no.6, p. 34-62 (1985).
1985
Franck, Robert. Stériles, ces thèses ne mènent nulle part! Réponse à Robert Maier. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, , no.6, p. 178-184 (1985).
1984
Franck, Robert. La signification sociale de la psychologie. III. Pourquoi fait-on de la psychologie clinique?. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, , no.3, p. 127-178 (1983).
1984
Franck, Robert. La signification sociale de la psychologie. IV. Pourquoi pense-t-on aujourd'hui à la manière des psychologues?. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, , no.4, p. 7-38 (1984).
1983
Franck, Robert. A significaçao social da psicologia. III. Porque se pratica a psicologia clinica?. In: Analise Psicologica, Vol. Série III, no.3, p. 547-558 (1982).
1983
Franck, Robert. La signification sociale de la psychologie. I. Pourquoi fait-on de la psychologie scolaire?. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, , no.1, p. 181-205 (1983).
1983
Franck, Robert. La signification sociale de la psychologie. II. Pourquoi fait-on de la psychologie industrielle?. In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, , no.2, p. 177-198 (1983).
1983
Franck, Robert. Une autre science est-elle possible? Perspectives et garde-fous. In: Cahiers Galilee, , no.50, p. 5-21 (1983).
1982
Franck, Robert. A significaçao social da psicologia. I. A psicologia escolar. In: Analise psicologica, Vol. Série II, no.2/3, p. 385-398 (1982).
1982
Franck, Robert. A significaçao social da psicologia. II. Porque se pratica a psicologia industrial? . In: Analise Psicologica, Vol. Série II, no.4, p. 547-558 (1982).
1981
Franck, Robert. Encore une fois : la psychanalyse est-elle ou non scientifique? Etude critique. In: Revue philosophique de Louvain, Vol. 4e série/81, no.49, p. 103-112 (1983).
1981
Franck, Robert. Recherche - Action, ou connaissances pour l'action? Quelques points de repère, et trois positions de principe. In: Revue internationale d'action communautaire - International Review of Community Development, numéro thématique "La Recherche-Action", , no.5 (1981).
1979
Franck, Robert. Différents types de groupes ? Différents types de médecine ?. In: Journal d’Hippocrate, Vol. -, no.5-12, p. - (1979).
1979
Franck, Robert. Quelques questions sur l'orientation des centres locaux de santé. In: Revue internationale d'action communautaire - International Review of Community Development - numéro thématique "Les centres de santé, , no.1, p. 109-114 (1979).
1978
Franck, Robert ; Gobbe, François. Emploi médical et chasses gardées. In: La Revue Nouvelle, numéro thématique Trop de médecins… pour quoi faire ? (dir. R. Franck et F. Gobbe), no. 9, p. 147-156 (1978).
1978
Franck, Robert. Où est la vérité?. In: Dialogue, Vol. 17, no.2, p. 286-316 (1978).
1978
Franck, Robert ; Gobbe, François. Une alternative pour une autre médecine. In: La Revue Nouvelle, no. 9, numéro thématique Trop de médecins… pour quoi faire ?, p. 157-162 (1978).
1974
Franck, Robert. Halte à la croissance? Un surprenant remue-ménage idéologique. In: La Revue Nouvelle - numéro thématique "Le Rapport du Club de Rome", , no.3, p. 245-256 (1974).
1974
Franck, Robert. Le changement pédagogique barré par l'enjeu des examens. In: Débats, , no.2, p. 18-32 (1974).
1974
Franck, Robert. Médecine et pratique libérale. In: Journal d'Hippocrate, p. 1-18.
1973
Franck, Robert. Note sur Marc Richelle et sur Burrhus Frederic Skinner. In: Revue de psychologie et des sciences de l'éducation, Vol. 8, no.4, p. 407-410 (1973).
1973
Franck, Robert. Valeur scientifique et rôle idéologique de la psychologie. In: Revue de Psychologie et des Sciences de l'Education, Vol. 8, no.3, p. 305-353 (1973).
1972
Franck, Robert. La science : critique ou mystification? A propos de Jacques Monod. In: La Revue Nouvelle, numéro thématique "Sciences et société" (dir. R.Franck), , no.1, p. 32-45 (1972).
