Mich "How Should We Distribute Cooperative Tasks? A Case for the Difference Principle in Work Distribution"

Mardi intime de la Chaire Hoover par Juan Olano

Opportunities for fruitful cooperation are unequally distributed across society. How should we allocate these opportunities? While Rawls’ theory of justice, which defines justice as fair terms of cooperation, seems well-suited to address this question, it does not directly do so. This paper aims to fill that gap by using the example of how we might distribute tasks when preparing dinner together. First, it proposes a redefinition of cooperation to avoid the circularity between identifying who the cooperators are and what the fair terms of cooperation entail, which makes it difficult to assess someone’s exclusion from cooperative tasks as unjust under Rawls’ framework. The new, inclusive definition breaks this circularity, allowing for a clearer discussion of how cooperative tasks should be distributed and how principles of justice apply to the cooperative process itself. Second, I argue that Rawls’ principles of Equal Basic Liberty and Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) are inadequate. The Principle of Equal Basic Liberty is too rigid, as it disallows trade-offs that could benefit the least advantaged. FEO, while addressing equality of opportunity, wrongly ties task allocation to talent—a morally arbitrary criterion. The Difference Principle, however, provides the right framework: it permits inequalities in task distribution only if they benefit the least advantaged, aligning with our intuitions in the dinner model. Philosophically, this suggests that job distribution should aim to promote equality. Institutionally, this calls for hiring practices that prioritise the less advantaged, starting with equally qualified candidates and paving the way for more complex cases, where the less advantaged might be favoured even when less talented.