OR Seminar - Hugo Gilbert

Hugo Gilbert (Université Paris Dauphine).
Invited by Daniele Catanzaro

will give a presentation on :

On the Computation of Strategyproof and Fair Picking Sequences

Abstract : 

When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships (also known as non-interleaving picking sequences): given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated agent chooses a given number of items (depending on her position in the sequence). With these rules, agents who come earlier in the sequence have a larger choice of items. However, this advantage can be compensated by a higher number of items received by those who come later. How to balance priority in the sequence and number of items received is a nontrivial question. 
In this presentation, we use a model parameterized by a mapping from ranks to scores, a social welfare functional, and a distribution over preference profiles. For several meaningful choices of parameters, we show that an optimal sequence can be computed exactly in polynomial time or approximated by resorting to sampling.  

Joint work with Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang, and Guillaume Méroué.

  Hugo Gilbert