"Post Darwinian Societies Seminar" #4

"Games, Rules and Cultural Evolution"

Alessandro CIGNO (Université de Florence)

A species or society’s survival depends as much on its members’ ability to cooperate among themselves, as on their ability to reproduce faster than potential invaders. Both the biological and the economic literatures on cultural evolution lay great stress on the evolutionary stability of strategies and preferences conducive to cooperation, but pay little attention to the role of precommitment via contracts, rules and institutions. Besides, the economic literature pays little attention to the role of sexual reproduction in the evolution of cultural traits. Reproduction is typically either out of the picture, or asexual. If it is sexual, equilibrium is typically homogamous. In any case, no evolution can come from it. Today’s conversation addresses both these issues by examining the role of family rules and social norms in fostering cooperative behaviour, and highlighting their effects on the evolution of individual preferences.