1972
Franck, Robert ; Stainier, André. Pourquoi parler des sciences?. In: La Revue Nouvelle, numéro thématique Sciences et société, no. 1, p. 17-23 (1972).
1969
Franck, Robert. Langue, discours et significations. In: Revue philosophique de Louvain, , no.67, p. 306-321 (1969).
1967
Franck, Robert. L'analyse du langage et les jugements moraux dans l’œuvre de R.M.Hare, adaptation en français de A.R.Dilanni, "R.M.Hare's Linguistic Analysis of Moral Judgments", inédit. In: Revue philosophique de Louvain, , no.65, p. 281-331 (1967).
1967
Franck, Robert. Les Excuses, adaptation en français, précédée d'une introduction, de John L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses". In: Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, , no.4, p. 414-445 (1967).
1966
Franck, Robert. Deux interprétations de la méthode de Jean Nabert. In: Revue philosophique de Louvain, Vol. -, no.64, p. 416-435 (1966).
1966
Franck, Robert. Deux interprétations de la méthode de Jean Nabert. In: Revue philosophique de Louvain, , no.64, p. 416-435 (1966).
1966
Franck, Robert. La philosophie et l'analyse du langage ordinaire, adaptation en français, précédée d'une introduction, de Gilbert Ryle, "Ordinary Language". In: Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, , no.3, p. 257-276 (1966).
1965
Franck, Robert. Les traits fondamentaux de la méthode de Jean Nabert. In: Revue philosophique de Louvain, , no.63, p. 97-115 (1965).
2002
The Explanatory Power of Models, Bridging the Gap between Empirical and Theoretical Research in the Social Sciences, éd. Franck, Robert (Methodos Series; Vol. 1), Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, Boston, London, 2002. 320 p p.
1998
Franck, Robert. L'insertion dans le milieu des pratiques de santé mentale. Risques et pertinence, La Pioche : Charleroi, 1998. 1-14 p.
1995
Les sciences et la philosophie: quatorze essais de rapprochement, éd. Franck, Robert, J. Vrin - IIEE: Paris, Lyon, 1995. 289 p p.
1994
Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L’explication causale dans les sciences humaines, éd. Franck, Robert, J. Vrin - IIEE: Paris, Lyon, 1994. 464 p p.
1990
Franck, Robert. Le diagnostic clinique est-il conciliable avec de vraies alternatives en santé mentale? (Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques; 16 - p. 37-44), 1990.
1984
Franck, Robert. La signification éthique d'une discipline scientifique réside dans les rapports qu'elle établit entre soi, les objets, le langage et autrui", Justifications de l'éthique. Actes du XIXe Congrès des Sociétés de Philosophie de langue française, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles: Bruxelles, 1984. 185-192 p.
1968
Franck, Robert. Théorie de la connaissance, Librairie universitaire Uystspruyt: Leuven, 1968. 87 p p.
2018
Jakub Bijak ; Daniel Courgeau ; Franck, Robert ; Eric Silverman. Modelling in demography : from statistics to simulation.. In: Eric Silverman, Methodological Investigations in Agent-Based Modelling., Springer, 2018.
2016
Courgeau, Daniel ; Bijak, Jakub ; Franck, Robert ; Silverman, Eric. Model based demography: towards a research agenda. In: Jan van Bavel and André Grow (Eds), Agent Based Modelling in Population Studies – Concepts, Methods, and Applications (Agent-Based Modelling in Population Studies - Concepts, Methods, and Applications,; Chapter 2), 2016. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-32283-4_2.
2015
Franck, Robert. Faut-il se défaire des connaissances vulgaires dans la recherche ?. In: B. Walliser (Dir.), La distinction des savoirs, Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS): Paris, 2015, p. 297 -309.
2014
Silverman, Eric ; Franck, Robert ; Bijak, Jakub ; Courgeau, Daniel. Advancing social simulation: lessons from demography. In: Hiroki Samaya, John Rieffel, Sebastian Risi, René Doursat, Hod Lipson (Eds.), Artificial Life 14, 2014.
