Brown Bag Seminar: Sylvain Funck

This paper studies a model of matchings where each individual can be either single or part of a couple. In addition, we assume that each agent is farsighted. This means that she can anticipate which deviations from the other agents her action could trigger. This assumption differs from the common assumption that agents are myopic and cannot anticipate the consequences of their decisions.
We use the concept of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable set to capture matchings stability with such agents. We study the composition of these sets and show that a singleton is vNM farsightedly stable if and only if it is a stable matching. It means that the matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents are farsighted. Finally, we provide examples of vNM farsightedly stable sets with 3 elements in markets with and without stable matchings.

Please fill the doodle by Tuesday, April 23rd at noon if you plan to attend and mention whether you would like a sandwich: