09 janvier 2018
10h00
Louvain-la-Neuve
DOYEN 21
Le Recteur de l'Université catholique de Louvain fait savoir que
Mr. François Randour
soutiendra publiquement sa dissertation pour l'obtention du titre de Docteur en Sciences Politiques et Sociales
‘Defining and explaining the negotiation autonomy of Austrian, Belgian and German federal executives in the Council of the European Union vis-à-vis their domestic parliaments: an outcome oriented, case specific and qualitative comparative analysis’
Summary:
The doctoral dissertation examines in a comparative perspective the negotiation autonomy of the Austrian, Belgian and German federal executives in the Council of the European Union vis-à-vis their domestic parliaments. More precisely, it aims at explaining to what extent, how and why regional and national parliamentary actors scrutinise EU decision-making processes, as well as the consequences for the negotiation autonomy of federal executives. The doctoral dissertation defends two main theoretical (and empirical) arguments. First, the dissertation shows that in federal Member States, the scrutiny of EU affairs conducted by regional parliaments also matters! It is the combined actions of national and regional parliaments (the parliamentary system) that explain the degree of negotiation autonomy of federal executives. Second, the study also demonstrates that a high level of activity of domestic parliaments does not automatically translate to a decrease in the autonomy of executive. Phrased differently, it is not only the quantity of actions that matters, but well the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny.
The doctoral thesis presents original empirical data on four legislative decision-making processes (period 2009-2014) in the environmental policy sector, a competence that is in part regionalised in Austria, Belgium and Germany. The study uses the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method and examines how the following five variables impact on the negotiation autonomy of federal executives: (1) the preference homogeneity between federal executives and domestic parliaments, (2) the cohesion of the domestic parliamentary system, (3) the existence of an informational asymmetry in favour of the federal executives, (4) the domestic salience of the EU decision-making process, and finally, (5) the impact of the implementing powers of domestic actors.
Overall, the results show that federal executives enjoy an important level of autonomy of negotiation vis-à-vis their domestic parliaments. In addition, the degree of autonomy of executives in EU affairs is to a large extent country-specific, with the Austrian and Belgian executives enjoying a high degree of autonomy in EU negotiations whereas the German executive has less room of manoeuver vis-à-vis its domestic parliaments. Indeed, it is not only the quantity of parliamentary scrutiny that matters, but also the quality of the scrutiny process. Finally, the level of autonomy of federal executives is also closely bound to the presence or absence of homogenous preferences and of the salience of EU decision-making processes.
Membres du jury :
Professeur David Aubin (UCL), Président
Professeur Peter Bursens (University of Antwerp)
Professeur Tapio Raunio (University of Tampere)
Professeur Olivier Rozenberg (SciencesPo)
Professeure Nathalie Schiffino-Leclercq (UCL), Secrétaire