2011
Franck, Robert. Preface to Deirdre Pratt. In: Modelling Written Communication, A New Systems Approach to Modelling in the Social Sciences, (Methodos Series; 8), Springer, 2011, p. 226. 9789048198436.
2009
Franck, Robert. Allier l’investigation empirique et la recherche théorique : une priorité. In: B. Walliser (Dir.), La cumulativité du savoir en sciences sociales, Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS): Paris, 2009, p. 57-84.
2007
Franck, Robert. Peut-on accroître le pouvoir explicatif des modèles en économie? . In: A. Leroux, P. Livet (dir.), Leçons de philosophie économique, Economica: T.III Paris , 2007.
2004
Franck, Robert. Introduction. Modelling is the Key to Science. In: M. Negrotti (Ed.), Yearbook of the Artificial, vol.2 Models in Contemporary Science, Peter Lang: Bern/Berlin/Bruxelles/Frankfurt a.M./New York/ Oxford/Wien , 2004, p. 9-21.
2003
Franck, Robert. Causal analysis, systems analysis and multilevel analysis : philosophy and epistemology. In: Methodology and Epistemology of Multilevel Analysis, Approaches from different social sciences, (Methodos Series ; Vol. 2), D. Courgeau: Dordrecht/Boston/London : Kluwer Academic Publishers , 2003, p. 175-198.
2002
Franck, Robert. Conclusions of Part I, Statistical Modelling and the Need for Theory. In: Robert Franck (Ed.), The Explanatory Power of Models (Methodos Series ; Vol.1), Kluwer Academic Publishers : Dordrecht/Boston/London , 2002, p. 87-100.
2002
Franck, Robert. Conclusions of Part II, Computer simulation and the Reverse Engineering Method. In: Robert Franck (Ed.), The Explanatory Power of Models (Methodos Series ; Vol.1), Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht/Boston/London, 2002, p. 141-146.
2002
Franck, Robert. Conclusions of Part III, Models and Theory. In: Robert Franck (Ed.), The Explanatory Power of Models (Methodos Series ; Vol.1), Kluwer Academic Publishers : Dordrecht/Boston/London , 2002, p. 229-239.
2002
Franck, Robert. Conclusions of Part IV, Epistemological Landmarks. In: Robert Franck (Ed.), The Explanatory Power of Models (Methodos Series ; Vol.1), Kluwer Academic Publishers : Dordrecht/Boston/London , 2002, p. 285-294.
2002
Franck, Robert. General Conclusion. In: Robert Franck (Ed.), The Explanatory Power of Models, Bridging the Gap between Empirical and Theoretical Research in the Social Sciences (Methodos Series; Vol.1), Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht/Boston/London, 2002, p. 295-299.
2002
Franck, Robert. General Introduction. In: Robert Franck (Ed.), The Explanatory Power of Models, Bridging the Gap between Empirical and Theoretical Research in the Social Sciences (Methodos Series; Vol.1), Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht/Boston/London, 2002, p. 1-8.
2001
Franck, Robert. Histoire et structure. In: J.M. Bethelot (Dir.), Epistémologie des sciences sociales, Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 2001, p. 317-356.
1997
Franck, Robert. Faut-il deux principes explicatifs différents pour comprendre l'évolution?. In: J.M. Exbrayat et J. Flatin (Dir.), L'évolution biologique. Science, histoire, philosophie?, J.Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1997, p. 559-566.
1997
Franck, Robert. Synthèse et Conclusions. In: J.M. Exbrayat et J. Flatin (Dir.), L'évolution biologique. Science, histoire, philosophie?, J.Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1997, p. 635-659.
1995
Franck, Robert. Synthèse et conclusions. In: Robert Franck (Dir.), Les sciences et la philosophie : quatorze essais de rapprochement, J.Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1995, p. 253-289.
1994
Franck, Robert. Ce que dit Hegel de l'objectivité des sciences et du rôle de l'analyse causale. In: Robert Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J.Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 213-222.
1994
Conclusions de la Deuxième Partie, éd. Franck, Robert. In: R. Franck (Dir), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison ? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J. Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 303-316.
