12h45 - 14h 
D.041 Batîment Dupriez 
Mardi intime de la Chaire Hoover par Samuel Dishaw

Many decisions that materially affect the lives of people are made by algorithms. Some of these algorithms are opaque, in the sense that we cannot explain why they arrived at a decision. Those on the receiving end of these decisions object to the lack of explanation. What, if anything, is the moral basis of their objection? 

I consider two prominent views as to why opaque decision-making is objectionable. The first emphasizes our interest in self-advocacy, and the instrumental contribution of explanations to this interest (Vredenburgh 2022). The second draws on the notion of public reason, which requires rules to be public and acceptable to all. Neither account, I argue, provides a sound basis for the objection to opaque decision-making: opaque algorithms may very well promote our interests more effectively than transparent ones, and the decision to rely on them may be justified from the point of view of public reason. 

I then develop an alternative account of the moral objection to opaque decision-making, which centers on the right to a justification. I specify my account by answering two questions: when do we have a right to a justification, and what does it entitle us to? I argue that we have, at minimum, a right to a justification whenever any of our other rights is infringed, and that we are, in such circumstances, entitled to the particular reasons why that infringement was justified. Relying on opaque algorithms precludes the provision of such a justification. That is the moral basis for objecting to their use.