1994
Conclusions de la Première Partie, éd. Franck, Robert. In: R. Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 156-161.
1994
Conclusions finales, éd. Franck, Robert. In: R. Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J. Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 421.
1994
Franck, Robert. Deux approches inattendues de la causalité: Aristote et les Stoïciens. In: Robert Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J.Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 166-182.
1994
Introduction générale, éd. Franck, Robert. In: Robert Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J.Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 1-18.
1994
Introduction à la Deuxième Partie : La nature de l'explication causale, éd. Franck, Robert. In: R. Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison ? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 164-165.
1994
Franck, Robert. Introduction à la Première Partie : L’interprétation causale des relations statistique ; le rôle de la théorie et de l’intuition. In: Robert Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J.Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 1-18. 978-2-7116-9810-3.
1994
Introduction à la Troisième Partie : une science de la singularité et du changement est-elle possible ?, éd. Franck, Robert. In: R. Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J. Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 319.
1994
Franck, Robert. Les explications causale, fonctionnelle, systémique ou structurale, et dialectique, sont-elles complémentaires?. In: Robert Franck (Dir.), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines, J.Vrin - IIEE: Paris-Lyon, 1994, p. 275-302.
1993
Franck, Robert. Actes des Journées d'étude : "Psychiatrie, interventions ambulatoires et hospitalières : quelles évaluations ?". In: Recherche-Action sur la Psychiatrie et les alternatives (revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques; 23), 1993, p. 139-144.
1993
Franck, Robert. Quels modèles pour évaluer la qualité du travail en psychiatrie?. In: Actes des Journées d'étude 'Psychiatrie, interventions ambulatoires et hospitalières : quelles évaluations?', organisées par l'Autre 'lieu' (Recherche-Action sur la Psychiatrie et les alternatives; 23). Bruxelles, 1993, p. 67-68 (Accepté/Sous presse).
1991
Franck, Robert. Faut-il trouver aux causes une raison ?. In: Faut-il trouver aux causes une raison? (Revue philosophique de Louvain; 89/4e série 84), 1991, p. 659-665.
1985
Franck, Robert. Auto/auto. Micro/macro", Systèmes technologiques et autogestion . In: G. Thill, P. Kemp, V. Muljevic (Dir.), Auto/auto. Micro/macro", Systèmes technologiques et autogestion, Presses universitaires de Namur: Namur, 1985, p. 169-195.
1985
Franck, Robert. La psychiatrie et le droit sont-ils conciliables?", Malades mentaux : patients ou sujets de droit? . In: J. Gillardin, La psychiatrie et le droit sont-ils conciliables?", Malades mentaux : patients ou sujets de droit?, Publications des Facultés universitaires St Louis: Bruxelles, 1985, p. 61-68.
1979
Franck, Robert. Knowledge and Opinions. In: Helga Nowotny and Hilary Rose (Eds.) Counter-movements ine the Sciences, The Sociology of the Alternatives to Big Science, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979, 39-56.
1977
Franck, Robert. Le savoir et les opinions. In: Hilary Rose, Steven Rose (Dir.) L'idéologie de/dans la science, Editions du Seuil, Seuil: Paris, 1977, 243-264.
2014
Franck, Robert ; Silverman, Eric ; Bijak, Jakub ; Courgeau, Daniel. System – based modelling : a new paradigm for demography ?. Leuven ABM Workshop, 2014 (Leuven).
2011
Franck, Robert. Induction et axiomatisation. Congrès de l’Académie Européenne Interdisciplinaire des Sciences (AEIS). Objet : Théories et modèles en sciences sociales (Paris, du 28/11/2011 au 29/11/2011).
2005
Franck, Robert. Quel rôle faut-il réserver aux structures sociales dans l’explication ?. The XXV International Population Conference - , paper uploaded to the IUSSP Conference website (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population) (Tours, du 18/07/2005 au 23/07/2005).
1998
Franck, Robert. Introduction. Comment rapprocher l’investigation empirique et la recherche théorique dans les sciences sociales ?. Colloque du Centre Methodos (du 14/11/1998 au 16/11/1998).
1998
Franck, Robert. L’insertion dans le milieu des pratiques de santé mentale. Risques et pertinence. Actes de la Journée d'étude du Centre de Santé Mentale La Pioche (Charleroi, 1998).
1997
Franck, Robert ; Anne-Marie Aish. Models : the link between theory and empirical research. Fourth International Social Science Methodology Conference (University of Essex, du 1 July 1996 au 5 July 1996).
1997
Franck, Robert. When is a model analytical?. XIVième Congrès Mondial de Sociologie, RC33 Session 7 : Explanatory Power of Models (1997).
1996
Franck, Robert ; Aish, Anne-Marie . Models : the link between theory and empirical research. Fourth International Social Science Methodology Conference (University of Essex, du 01/07/1996 au 05/07/1996).
1993
Franck, Robert. Actes des Journées d'étude : "Psychiatrie, interventions ambulatoires et hospitalières : quelles évaluations ?. In: Recherche-Action sur la Psychiatrie et les alternatives (revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques), Vol. -, no.23, p. 139-144 (1993).
1993
Franck, Robert. Propositions pour le travail des Ateliers sur l'évaluation des besoins, et sur l'évaluation de la qualité du travail en psychiatrie. Actes des Journées d'étude 'Psychiatrie, interventions ambulatoires et hospitalières : quelles évaluations?' (L'Autre 'lieu', Recherche-Action sur la Psychiatrie et les alternatives, Bruxelles). In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, Vol. -, no.23, p. 139-144 (1993).
1993
Franck, Robert. Quels modèles pour évaluer la qualité du travail en psychiatrie ? Synthèse des travaux. Actes des Journées d'étude 'Psychiatrie, interventions ambulatoires et hospitalières : quelles évaluations?' (L'Autre 'lieu' Recherche-Action sur la Psychiatrie et les alternatives, Bruxelles). In: Perspectives, revue sur les enjeux sociaux des pratiques psychologiques, , no.23, p. 67-78 (1993).
1984
Franck, Robert. La signification éthique d'une discipline scientifique réside dans les rapports qu'elle établit entre soi, les objets, le langage et autrui", Justifications de l'éthique. Justifications de l'éthique. In: Actes du XIXe Congrès des Sociétés de Philosophie de langue française, Vol. -, no.-, p. 185-192 (1984).
1964
Franck, Robert. Existence et raison : étude de la philosophie de Jean Nabert, prom. : Wylleman, A., 1964.
2013
Franck, Robert. Analyse politique du Comité Afghanistan Belgique/België 1979-1989 (Contribution Mémoire d’Histoire Contemporaine, mars 2013; ), 2013.
2004
Franck, Robert. La Semantic Approach selon Frederick Suppe : sept solutions majeures, une interrogation (II). Séminaire d'épistémologie des sciences sociales sous la direction de Jean-Michel Berthelot, Paris, 09.05.04, 2004.
2004
Franck, Robert. L’approche sémantique des théories scientifiques (I) (Séminaire d'épistémologie des sciences sociales, 17.02.04; ), 2004.
2002
Franck, Robert. Réhabiliter l’induction ? Bacon, Galilée, Descartes, Newton (Séminaire d'épistémologie des sciences sociales sous la direction de Jean-Michel Berthelot, Paris, 30.04.02; ), 2002.
1999
Franck, Robert. Comment construire un modèle réaliste ? (Séminaire de philosophie des sciences, I.S.P.; ), 1999.
1997
Franck, Robert. Atomisme. Holisme. Hylémorphisme (Séminaire de philosophie des sciences de l’homme, I.S.P; ), 1997.
1997
Franck, Robert. Inventaire des déterminations selon M. Bunge (Séminaire de philosophie des sciences de l’homme, I.S.P.; ), 1997.
1997
Franck, Robert. Typologie des relations de cause à effet établie par Guillaume Wunsch (Séminaire de philosophie des sciences de l’homme, I.S.P.; ), 1997.
1993
Franck, Robert. Pourquoi enseigner la philosophie à la Faculté des Sciences ? (Introduction à l’enseignement de la philosophie; ), 1993.
1974
Franck, Robert. Notes provisoires sur l'autonomie relative du droit, 1974.